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INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a condemnation action by the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") to acquire property owned by Admiral Beverage Corporation 
("Admiral") as part of UDOT's project to reconstruct Interstate 15 ("1-15") in Salt Lake 
City. The matter is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and the issues presented have 
been fully briefed and heard by the Court. Subsequently, the Court requested 
supplemental briefing and rehearing on the issue of whether the decision in Ivers v. Utah 
Dep 't of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802 ("Ivers") should be overruled on 
constitutional grounds. 
The Ivers decision held that severance damages in a condemnation action were 
recoverable for impacts caused to a property for loss of view, but not for loss of visibility. 
The decision's ruling on loss of visibility contravenes the constitutional protections of 
just compensation afforded to landowners who must endure the involuntary taking of 
their property by the government. The Ivers decision should be overruled. 
The Ivers decision is constitutionally infirm in three regards: First, it ignores long-
standing Utah eminent domain laws and fails to recognize a constitutional "taking" where 
governmental actions constitute a substantial interference with property or cause a 
material decrease in the property's value or the landowner's right to use and enjoy his 
property. Second, it fails to provide landowners with the constitutionally required award 
of just compensation for damages stemming from such interference, diminution in value, 
and impairment of the use and enjoyment of the property by not putting the landowner in 
-1-
as good a position monetarily as he would have been in but-for the taking. Third, the 
Ivers decision denies a landowner the ability to obtain the full measure of just 
compensation by precluding the landowner from presenting evidence of all factors that 
bear on the market value of the land after the taking of his property, the severance of his 
land, and the damages caused to his property. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Admiral5s property was taken "in 
connection" with the UDOT's 1-15 Project and was an integral and essential part of the 
Project. (R. at 493, 673, 678, 684, and Supreme Court Oral Argument, Hr'g. Tr. at p. 10, 
11. 2-10. p. 16,11. 16-18. (Nov. 5, 2009)) ("It [the relocation of 500West] meets the 
integrated project requirement."; "For purposes of this motion in limine, we agreed that it 
was an essential part of the project.") (Addendum Tab D).1 As part of the Project, UDOT 
elevated 1-15 by approximately 28 feet and consequently, the Project substantially 
impaired the market value of the remaining portion of Admiral's property. (R. at 494). 
In particular, the Project has significantly obstructed the visibility of and view from 
Admiral's property, resulting in a depreciated market value to the remainder, a substantial 
1
 During oral argument before the Court, counsel for UDOT w7as asked whether the 
relocation of 500 West "was part of the integrated project for which this property was 
taken. Hr'g. Tr., p. 10,11. 2-3 (Addendum Tab D). In response, counsel stated "[i]t is, 
yes." Id. at p. 10,11. 6-7. Then, the Court queried whether "to the extent, though, that 
we're applying the Ivers standard that says it's part of the integrated project, it meets that 
requirement? Id. at p. 10,11. 6-8. Counsel without qualification stated, "[i]t meets the 
integrated project requirement." Id. at p. 10,11. 9-10. Counsel further stated that "[f]or 
the purposes of this motion in limine, we agreed that it wras an essential part of the 
project." Id. at 16,11. 16-18. 
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impairment to Admiral's use and enjoyment of the property, which amounts to a "taking" 
for which just compensation is owed under Utah's eminent domain law. Finally, because 
the district court excluded any and all evidence of loss of visibility and loss of view 
damages from its consideration of market value for severance damages, Admiral has been 
denied the just compensation to which it is entitled to under the Utah Constitution. 
The Ivers decision regarding loss of visibility runs afoul of the constitutional 
mandate that just compensation be paid when private property is "taken or damaged" for 
public use and should be overruled.2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued on 
November 28, 2008. Dep't of Tramp, v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App 426, 
198 P.3d 1003. Admiral timely filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 29, 
2008, which this Court granted on April 14, 2009. The matter is now before the Court on 
rehearing pursuant to the Court's June 23, 2010 Order for Supplemental Briefing and 
Rehearing. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2
 Admiral does not challenge the Ivers decision on the issue of loss of view, nor does it 
contend that this portion of the Ivers decision violates Utah's constitution. However, 
Admiral maintains its position that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted and misapplied 
the Ivers decision on the loss of view issue. If the decision is properly read and the 
clearly-stated standard for loss of view damages is appropriately applied to the facts of 
this case—particularly with UDOT's admission that the relocation of 500 West was 
essential for and integral to the 1-15 Project for purposes of the Ivers standard—loss of 
-3-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Court framed the issue for supplemental briefing and rehearing as "whether 
Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (UT 2007) [(;;Ivers")] should 
be overruled on constitutional grounds." Order for Supplemental Briefing and Rehearing 
(Addendum Tab A). Of the two rulings in Ivers—that severance damages are not 
recoverable in condemnation actions for loss of visibility, but they are available for loss 
of view—Admiral only contests the portion of the Ivers decision relating to the Court's 
denial of severance damages based upon loss of visibility.3 Accordingly, the issues on 
Ivers' loss of visibility ruling are as follows: 
(cont 'd) 
view damages should be awarded to Admiral, with the single question remaining of the 
amount of the award. 
3
 As noted in the footnote above, Admiral limits its challenge to the loss of visibility rule 
announced in Ivers premised upon the understanding that this Court will render the 
proper interpretation and application of the Ivers loss of view rule, which was 
subsequently reaffirmed in Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583 
{"Ivers IF) (holding that "[w]hen land is condemned as part of a single project—even if 
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was 
condemned—if the use of the condemned property is essential to the completion of the 
project as a whole, the property owner is entitled to severance damages."). 
Notably, the Utah Court of Appeals decision in the present case failed to apply the proper 
standard for damages for loss of view in accordance with Ivers. Dep 't ofTransp. v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App. 426, ffif 3-5, P.3d 1003, 1004. Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals' decision improperly applied the "abutment rule," when that rule w7as 
neither applied, nor referenced in either Ivers or Ivers II. Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals decision should be considered as effectively nullified - if not tacitly overruled -
in light of this Court's subsequent reaffirmation of the proper standard for the loss of 
view rule in Ivers II. Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, If 14 (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, % 21). 
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1. Whether the r uling in 1 vers denying se\ erance damages to landowners for 
impairments and impacts arising from a loss of visibility of the properly violates the 
constitutional mandate under the Utah Constitution requiring that "private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art. 
I, § 22 (emphasis added). 
2. Whether the hers decision denying severance damages for loss of visibility 
violates the constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid when the loss of 
visibility results in a substantial interference with private property that destroys or 
materially lessens its v ah le, or by w hich the owner's right to its I lse and enjoyment is 
substantially abridged or destroyed. 
3. Whether the hers decision violates the constitutional requirement that the 
lando wxiei' be paid the full 1 measure of just compensation w hich includes the depreciation 
of the fair market value of the remainder property. 
4. Whether the hers decision violates the constitutional requirement that the 
landowner be paid the full measure of just compensation when the Court improperly 
precluded the landowner from presenting evidence of a ] 1 factors bearing on the property's 
market value, including loss of visibility and the diminution of the market value of the 
property. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation and application of case law is a question of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339. 346 (Utah 1996) 
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("[W]e consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a 
question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness/'). 
Moreover, this Court reviews constitutional challenges for correctness. State v. Johnson, 
2009 UT App. 382, % 18, 224 P.3d 720 ("Appellate courts review constitutional 
challenges for correctness.") (quoting State v. Sheperd, 1999 UT App 205, % 8, 989 P.2d 
503 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted in original). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Utah Constitution, art. I, § 22. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2); § 78B-6-512. 
3. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 
4. Ivers v. Utah Dep 't of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. 
5. Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583 fivers IF) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE 
I. Factual Background Of The Case. 
Admiral incorporates by reference its prior Statement of the Case into this brief, 
and therefore only provides a brief summary of recent factual developments which have 
occurred since the completion of the parties" briefing and oral argument. 
In the original condemnation action, UDOT sought to acquire a portion of 
Admiral's property as part of the reconstruction of 1-15 in Salt Lake City (the "Projecf). 
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(R. at 11-20).4 UDO I: s I- ] 5 reconstruction Project involved not only construction work 
on the Interstate high;v\ a\ ., but also requi red the w idening and relocating of 500 '\;lv est, 
which served as a frontage road to 1-15 and is owned by Salt Lake City. (R. at 493-94). 
Admiral owns two lots located directly west of 1-15 and bordering on 500 West. 
(R. at 494), A portion of Admiral5s property was required for the 1-15 Project, (R at TI-
TS) \ dmiral's property 'was physically used for the relocation and reconstruction of 500 
West. There is no dispute that the taking of Admiral's property was necessary and 
essential for the 1-15 Project. (R, at 673, 678, 684; see Admiral Reply Br. at 9 (Utah Ct. 
App., Sept. 1 7, 2008)). 
During oral argument and on ' - *\, -*J s : >:•-*- <. • ' > --*• •* v;. .• *i-e 
widening of 500 West was essential and "integral" to UDOT's I-15 Project - an 
admission that triggers the standards set forth in Ivers, 2007 Ul ° Supreme Court Oral 
Argument, Hrg ' l\ .... -,::* :^ **. • t.e 
exchange between this Court and counsel for UDOT: 
21 MR. BURNETT: May it please The Court, first 
22 a correction. Fifth West is, was, continues to be a 
23 Salt Lake City-owned street. Yes, the Department of 
24 Transportation, as part of the 1-15 remodeling, did 
25 move a purchased property so as to remake Fifth West 
10 
1 :,)rV;,. ^ . -. ity. 
4
 See Admiral's Opening Brief for full discussion of the ownership history of the ^ r^eny 
at issue in this case. (Admiral's Opening Br. 2-3.). 
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2 THE COURT: It was part of the integrated 
3 project for which this property was taken? 
4 MR. BURNETT: It is, yes. But the road 
5 itself is owned by Salt Lake. 
6 THE COURT: But to the extent, though, that 
7 wefre applying the Ivers standard that says it's part 
8 of the integrated project, it meets that requirement? 
9 MR. BURNETT: It meets the integrated 
10 project requirement 
Id. at p. 9,11. 21-25, p. 10,11. 1-10 (emphasis added). In addition, the following 
discussion between the Court and counsel for UDOT was had, whereby counsel admitted 
that the widening of 500 West was "an essential part of the project:" 
16 
14 Because if you had not widened Fifth West, 
15 could you have raised the freeway? 
16 MR. BURNETT: No. For the purposes of this 
17 motion in limine, we agreed that it was an essential 
18 part of the project. 
Id. at 16,11. 16-18 (emphasis added). 
The 1-15 Project involved elevating the reconstructed highway, which increased 
the height of the roadway and its abutting wall to a height of approximately 28 feet above 
Admiral's property and about 6 inches outside the prior southeast corner of its property. 
(R. at 181, 494-95). As part of its claim for just compensation, Admiral sought several 
types of severance damages caused to its property, including damages for loss of 
visibility and loss of view. (R. at 494). Admiral's claims for damages were supported by 
Admiral's expert appraiser, who had appraised the property and assessed the impacts of 
the taking on the fair market value of the property. (Id.) Based upon his analysis and 
-8-
conclusions, UDOT's taking caused substantial damage to Admiral's property, including 
a significant depreciation in the market \ ah le of the remaining property. (Id.) 
II. Procedural Background Of The Case, 
Admiral's outline of the procedural background of this case in its Statement of the 
Case is Incorporated herein b)< reference V brief summar> of the ea>c ana mv. aeiaiis o: 
recent: procedural developments since the completion of the pa rties' briefing are provided 
herein. 
Procedurally, this case is on appeal from the district court's grant of UDOT's 
motions in limine to excli ide evidence of Admiral's severance damages, specifically its 
damages for loss of view and loss of visibility. (Minute Entry, Consolidated Case No. 
970905361CD and 970905368CD (Dec. 27, 2007) (R.866) (Addendum Tab C) 
(affirming Memorandum Decision and Order (Oct. 31, 2005) (Addendum I ab B) (R at 
492.500))). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling on November 28, 2008. 
Dep't ofTransp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UTApp. 426.. fflj 3-5. The Utah 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 1 7., 2009. and af ter being fully briefed on the 
issues presented, the Court heard oral argument on November 55 2009. Following oral 
argument, on June 23, 2010, the Court issued an Order for Supplemental Briefing and 
Rehearing on the issue of "whether hers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P 3d 
802 (UT 2007) should be overruled on con stiti itional grounds."!" Order for Supplemental 
Briefing and Rehearing (Addendum Tab A). 
.9. 
Since the Court granted certiorari in this matter, the Ivers case has twice returned 
to the Utah Supreme Court on appeal. In April 2009, the Court took up the case on 
appeal for a second time, and in August 2009, it issued its decision in "Tvers IIP Utah 
Dep 't of Tramp, v. hers. 2009 UT 56 fivers IP). 
The Court in Ivers //reaffirmed its prior ruling on loss of view and concluded that 
the district court both exceeded the scope of the remand order issued in Ivers and 
misinterpreted the statute by allowing the amendment of pleadings following the entry of 
the Final Order of Condemnation and remand. Id. at ^ 20, 27. In its analysis of the 
scope of remand issue, the Court re-affirmed its prior ruling in Ivers that "severance 
damages are awardable for the loss of view—even if the view-impairing structure is not 
built on the condemned land—if the 'condemned property is essential to the completion 
of the project as a whole/" Id. at \ 14 (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, j^ 21). It further 
concluded that when UDOT admitted that the partial taking of the Arby's property was 
essential to the completion of the construction project, all that was left for the district 
court to do was to award Arby's appropriate severance damages. Id. 
On remand the case proceeded to trial on April 13-15, 2010, on the issue of 
Arby's claim for severance damages resulting from the obstruction built by UDOT. 
(Addendum Tab F. Attach. A & C.) The jury declined to award Arby's severance 
damages based upon loss of view—despite the fact that Arby's suffered such losses as a 
result of UDOT's actions. (Id.) Arby's has once again appealed the results from the trial 
court proceedings. (Addendum Tab F, Attach. B.) 
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III. Factual and Procedural Background Olivers v. Utah Dep't of Tramp. 
Because the issue presently before the Coi u: t in\ Dives the constit utionalit} of the 
decision in Ivers, 2007 U T 19, a detailed discussion of the Cour t ' s decision, analysis and 
reasoning is warranted. 
rI hzlvers ease iiiv olved a condemnation ac tion by I J D O I ' as pai t of a highvv ay 
project to construct a frontage road adjacent to U.S. Highway 89 in Farmington, I Jtah. 
Ivers, 2007 U T 19, r r L 2. The frontage road construction was part of a larger project to 
improve Highway 89. ..
 ;:i its condemnation action, 1 DO I sought to acquire a portion 
of property belonging \c- !V doners (collectively referred to as " A rby's"). Id at (| 2. 
Similar to the present condemnation action, the property UDOT acquired in Ivers was 
used for the creation of the frontage road, and no portion of the raised highway, its 
footings, or its foundation w as constructed on Arb> ' 's c ondemned property. Id. at M\ f 3 
A spart of its claim for just compen sation A rb> 's son iglit severance damages 
resulting from the loss of visibility of its restaurant from the highway and the loss of view 
from the property. Id. at *[  5. Axby's argued that the loss of visibility and view materially 
diminished the market value of its remaining property. Id. 
In response, UDOT moved to exclude evidence of both the loss of visibility and 
view. Id. The district court granted UDOT's motion, and Arby's appealed. Id. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district cour rs decision Id. Arby"'s subsequently sought, 
and was granted, a writ of certiorari. 
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In Ivers, the Utah Supreme Court addressed two issues: First, "whether a 
landowner has a protectable property interest in the visibility of his land/' and second, 
whether severance damages are awardable for the loss of view where "land was 
condemned as part of a single project to build a structure that would impair the view from 
the remaining property, but in which that structure was not built on the severed land." Id. 
at ffij 11, 17; see Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, \ 5. On the first question, the Court concluded that 
landowners did not have a protected interest in the visibility of their property7 and 
affirmed the district court's grant of UDOT's motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
loss of visibility. Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ffif 12, 15; Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, \ 5. 
On the second question regarding loss of view, the Court announced for the first 
time that under Utah's eminent domain laws, 
[w]hen land is condemned as part of a single project—even if 
the view-impairing structure itself is built on property 
other than that which was condemned—if the use of the 
condemned property is essential to the completion of the 
property as a whole, the property owner is entitled to 
severance damages. 
Ivers, 2007 UT 19, f 21 (emphasis added). The Court's ruling expanded the prior 
law that limited severance damage awards to situations where the view-impairing 
structure is built directly on the condemned land and causes damage to the remainder 
property. Id. at % 16 (citing Utah State Rd Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 
1974); Utah Dep't of Trans, v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987) and Utah 
Dep 't ofTransp. v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107 % 10, 57 P.3d 1088)). 
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Under Ivers' new test for severance damages, when a view-impairing structure is 
constructed on property other than the condemned property, the land owner is entitled to 
severance damages for loss of view "if the i lse of the condemned property is essential to 
the completion of the project as a whole." Ivers, 2007 UT 19, ^  21 (emphasis added). 
The Court explained that the property is "essential" to the project if its use "is such a 
critical part of the project, tha t without the taking, the pt oject could not ha\ e been 
completed." Id. 
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that Arby's would be entitled to 
severance damages if the condemned property was "essential" to the project. Id. at Tj 24. 
However, the (\ »nrl was nnahlc lo detemiiha mi tha nauu'il before it whether the had 'n a> 
"essential to the project" and the Court remanded the case for a factual determination on 
that question. The Court specifically instructed the district court that if the condemned 
property \ub "essential" hi lite project, llien Ark *s was entitled to appropriate damages. 
Id at ffif 23, 24; see Ivers II, 2009 UT 56, ffi[ 1, 6. 
On remand, UDOT admitted that Arby's condemned property was essential to the 
project. Ivers, 2007 11 "1 I "^  ^ i <>. Despite that admission, the district court failed to 
determine or awrard \ rbyas damages, as ordered by the Supreme Cour t h / Instead, the 
district court permitted UDOT to argue for the first time on remand that (1) Arby's did 
not have a compensable right of view that would entitle it to severance damages because 
a prior deed executed by A rby's predecessors had relinquished to IJDO I ' all appurtenant 
rights, including the right of view; and (2) UDOT was allowed to amend its tale sr. •  V-- r 
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was no longer taking Arby's right of view as part of its condemnation action. Id. at ffl{ 6, 
7. The district court rejected UDOT's first argument, but agreed with its second one. Id. 
at \ 7. The district court then ruled that it no longer had jurisdiction over the issue 
because UDOT no longer claimed to take Arby's right of view and did not award Arby's 
damages for loss of view. Id. Arby's once again appealed the district court's decision. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court took up the case on appeal for a second time, and in 
August 2009, it issued its decision in "Ivers II" Utah Dep 7 ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 
56 ('Tvers IF). In the second appeal, the Court considered the issues of: 
"(1) whether the district court violated our mandate in Ivers I 
to determine whether Arby's condemned land was essential to 
the project and if so, award appropriate damages; (2) whether 
the district court misinterpreted Utah Code section 78B-6-512 
(2) to allow UDOT to amend its complaint at any time in 
order to exclude a property right from the original scope of its 
taking; and (3) whether UDOT's strategy of shifting theories 
warrants a change in the date of valuation." 
Id. at % 10. The Utah Supreme Court held that the district court exceeded the scope of the 
remand order in Ivers and that it misinterpreted the statute allowing for the amendment of 
pleadings following the entry of the Final Order of Condemnation and remand. Ivers II, 
2009 UT 56, THf 20, 27. The Court further concluded that UDOT had failed to preserve 
the valuation issue, and therefore the Court did not reach the issue on appeal. Id. at \ 30. 
The Court reversed the district court's order and once again remanded the case. Id. at f 
31. 
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In its anahsiv the ('ourt n>emphasi/ed its prioi ruling from Ivers that "severance 
damages are awardable for the loss of view—even if the vi<:\^  -impairing structure h. imi 
built on the condemned land—if the 'condemned property is essential to the completion 
of the project as a whv>:c. . . .•:.* ;4 • quoting Ivers, 2007 TTT 1Q. * 21). It further 
concluded"' ' ' | , : mm.*- • * ;• i\v p i ::.' .> - ^ m Vib) \s property was 
essential to the completion of the construction project, all that was left for the district 
court to do was to award Arby's the appropriate severance damages. Id. 
On the second remand back to the district court.., the case proceeded to trial on 
April 13-15, 2010, with respect to Arby's claim, for se\ i/nince damages resulting from the 
obstruction built by UDOT, (Addendum Tab F? Attach. A). The jury declined to award 
Arby's severance damages based upon loss of view—despite the fact Arby's suffered 
such losses as;nrsiiIf nfULK ) Ts actions i 'n i Aih\ I ia> once again appealed the 
results from the trial court proceedings. (Id. Tab F, Attach. B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Ivers decision and its holding that severance damages for loss of visibility are 
not compensable—despite the impacts caused by such loss on the remainder property and 
the resulting depreciation in the landowner's property—deprive landowners, such as 
Admiral, of their constitutional guarantees and their right to receive just compensation.3 
3
 Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
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First, the denial of severance damages for loss of visibility in Ivers fails to 
acknowledge that a constitutional 'taking" has occurred for such losses and. therefore 
fails to fully compensate Admiral, and other similarly situated landowners, for the 
"substantial interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its 
value," or for the substantial impairment or destruction of their right to its use and 
enjoyment. Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah 1990) (citations 
omitted). 
Second, Ivers' denial of loss of visibility severance damages fails to award 
landowners, like Admiral, the full measure of "just compensation" as required by Utah's 
Constitution. Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1971) ("For 
compensation to be fair and just, it must reflect the fair value of the land to the 
landowner. Just compensation means that the owners must be put in as good a position 
money wise as they would have occupied had their property not been taken."); City of 
Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56,1 19, 28 P.3d 697 (same). 
Third, the conclusion reached in Ivers—that a landowner cannot present evidence 
of all damages that result in a depreciation of the market value of his land—contravenes 
the constitutional requirement that "just compensation" be paid. See City of Hildale v. 
Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \ 18, 28 P.3d 697. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (the 
finder of fact must "hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to the 
proceedings, and determine and assess" the market value of the property taken or 
damaged) (emphasis added); § 78B-6-512. Specifically, by denying the finder of fact the 
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opportunity to consider evidence of loss of visibility, Ivers has effectively denied a 
landowner the full measure of just compensation as required by the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the Ivers decision to preclude severance damages for loss of 
visibility violates the constitutional protections of just compensation afforded to 
landowners who must endure the involuntary taking of their property by the government 
and should be overruled.6 
ARGUMENT 
The denial of severance damages for loss of visibility in condemnation actions 
involving partial takings of private property violates article L section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution because it denies landowners their constitutional guarantee of just 
compensation. The plain language of Utah's Constitution, the historical background of 
the constitutional provision, the clear and stated intent of the framers of Utah's 
6
 Admiral does not contend that the Ivers decision should be overruled on the issue of 
loss of view. If properly read and properly applied, the Ivers (and Ivers II) decision on 
loss of view affords appropriate constitutional protections to the landowner and serves to 
provide compensation for the taking and the damage that has been caused. Utah Dep't of 
Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ^  14 ("Ivers IF) (quoting Ivers, 2007 UT 19, If 21) (re-
affirming its conclusion that "severance damages are awardable for the loss of view— 
even if the view-impairing structure is not built on the condemned land—if the 
'condemned property is essential to the completion of the project as a whole/"). 
The Court further concluded that upon UDOT's admission that the partial taking of the 
Arby's property was essential to the completion of the construction project—as it has 
done in the present case—then, all that was left for the trial court to do was to award 
Arby's the appropriate severance damages. Id. Similarly, this case should be remanded 
to the district court for a determination of the amount of the appropriate award of 
severance damages due to loss of view. 
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Constitution, and the long-standing case law established in Utah and other jurisdictions 
necessitate the reversal of Ivers. 
I. Utah's Constitutional Provision On Eminent Domain Requires The Payment 
Of Just Compensation When Private Property Is "Taken or Damaged" For 
Public Use. 
The source of Utah's eminent domain laws arises from article I, section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. In interpreting the provisions of Utah's Constitution and the 
protections afforded by it the Court's analysis is to begin with a review of the 
constitutional text. American Bush v City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ^ 10, 140 
P.3d 1235 (citing Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, f 29, 52 P.3d 1148 
(explaining that "our starting point in interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual 
language itself). 
Utah's eminent domain provision states *'[p]rivate property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST. Art. L § 22. See also 
City ofHildale v Cooke, 2001 UT 56, % 18. The plain language of Utah's Constitution is 
significant. The Utah eminent domain provision is distinct from other jurisdictions in 
that Utah not only provides for the payment of'"just compensation" where private 
property has been "taken." but it also affords payment of damages when the property has 
been '"damaged." Since the early days of the state's history, Utah's eminent domain 
provision has been interpreted as being distinct from, and providing greater protections 
than, those constitutions which only provide just compensation for the 'taking" of private 
property. 
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As recognized in the 1907 case of Kimball v. Salt Lake City, Utah's constitutional 
provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all whose property 
might thereafter be damaged." 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907) (finding it "manifest" that the 
landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration 
of the street grade); see also Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) 
("Consequential damages to property which are caused by making public improvements 
are recoverable under the Constitution of this state"). The policy behind the provision is 
to allow recovery for all consequential damages arising out of public improvements, 
thereby ensuring that the "burdens for such damages are distributed among all the 
taxpayers" where previously they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained 
the injury." Kimball, 90 P. at 396. 
Utah's constitutional provision and its inclusion of the term "damage" as a basis 
for awards of just compensation is significant, and in this case supports the conclusion 
that Ivers' denial of severance damages for loss of visibility is improper, violates Utah's 
Constitution, and should be overruled. 
A. Constitutional Provisions Providing for Just Compensation for the 
"Taking" or "Damage" Caused to Private Property Provide Greater 
Protections for Landowners. 
In addition to the plain language of Utah's eminent domain provision, the history 
of Utah's constitutional language, as well as the provisions of other jurisdictions with 
similar "take or damage" language in their constitutions, is critical to a full understanding 
of the protections intended for landowners whose private property is taken for public 
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purposes. Prior to 1870, the constitutional provisions of every state in the nation 
provided that private property could not be taken for public use without payment of just 
compensation. City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 164 (1888); see Brown v. City of 
Seattle, 31 P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1892); Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of 
Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 119 P. 60, 65 (Idaho 1911). At the time, the 
respective state constitutional takings provisions mimicked the language of the United 
States Constitution, which provides in relevant part that "nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST, amend V. 
As interpreted by courts across the nation, the "almost universally accepted" rule 
was that "acts done in the proper exercise of governmental power, and not directly 
encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are 
universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provisions."7 
City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 164 (quoting Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641 
(1878) (ruling abrogated on other grounds relating to regulator}7 takings in McQueen v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 496 S.E.2d 643, 647-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g 
denied (March 19, 1988), cert, granted (Mar. 18, 1999)). Instead, the damages were 
considered "damnum absque injuria" [a harm without legal injur}7] and therefore not 
7
 While not specifically stated in the City of Chicago case, the exceptions to the 
"universal rule" appear to have been Ohio and Kentucky, wrhich courts "had given an 
unusually wide definition to what constituted a taking." See Brown v. City of Seattle, 31 
P. 313, 314 (Wash. 1892) (noting Ohio as an exception to the general rule against 
compensation awards for consequential damages); Idaho-Western Ry., 119 P. at 
65 (Idaho 1911) (noting Ohio and Kentucky as exceptions). 
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compensable. Id. Accordingly, 'there could be 'no recovery by an adjacent property 
holder, on streets the fee whereof is in the city, for the merely consequential damages 
resulting from the character of the improvements made in the streets, provided such 
improvement has the sanction of the legislature." Id. at 164-65 (quoting several Illinois 
court decisions). 
As a result of the general rule, several jurisdictions believed that a "a great and 
manifest injury was constantly done by the states, counties, and cities to the private 
citizen without any legal means of reimbursement." Brown, 31 P. at 314; see Idaho-
Western Ry. Co., 119 P. at 65 (stating that the limitations of the general rule "frequently 
resulted in hardship"). In order to remedy the inherent injustice and uncompensated 
injury, in 1870 Illinois amended its constitution to expand its takings clause and provide 
for "just compensation" not only in situations where property was taken, but also where 
property was "damaged." City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 165. Thus, the Illinois 
constitutional takings clause read that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." Id.; ILL. CONST, art XIII, § 11. 
The United States Supreme Court in City of Chicago interpreted Illinois' new 
provision and found that the use of the word "damaged" in the amended constitutional 
provision was not meaningless. Id. at 168-69. Rather, the Court concluded that it was 
significant that the term "damaged" was inserted into the clause providing for 
compensation to owners of private property appropriated to public use. Id. As a result, 
the Court concluded that under the expanded language of the constitution, the rule of law 
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in Illinois was that "a recovery may be had in all cases where private property has 
sustained a substantial damage by the making and using an improvement that is public in 
its character; that it does not require that the damage shall be caused by a trespass, or an 
actual physical invasion of the owner's real estate, but if the construction and operation 
of the railroad or other improvement is the cause of damage, though consequential, the 
party may recover." City of Chicago, 125 U.S. at 168 (approving and reaffirming the 
holding of Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 111. 64, 74 (111. 1881)). 
After Illinois revised its constitution, numerous other jurisdictions followed suit— 
West Virginia in 1872, Arkansas and Pennsylvania in 1874, Alabama, Missouri, and 
Nebraska in 1875, Colorado and Texas in 1876, Georgia in 1877, California and 
Louisiana in 1879, and Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington in 1899. 
See Brown, 31 P. at 314 (Wash. 1892) and Idaho-Western Ry. Co., 119 P. at 65 
(discussing history of the "take and damage55 jurisdictions). All of the jurisdictions 
enacted the "taken or damaged55 language with the intention of affording greater 
constitutional protections to landowners for impacts and damages caused to their property 
as a result of the involuntary taking of their land for public purposes. 
As stated in 1892, by the Supreme Court of Washington, as part of its historical 
summary of the evolution of eminent domain laws across the nation, 
"Damaged55 does not mean the same thing as "taken,55 in 
ordinary7 phraseology. The makers of the Illinois constitution 
used the word in that instrument for some purpose. Other 
states changed their constitutions for substantially the same 
purpose. They took the new phrase subject to the general rule 
of construction, that the adoption of constitutional or statutory 
-22-
language by one state from another adopts to some extent, at 
least, the construction put upon the borrowed language by the 
courts of the state from which it came. After almost 20 years 
of discussion and decision in Illinois and other states, we put 
the words "taken or damaged" into our constitution, and they 
must have their effect." 
Brown, 31 P. at 315 (emphasis added). The Washington Court went on to quote from the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Chicago v. Taylor, stating that 
"The use of the word 'damaged' in the clause providing for 
compensation to owners of private property, appropriated to 
public use, could have been with no other intention than that 
expressed by the state court. Such a change in the organic 
law of the state was not meaningless. But it would be 
meaningless if it should be adjudged that the constitution of 
1870 gave no additional or greater security to private property 
sought to be appropriated to public use than was guarantied 
[sic] by the former constitution." 
Brown, 31 at 315 (quoting Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. at 168-69). 
Through the amendment or adoption of their respective constitutions, states 
throughout the nation provided greater security and protection to landowners and enacted 
a constitutional guarantee that they would receive "just compensation" when their 
property was "taken or damaged" as a result of the government's exercise of eminent 
domain. 
B. Following the Trend of Other Jurisdictions Utah Enacted Its Own 
Constitutional Provision Requiring Just Compensation When Property 
is "Taken or Damaged." 
Like numerous other jurisdictions, Utah followed the growing trend to afford the 
general public greater protections and a more meaningful remedy for governmental 
takings. In 1895, the framers of the Utah Constitution adopted language stating that 
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"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).8 Vintage Utah Supreme 
Court decisions detail how Utah took a similar view of the injustice and unfairness that 
resulted from the then existing eminent domain laws and sought to avoid such a result 
from occurring in this state. 
For example, in 1904, the Utah Court in Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 
acknowledged that "the law, as to what constitutes a taking, has been undergoing radical 
changes in the last few years." 77 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904) (citing 1 Lewis on Eminent 
Domain (2d Ed.) § 57). In its discussion, the Court noted that: 
the great weight of the more recent judicial authority, which 
we believe to be supported by the better reason, and which is 
more in accord with our ideas of equity and natural justice, 
holds that any substantial interference with private 
property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or 
by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact 
To date, there are 24 jurisdictions with constitutional provisions that require the 
payment of just compensation when private property has been taken or damaged for 
public purposes: ALASKA CONST, art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST, art. II, § 17; ARK. CONST, 
art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST, art. I, § 19; COLO. CONST, art. II, § 15; GA. CONST, art. I, § 3, 
If I; HAW. CONST, art. I, § 20; I I I . CONST, art. I, § 15; LA. CONST, art. I, § 4, Tf B; MINN. 
CONST, art. I, § 13; Miss. CONST, art. Ill, § 17; Mo. CONST, art. I, § 26; MONT. CONST. 
art. II, § 29; NEB. CONST, art. I, § 21; NM CONST, art. II, § 20, ND CONST, art. I, § 16; 
OKLA. CONST, art. IL § 24; SD CONST, art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST, art. I, § 17; UTAH 
CONST, art. I, § 22; VA. CONST, art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST, art. I, § 16; W.VA. CONST. 
art. Ill, § 9; WYO. CONST, art. I, § 33. Of note, is that the constitutions of Alabama, 
Kentucky and Pennsylvania provide for the payment of just compensation when private 
property is taken or ''applied to"* public use and have been interpreted in similar fashion 
to the general "taken or damage'* constitutional provisions. See ALA. CONST, art. I, § 23; 
KY. CONST. § 13, PA. CONST^H. I, § 10. 
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and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense, to the 
extent of the damages suffered, even though the title and 
possession of the owner remain undisturbed. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing to cases from Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, New York, 
Michigan, and Nebraska). The Court went on to state that "[t]he tendency under our 
system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community and it seems very 
difficult, in reason, to show why the state should not pay for property of which it destroys 
or impairs the value, as well as for what it physically takes." Id. (quoting ELIOTT ON 
ROADS & STREETS § 202 (2d ed.) and citing MILLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 30-32 (2d 
ed.)). Thus, Utah, like other jurisdictions incorporated the term "or damaged" into its 
constitution "to set at rest this much-vexed question, and at the same time give additional 
security to private property" located within their respective jurisdictions. Id. at 853. 
Accordingly, Utah's Constitution "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then 
existing to all whose property might thereafter be damaged." Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 
90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907) (finding it "manifest" that the landowners were "entitled to 
recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration of the street grade); see also 
Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 120 P. 851, 853 (Utah 1912) ("Consequential damages to 
property which are caused by making public improvements are recoverable under the 
Constitution of this state"). 
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C. The Framers of Utah's Constitution Specifically Incorporated the 
Term "Take or Damaged" and Specifically Contemplated Awards of 
Just Compensation for Damages Caused by Elevated Highways. 
In addition to reviewing the plain language of Utah's constitution, the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized "that constitutional 'language ... is to be read not as barren 
words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the 
presuppositions of those who employed them.'" American Bush v. City of South Salt 
Lake, 2006 UT 40, \ 10 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Thus, the Court has determined that it is to "inform [its] 
textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent." Id. (citing State v. 
Betensei% 378 P.2d 669, 669-70 (Utah 1963) ("[I]t is proper to look not only to the 
[constitution] itself, but to the background out of which it arose and its practical 
application in order to determine the [framers5] intent.")); see also Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of 
Exam 'rs, 295 P.2d 348, 361-62 (Utah 1956) ("[I]f the words are ambiguous or their 
meaning not clear, then it is proper to look outside the instrument itself to ascertain what 
the framers meant by the language used."). 
The debates and discussions of the framers of Utah's Constitution provide 
considerable insight and guidance on the legal significance of the inclusion of the term 
"or damaged" into the constitution, lending important historical context to how the 
framers' intended that term is to be interpreted for purposes of determining when just 
compensation must be awarded. Notably, the discussions at the constitutional convention 
focused on the very issue currently pending before this Court—namely, the extent to 
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which compensation is to be awarded to a landowner, like Admiral, whose property is 
taken or damaged by the construction of an elevated highway near, but not on the 
landowner's property. As detailed below, the constitutional framers insisted on the 
inclusion of the term "or damaged" for the specific purpose of ensuring that landowners 
receive the full measure of compensation for what has been taken from them, including 
the loss of value of the property caused by the construction of the public improvement. 
See Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention for 
the Utah Constitution, at 328 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Statement of Mr. Pierce) 
(Addendum Tab E). 
At Utah's constitutional convention held in 1895, the framers of the Constitution 
analyzed and debated each provision of the state's new governing document. When the 
framers came to the debates over Utah's eminent domain provision, the initial draft 
provision was identical to its current version, stating that "[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Proceedings and Debates 
of the Constitutional Convention, at 326 (Day 22, Mar. 25, 1895) (Addendum Tab E). 
The debate on the eminent domain language centered on the issue of whether the "or 
damaged" language should be remove from the provision.9 Id. 
9
 The framers' debates also included the issue of the timing for the payment of just 
compensation and whether the sum should be paid before or after the taking/damage 
occurred. See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention at 326-27 
(Addendum Tab E). 
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In response, Mr. Varian explained at length the importance of retaining the "or 
damaged" language in the constitution. He stated that: 
[I]t seems to me that to strike out "or damaged" is a very 
material matter. I have taken pains to look at it a little to-day 
[sic] in the late works on eminent domain, and I find it is put 
in other constitutions or statutes to meet the entire case. In 
some states some courts have held that damages to property 
of a consequential kind was not necessarily within the 
meaning of the article of the constitution. For instance, I 
believe in Pennsylvania—I may have confounded the state— 
the question arose where an elevated road was erected upon a 
street and while it did not touch the property of the abutting 
owner, did not destroy a brick, did not take a foot of his 
ground. It did affect his use and occupation of his premises 
very disastrously. It affected the convenience of the 
inhabitants of a house, and in this particular case, following 
later, it was held that there was no remedy. There was not the 
taking of the property. 
Id. at 326-27 (Statement of Mr. Varian). Mr. Varian continued his discussion and 
provided another example of a decision in New York where the court reached the 
opposite conclusion as the Pennsylvania case. Id. at 327. In the New York case, 
according to Mr. Varian, the court held that a similar injury caused by the construction of 
an elevated road near a landowner's property was compensable under that state's eminent 
domain laws. Id. 
Insistent that Utah's laws afford an adequate and just remedy and compensation 
for injuries caused to property as a result of public improvements—specifically by an 
elevated highway located near, but not upon, the landowner's property—Mr. Varian 
sought "to make it perfectly clear this word has been put in laws and constitutions, and 
the text-writers say that it is an equivalent for any kind of injury of that kind." Id. The 
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type of "injury" referenced by Mr. Varian and other constitutional framers, as described 
in further discussion of the damages issue, was not only "the deprivation of light and air" 
but also all of the other "necessary inconveniences" brought about by the elevated 
highway, including "noise and soot and cinders, and disturbing the peace and rest of the 
family." Id. (emphasis added). As stated by Mr. Thurman in his statement regarding the 
breadth that the "or damaged" term should encompass, "[djamage is not always—and in 
fact is not often contemplated or expected. It comes unlooked for as the consequence of 
an act which the party performs." Id. (Statement of Mr. Thurman). It is this type of 
broad measure of damage that was specifically contemplated by the constitutional 
framers and intended by them to be included in the amount of just compensation to be 
awarded landowners whose property is "taken or damaged." 
Throughout the course of the debates, the framers weighed counter arguments to 
allowing damages caused by the "necessary inconveniences" of a public improvement 
project as part of the award of just compensation. These arguments focused on the 
potentially harmful fiscal ramifications a provision with a greater measure of damages 
would have on governmental entities—including the fear that it would potentially 
bankrupt them. Id. at 328 (Statement of Mr. Eichnor). 
Yet despite these concerns, the constitutional framers, underscored the unfairness 
that would result if a public improvement should destroy a landowner's property or take 
away half the value of the property "without making some compensation for that 
property[.]" Id. As stated by Mr. Pierce, 
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I say I am in favor of being liberal in [sic] eminent domain 
act, but whenever we grant this liberty to corporations in any 
way—public or private corporations, we should make them 
pay for whatever they take, and I believe the words 'or 
damaged' should remain in the Constitution. 
Id. (emphasis added). This view was echoed by Mr. Richard who said, 
Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the motion to strike out the 
words "or damaged." I believe, as has been said already in 
this discussion, that when the public uses a man's property 
or makes an improvement that virtually destroys the use 
of that property, that they should pay for it as much as if 
the property itself were taken. 
Id. (emphasis added). The framers' insistence that landowners be fairly compensated for 
damages caused to their property prevailed and the motion to amend the Constitution and 
strike the term "or damaged" was withdrawn. Id. at 329. 
As evidenced by the debates at the constitutional convention, the framers of 
Utah's Constitution clearly contemplated that inclusion of the term "or damaged" would 
provide greater protections to landowners and avoid unjust results. Moreover, inclusion 
of the term was specifically debated in the context of situations like the present one, 
where damages and injury result from the construction of an elevated highway. 
Therefore, consistent with the stated intention of the constitutional framers, Admiral is 
entitled to damages sustained from UDOT's 1-15 Project. At the very least, Admiral is 
entitled to present evidence of its injury and damages as reflected in the decrease in value 
of its property. 
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II. Consistent With The Plain Language Of Utah's Constitution, Its Historical 
Background, And The Framer's Stated Intent, Utah's Courts Have 
Interpreted The State's "Taken Or Damaged" Constitutional Provision As 
Providing Greater Protections For Landowners. 
As outlined above, based upon the plain language of Utah's Constitution, the 
historical background of the constitutional provision, the clear and stated intent of the 
framers of Utah's Constitution, and the long-standing case law established in Utah and 
other jurisdictions, Utah's "taken or damaged" constitution was specifically drafted for 
the purpose of providing greater constitutional protections for landowners whose property 
is impacted as a result of governmental actions. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 
UT 37, *{ 13, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 ("because the Utah Constitution bounds the ability 
of the government not only to "take[ ]," but also to "damage[ ]," private property, we 
have characterized this state constitutional provision as being broader than its federal 
counterpart.") (omissions in original) (citing Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 
1097 (Utah 1995) ("This provision is broader in its language than the similar provision in 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.")). Utah's constitutional 
language also provides for a broader definition of what types of governmental actions 
serve to trigger the "just compensation" clause of its eminent domain provision and 
guarantees to landowners a more expansive measure of just compensation when their 
property is "taken or damaged" for public purposes. Sti'awberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. 
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (explaining that article I, section 22's 
"expansive language" has been interpreted to encompass "every species of property 
-31-
which the public needs may require, ... [including] legal and equitable rights of every 
description.") (citations omitted). 
The Court in hers failed to uphold the foundational principles of Utah's eminent 
domain laws when it failed to recognize that property can be "taken or damaged" when 
the loss of visibility "substantially interferes with property," "destroys or materially 
lessens a property's value" or impairs or destroys "the owner's right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Bingham v. Roosevelt 
City Corp., 2010 UT 3 7 , \ 13; Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry., 11 P. 849, 852 (Utah 
1904). The Ivers decision likewise contravened the constitutional requirement of just 
compensation when it denied to landowners the ability to obtain the full measure of 
compensation guaranteed them, which includes damages caused by loss of visibility. 
A. Property has been "Taken or Damaged" When There is Any 
Substantial Interference with Private Property that Destroys or 
Materially Lessens its Value or When the Landowner's Use and 
Enjoyment of the Property has been Impaired or Destroyed. 
It has long been the law in Utah that a "taking" occurs—meaning that property has 
been sufficiently "taken or damaged" so as to trigger Utah's constitutional guarantee of 
just compensation—when there is "any substantial interference with private property 
which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Stockdale v. Rio Grande 
Western Ry., 11 P. 849, 852 (Utah 1904) (emphasis added); see State ex rel State Road 
Comm 'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 78 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937); Hampton 
v. State Road Comm % 445 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Utah 1968); Colman v. Utah State Land 
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Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah 1990). The establishment of the takings principle in 
Utah is significant. The rule of law was first recognized in 1904 by the Stockdale case, 
Stockdale, 77 P. at 852 (1904), and remains the established law in Utah. Bingham v. 
Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37,113. 
In the Stockdale case, the Court noted that "radical changes" had been going on at 
the time with respect to eminent domain laws in the country and concluded that "the great 
weight of the more recent judicial authority, which we believe to be supported by the 
better reason, and which is more in accord with our ideas of equity and natural justice," 
required that a taking be found when there is "any substantial interference with private 
property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's 
right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." 
Id. (emphasis added). In that instance, the Court stated in no uncertain terms that it 
would constitute "in fact and in law, a taking, in the constitutional sense." Id. And upon 
such a constitutional "taking," the landowner would be entitled to just compensation "to 
the extent of the damages suffered," even in the situation where the title and possession 
of the owner remain undisturbed. Id. 
Under this standard, where there is "any substantial interference" with the 
landowners property and that interference "destroys or materially lessens its value," a 
"taking" has occurred and the landowner is entitled to "just compensation." Id. 
(emphasis added). Additionally, a compensable taking is found where the landowner's 
right to the "use and enjoyment" of his property has "in any substantial degree" been 
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impaired or destroyed, then, again, there has been a taking and just compensation must be 
paid. Id. 
Other Utah Courts have phrased the standard slightly differently, but have 
intended the same thing. Under those cases, if a landowner establishes that his property 
has been substantially impaired or damaged as a "direct and necessary consequence of 
the construction or operation of a public use," then the landowner is entitled to just 
compensation. Farmers New World Life Ins, Co, v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244-
45 (Utah 1990) (holding that "[t]he diminution of value and cost of repairs to the mall 
which [landowner] alleged constitute damages within the guarantee of article I, section 
22."); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974) ("just 
compensation is due if the market value of property has diminished"). See also Pigs Gun 
Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^  29 & n.l 1, 42 P.3d 379 (remanding case for 
factual determination of whether "the damage was indeed for a public use and then 
whether the damage necessarily resulted from that use."). 
Additionally, Utah's courts have interpreted the term "damaged"' to mean a 
"definite physical injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on the present 
market value." Bd. ofEduc. of Logan City School Dist. v. Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 
1962). Other courts have stated that to be compensable, the damage caused to private 
property must be '•permanent, continuous and recurring" and must be "the direct and 
unavoidable consequence of the construction or use of the improvement." Farmers New 
World Life Ins., 803 P.2d at 1244-45. 
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The Utah courts' statement of what extent and degree of government action is 
necessary to trigger the "taken or damaged" provision of Utah's Constitution, is 
consistent with text of the Constitution as well as its background and history. As 
discussed above, the inclusion of the term "or damaged" into Utah's Constitution was a 
deliberate and intentional effort to broaden the circumstances under which a compensable 
"taking" occurs and to ensure an award of just compensation to a landowner when the 
government's actions "affect his use and occupation" of his property. Proceedings and 
Debates of the Constitutional Convention, at 326-27 (Statement of Mr. Varian) 
(Addendum Tab E) (Mr. Varian's complaint of a Pennsylvania court's refusal to fmd a 
taking had occurred as a result of damages caused by the construction of an elevated 
highway and argument that Utah's eminent domain provisions should avoid a similar 
result). 
As applied to the facts of the instant case, each of these standards is readily 
satisfied. The substantial impacts and impairments caused to Admiral's property, and the 
diminution of market value of its property, constitute a "taking" under Utah's 
Constitution for which it is entitled to compensation. It is undisputed that Admiral's 
property was taken "in connection" with the 1-15 Project and that the portions of the 
Project the relocation of 500 West, for which Admiral's property was taken was an 
integral and essential part of the Project. (R. at 493, 673, 678, 684; Supreme Court Oral 
Argument, Hr'g Tr. at p. 10,11. 2-10, p. 16,11. 16-18. (Nov. 5, 2009)) ("It [the relocation 
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of 500West] meets the integrated project requirement."; "For purposes of this motion in 
limine, we agreed that it was an essential part of the project.") (Addendum Tab D). 
Moreover, the Project substantially impaired the market value of the remaining 
portion of Admiral's property. In particular, as part of the Project, UDOT elevated 1-15 
by approximately 28 feet, (R. at 494), and where Admiral used to have a piece of 
property that w7as clearly visible, its property7 is now left "in a hole 28 feet deep." (See 
Supreme Court Oral Argument, Hr'g Tr. at p. 12,11. 20-23 (Nov. 5, 2009)) (Addendum 
Tab D). Consequently, the Project has significantly obstructed the visibility of and view 
from Admiral5s property, resulting in a depreciated market value to the remainder, a 
substantial impairment to Admiral's use and enjoyment of the property, which under 
Utah's eminent domain law amounts to a "taking" for which compensation is owed. 
The Ivers decision, as well as the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, erred in 
their conclusion that loss of visibility is not compensable. Accordingly the Ivers decision 
should be overruled, and the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed. 
B. Once a Constitutional "Taking" Occurs, Just Compensation Requires 
the Landowner Be Placed in as Good a Position as It Would Have Been 
in Monetarily Had Its Property Not Been Taken. 
When a landowner, like Admiral, has its property "taken or damaged," under 
Utah's constitution, it is entitled to "just compensation. UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 22. The 
term "just compensation" has been interpreted by Utah courts to mean "that the owners 
must be put in as good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their 
property not been taken." State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495. 497 (Utah 1957). As explained 
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Friberg, "[t]he constitutional 
requirement of just compensation derives 'as much content from the basic equitable 
principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law/ when the State 
takes private property for the public welfare." Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) 
(quoting United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973)). In order for compensation to 
be fair and just as required by Utah's Constitution, "it must reflect the fair value of the 
land to the landowner[,]" and must make the landowner whole in a monetary sense and 
place him back in the position he would have occupied were his property not taken and 
the government's project not constructed. Id. (citing Noble, 305 P.2d at 497). 
To carry out the state's constitutional charge, the full measure of just 
compensation must be determined and awarded. Just compensation consists of two 
components, "(1) the value of the property sought to be condemned ...; [and] (2) if the 
property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511. Severance damages 
are those damages caused by the taking of a part of the property where the taking itself or 
construction of some improvement on the portion causes injury to the remaining parcel. 
UtahDep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987). 
The widely-accepted method for measuring severance damages—and thereby 
determining just compensation—is the "diminution of the fair market value of the 
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property immediately following the infliction of the damage." Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 
P.2d 1243, 1246 (1987). Utah case law is replete wiih similar variations of this well-
established rule: 
• City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, f 20 ('The cardinal and well-
recognized rule as to the measure of damages to property not actually taken 
but affected by condemnation is the difference in market value of the 
property before and after the taking.") (quoting Salt Lake County 
Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Toone, 357 P.2d486? 488 (Utah I960)); 
• State ex rel Rd. Comm 'n v. Peterson, 366 P.2d 76, 79 (Utah 1961) (holding 
that 'the correct measure" of severance damages is "the difference between 
its fair cash market value before and after the taking"); 
• State v. Noble, 305 P.2d 495, 498 (Utah 1956) ("The accepted formula for 
determining fair market value is . . . what would a purchaser willing to buy 
but not required to do so, pay and what would a seller willing to sell but not 
required to do so, ask."); 
• Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987) 
(severance damages are those damages that are caused by the taking of a 
part of the property where the taking itself or construction of some 
improvement on the portion causes injury to the remaining parcel). 
Thus, to properly determine the fair market value of the affected property—and 
correspondingly the amount of just compensation owed—requires "that all factors 
bearing upon such value that any prudent purchaser would take into account at [the time 
of the taking] should be given consideration, including any potential development in the 
area reasonably to be expected." Weber Water Basin Consei-vancy Dist. v. Ward, 347 
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1959; Morris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 102 P. 629, 631 (Utah 
1909) (holding that "everything which arises out of the proper construction and proper 
operation of the [public improvement] which directly affects the salable value of the 
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abutting property may ordinarily be considered as elements in assessing damages []") 
(emphasis added); see Carpet Barn v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 773-74 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (applying before-and-after valuation method as the proper method of determining 
damages). 
The policy behind a broad interpretation of just compensation awards under a 
"taken or damaged" constitutional provision like Utah's is to allow recovery for all 
consequential damages arising out of public improvements, thereby ensuring that the 
"burdens for such damages are distributed among all the taxpayers" where previously 
they disproportionately "fell upon those only who sustained the injury." Kimball v. Salt 
Lake City, 90 P. 395, 396 (Utah 1907). As recognized in Kimball in 1907, Utah's 
constitutional provision "was expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to all 
whose property might thereafter be damaged." Id. (finding it "manifest" that the 
landowners were "entitled to recover" damages suffered from the government's alteration 
of the street grade). Thus, under Utah's constitution, "the party7 whose property is 
injuriously affected by any change of grade may recover damages against the 
[governmental entity] for the diminution of the market value of his property to the extent 
that such diminution exceeds the direct benefits derived from the improvements causing 
the damage." Id. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court, 
interpreting Arizona's narrower "take" provision, nevertheless, has found loss of 
visibility to be a valid consideration in assessing depreciation of market value. City of 
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Phoenix v. Wilson, 21 P.3d 388; 394-95 (Ariz. 2001) (explaining that w*[t]he owner must 
be compensated for the entire damage, which, of course, includes the value of what was 
taken and the lessening in value of what remains."). 
Moreover, the California Supreme Court, interpreting California's similar 'taken 
or damaged" provision has held that a landowner possesses "an easement of reasonable 
view of their property" from a highway. People v. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal. 
1943). More recently, in Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the 
court held that a landowner has a "compensable visibility interest" and "the 'right to be 
seen' bears upon the value of the residual parcel" including "diminution of visibility" 
which must be "taken into account in determining damages in a condemnation or inverse 
condemnation proceeding." Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 
139 P.3d 119, 126 & n. 6 (Cal. 2006) (citing cases) (noting that state statute applicable to 
severance damages "recognizes no such distinction" that "the improvement that blocks 
visibility" must be "located on property taken from the landowner" to be compensable). 
Likewise, Utah's condemnation statute requires recovery of severance damages 
and contains no restrictive language that the improvement obstructing visibility must be 
built on the taken property. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) ("if the property sought 
to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel the damages which will accrue 
to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion 
sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed 
by the plaintiff"). In fact the Utah Supreme Court has broadly construed Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) (formerly Utah Code Ann. 78-34-10) to mean: "Damage to the 
noncondemned portion of land "caused" by the severance ... when the view-impairing 
structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is used 
as a part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the project.*' Ivers, 
2007 UT 19, Tf 26 (emphasis in original). 
In the present action, Admiral paid fair market value when it purchased its 
property, taking into consideration all factors which contributed to the property's value, 
including the value added to the property by its view and visibility. By contrast, in this 
condemnation action and under the loss of visibility rule announced by Ivers (and how it 
has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals in this case), Admiral is precluded from 
recovering the amount of the property's market value that is attributable to its particular 
view and visibility and is thus, left without the full measure of just compensation as 
required by Utah's Constitution. See Noble, 305 P.2d at 497. Stated otherwise, despite 
the fact that a willing and knowledgeable buyer will pay less for Admiral's property 
because of UDOTs taking and construction of the elevated highway, it cannot recover 
the diminished valued caused by UDOT because of the ruling in Ivers. 
In sum, Admiral has been precluded from having full consideration taken of all of 
the factors that affect the market value of its property and unable to have applied to its 
case the "cardinal and well-recognized'* before-and-after valuation rule as established by 
Utah's eminent domain laws. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, \ 20; Toone. 357 P.2d at 488. 
Admiral has been denied its constitutional right to receive just compensation as a result of 
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the Ivers decision—and the Court of Appeals' application of that decision to affirm the 
district court in this case. The Ivers decision should be overruled in order to remedy the 
unjust result caused to Admiral. 
C. In Order to x4fford Admiral the Full Measure of Just Compensation 
Under Utah Law. It Must Be Permitted to Present Evidence 
Concerning All Factors that Affect the Fair Market Value of its 
Property. 
In order to afford Admiral the full measure of just compensation as required under 
Utah's constitution, it must be permitted to present evidence of all factors that bear on the 
diminution in value caused by UDOT in this case. In its grant of UDOT's motion in 
limine, the district court, relying on Ivers, excluded Admiral's evidence of its severance 
damages caused by loss of view and loss of visibility. Both the district court and the 
Ivers's decision failed to adhere to the statutory requirements of Utah's eminent domain 
statutes and Utah cases interpreting Utah's Constitution. See State Road Comm 'n v. 
Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1971). 
Under Utah's eminent domain statutes, the court or jury is required to "ascertain 
and assess [] the value of the property sought to be condemned." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
6-511 (2010). See also Cooke, 2001 UT 56, ^ 20. Additionally, if the condemnation 
action only involves a partial taking of property, then the finder of fact is similarly 
required to consider 4the damages [that] will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the [condemning authority]." 
Id. Utah's eminent domain statutes further require that as to the scope of evidence to 
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consider in market value, the finder of fact must "hear any legal evidence offered by any 
of the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess" the market value of the 
property taken or damaged. Utah Code § 78B-6-511 (emphasis added). 
The statutory requirements are consistent with the broad view taken by Utah 
courts as to what is to be considered in determining the fair market value of the 
property—and correspondingly, just compensation. Morris v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 
102 P. 629, 631 (Utah 1909). See also 4-13 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.21[3] 
(explaining that compensation for loss of visibility "should be reflected in the diminished 
fair market value of the property left in a partial taking."). 
More recently, the Court in State Road Comm 'n v. Rohan, reaffirmed the 
requirement that all market-value related evidence be considered in the assessment of just 
compensation. 487 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1971). The Court held that "there should not be 
any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of damage any loss of value due to 
noise or any other such intangible factor;" however, "in order to correctly evaluate the 
severance damages, i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should 
be viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the improvement has 
been constructed." Id. at 859. Thus, the Court concluded that the expert appraiser's 
testimony was appropriate because he contemplated "the attendant increase in traffic and 
noise" as among several factors he considered in making his appraisal and "there was no 
attempt to segregate and place a separate money value thereon." Id. 
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Applying the proper standard for determining just compensation in Utah, loss of 
visibility—like loss of view, loss of access, loss of parking, increase in traffic, increase in 
noise—are factors a court must consider, as prescribed in Utah's Constitution, in 
determining the impact a taking and resulting public improvement has on the fair market 
value of the remainder property and awarding just compensation. Twenty-Second Corp. 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 103 P. 243, 
249 (Utah 1909) (holding that elements that impact the property "which may affect the 
market value of the property not taken are ordinarily permitted to be shown, not as 
independent elements of damage, but as elements to be considered in connection with all 
other things which may depreciate the market value of the property interfered with but 
not taken). 
In other words, if construction of the government's project substantially impairs 
the visibility of the remainder, the landowner is entitled as a matter of law to present any 
and all evidence that the loss of visibility contributed to the substantial devaluation of the 
remainder. Rohan, 487 P.2d at 858 ("[i]n making the appraisal, it is not only permissible 
but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and willing 
buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at its 
market value/y(emphasis added)). Cf Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 
1326 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding that in an inverse condemnation action. ;*[w]here 
governmental action, not amounting to a physical taking, substantially impairs a right 
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appurtenant to an owner's property, or otherwise causes peculiar injury, and thereby 
results in substantial devaluation, the owner is entitled to compensation."). 
In the instant action, Admiral had a protectable property interest in the property 
that was actually taken from it by UDOT to widen 500 West as part of the overall 1-15 
Project. As a result of UDOT's highway reconstruction project, which resulted in the 
elevating of 1-15 by nearly 28 feet, Admiral's property was directly and substantially 
impaired by the significant decrease in fair market value of the remaining portion of 
Admiral's property caused by the loss of view from and visibility of the property. Utah's 
Constitution mandates that Admiral must be compensated for all facts and circumstances 
that a reasonable buyer would consider in assessing market value—including loss of 
visibility and loss of view. As part of the required process for determining the full 
measure of just compensation for Admiral, the finder of fact was required to examine and 
consider all components having a bearing on the property's fair market value in assessing 
and awarding damages, which means that consideration be given to any and all damages 
affecting the remainder that were caused by and necessary to the 1-15 Project. To the 
extent hers holds otherwise, it must be overruled. 
Accordingly, the district court and Utah Court of Appeals erred in excluding 
evidence of loss of visibility and loss of view as components of diminished fair market 
value of the remainder. Because the district court excluded any and all evidence of loss 
of visibility and loss of view damages from its consideration of severance damages, 
Admiral has been denied the just compensation it is entitled to by the Utah Constitution. 
-45-
D. In the Alternative, If Severance Damages for Loss of Visibility are Not 
Compensable, Admiral May Still Present Evidence of Impacts the Loss 
of Visibility Has on the Market Value of Its Property. 
Admiral does not in anyway concede its position that loss of visibility is 
compensable in a condemnation action. However. Admiral recognizes that Utah courts 
have permitted the admissibility of evidence of severance damages, even if the element is 
not compensable as a separate item of damage. Morris, 102 P. at 631 (where public 
improvement was constructed several feet from landowner's property and the value of the 
land depreciated in value as a result, Court recognized that "[m]any things are usually 
taken into consideration in such actions which would not give rise to an independent 
action, and in such an action all the damages are assessed as constituting a single cause of 
action, and the measure of such damages is the amount that the property has depreciated 
in market value." (referencing 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain §§ 112 to 125); Twenty-Second 
Corp., 103 P. at 249. See also Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971) (holding that "there 
should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of damage any loss of 
value due to noise or any other such intangible factor" but rather "all facts and 
circumstances" impacting on the property's overall market value must necessarily be 
considered). 
Therefore, if the Court were to determine that loss of visibility is not a separate 
element of severance damages - in accordance with existing Utah law -Admiral should 
be permitted to present evidence of all factors that show the depreciated fair market value 
of Admiral's property. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Ivers decision that denies severance damage for loss of visibility violates 
Utah's constitutional guarantee to provide just compensation to landowners when private 
property is "taken or damaged" for public purposes. The decision should be overruled 
and this case remanded to the trial court on the issue of loss of visibility, as well as a 
determination of the amount of severance damages to be awarded Admiral for loss of 
view. 
\t-\C^ 
Dated this ft^ day of August, 2010. 
SNOW5 CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
D.JASON HAWKINS 
mtorrt^^Mr Defendant/Petitioner 
A^rntrac Beverage Corporation 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark 
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST 
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE, 
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE 
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affeci 
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"), While both motions are nominally focused on 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and 
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine) 
CONSOLIDATED: 
Case No. 970905361 CD 
CaseNo.970905368CD 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
the parties* competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be swarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
2005 where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31,2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background. 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the I-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the I-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
dentifred by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
nowi 
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside 
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast comer of the Admiral 
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the 
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on that property. 
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just 
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a square-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses, 
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "(a) loss of air, 
light, view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the 
reconstructed 1-15 freeway...." Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to 
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
' Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built 
.,,.
 t h e s o u t h e a s l corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
^ L T a S d u A m . About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submrtted. 
Z r t ^Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest 
Sfobesixinchesoutsideofthecondemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the heanng, Admiral had 
f r i s k y done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109 although four to five 
X at ta closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the 
court. 
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Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2, UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law. 
B. Analysis. 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to 
fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining 
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fames and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in ioio by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impression in Utah, 
1. Loss of Visibility. 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion ofl-l 5 passing by the Admiral 
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration. 
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance in this area, 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v. 
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that '"the right of ingress or 
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egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id at 711. The court 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "damnum absque 
injuria? or damage without legal injury. 
Id at 347, See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1961) ("The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miyay 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the 
owner to compensation."); Utah Department a/Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT ] 07, 
<|14 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other 
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a 
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how 
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited 1-15 is a "[IJimited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Rkardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of bis property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi 's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway:" 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway ts to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those nghts. 
People ex rel Department of Transportation v. Mb**, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994) 
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow 
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway "to view a 
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[shich purposes are 
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to "'prevent just that sort of thing.'" 
Id. {citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's: 
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of 
abuttinglandstoafreeway have limited or noright of access to or from their abutting 
S d s Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related nghts such as the 
right to a view. 
Id 
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a view of his property from the freeway." 
2. rwHgr Damages. 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility 
and aesthetics," a bundle of rights that may include, but goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15 
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the 
circumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements, Neither the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya. in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to betaken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 ofTransportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension, The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Jd at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its Jand was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the 
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i n l e r S e c t i o n c l o s u r e ' ^ 
UT 107,112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from 
movements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the 
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder 
from the talcing of a portion of the property and from "the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed: 
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
b v rconstuct ion of the improvement made on the severed property, ftdoes not 
g iv t t n e S o w n e r the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
of the construction project. 
* * * 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. ^mbr°m 
773pTdl220 ,1222(Utahl987)^ 
S we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
ottte ^ d of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on 
tollhouse!injury* that portion of the property nottaken." (Emphas* addai 
ffidSWS accords with the well-established common law pnnctple that 
fevemnc damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner . 
^ S t e m S d land], as long as those damages were directly caused by thetahng 
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added) 
Id. at 1110-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted). 
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
j u s t outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as part of 
tbereconstructionprojectarenotcompensableasseverancedamagesunderUta^ 
to include evidence related to all of "the components of severance damages" that were "taken into 
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated at paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert 
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."3 
ORDER 
11 is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
^ , _]_ day of October, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Roth 
DISTRICT JUDGE \ \ 
1
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
oroject (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion m 
Limine * at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
courts are better equipped to identify., analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests, 
well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change, in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: When you're ready, Counsel, 
4 would you enter your appearances for the record and 
5 let us know how you want to divide your time for 
6 appellants? 
7 MR MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. Reed 
8 Martineau and Jason Huffins for the appellant. I'd 
9 like to save five minutes for rebuttal. 
10 THE COURT: All right Thankyou. 
11 MR. BURNETT: RickBumett appearing on 
12 behalf of the Department of Transportation, Your 
13 Honor. '< 
14 THECOURT: Thankyou. You may proceed. 
15 MR MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 May it please The Court, Counsel. This 
17 case highlights the direct and irreconcilable 
18 conflict in the Utah cases on the issue of what 
19 constitutes just compensation in cases where the UDOT 
20 is involved 
21 To begin with, the cases all confirm 
2 2 without qualification the requirement of both the US 
2 4 rights may not be taken without payment of, quote, 
J 2 5 just compensation, end quote. Neither the US nor 
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1 Utah Constitution qualifies this just compensation 
2 mandate in any way. This requirement is repeated 
3 over and over again in the cases as an unqualified 
4 Constitutional mandate. 
5 Next, the cases all provide that just 
6 compensation is measured by the difference between 
7 fair market value before the taking and the fair 
8 market value after the taking. 
9 Third, the cases say that fair market 
10 value is determined by what a willing seller will 
11 take and what a willing buyer will pay. 
12 It is also stated without qualification 
13 that an owner must be placed in the same monetary 
14 possession after the taking as before the taking. It 
15 must be noted that these clear rules apply without 
16 qualification to takings by all condemning 
17 authorities in the State of Utah, including takings 
18 by UDOT. Even the US Government must pay full, just 
19 compensation for property it takes. 
2 0 No justification is given, either in 
21 statute or otherwise, for the special privileged 
2 2 treatment requested by UDOT. However, in takings by 
2 3 UDOT, the courts have sanctioned repeated and clear 
2 4 violation of these Constitutional mandates. 
1 25 The value of visibility of the property 
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1 from State roadways and the value of view from the I 
2 property are important factors that have very 1 
3 significant value as between buyers and sellers in 1 
4 the marketplace and also in condemnation by other 1 
5 condemning authorities. It's recognized in those 1 
6 cases. 1 
7 Yet the Utah Courts permit the right of 1 
8 visibility of the property, for example, to be taken i 
9 by UDOT without payment of any compensation, let | 
10 alone just compensation. The present case is a case 1 
11 of first impression, and it represents yet another I 
12 request by UDOT to further expand the Court's 1 
13 sanction of its privilege of taking without payment. 1 
14 No other case has involved the taking 1 
15 where the remainder property abuts the edge of the 1 
16 very property taken by UDOT for relocation and I 
17 construction by UDOT of a city street. 1 
18 No other cases involve the taking where 1 
19 the property was condemned by and taken in the name 1 
2 0 of UDOT, paid for by UDOT, and where the roadway and 1 
21 storm sewer construction were undertaken by UDOT at I 
22 its expense for relocation of a city street all as an 1 
23 essential part of an integrated UDOT project. 1 
24 Just as in the recent Ivers case, the I 
2 5 remainder property of Admiral abuts property taken by ( 
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1 UDOT, upon which an access road and other I 
2 improvements were constructed by UDOT as an essential 1 
3 part of the highway project. Significantly, E 
4 Salt Lake City was in no way involved in the taking, 1 
5 entitled to the property taken, or in use of the take 1 
6 and payment for construction of the relocated access 1 
I 7 road and the large storm drain, both of which were 1 
8 placed on the property taken. § 
9 THECOURT: So, Counsel, who actually holds g 
10 title to fee Frontage Road, or is it 500 West Street? g 
11 Is that title in Salt Lake City? | 
12 MR MARTINEAU: Tve asked UDOT to clarify 1 
13 whether the City owns it or not. They cant tell me. 1 
14 I just wanted to be honest with The Court on feat. B 
15 Because I did make that inquiry. g 
16 THE COURT: So we don't know who owns it. S 
17 But what we know is that the construction and design 1 
18 and all of that was done by UDOT. 1 
19 MR. MARTINEAU: We know that title was taken 1 
20 in the name of UDOT. We know that they relocated and | 
21 reconstructed that road on the part taken, along with 1 
22 a storm drain. We know that fee remainder property f 
2 3 adjoins that road that supposedly is a city street. I 
2 4 UDOT doesn't deny that the price paid by | 
1 2 5 Admiral for these properties was based upon a formal § 
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appraisal prepared by a well-qualified, certified 
appraiser that reflected accepted appraisal 
standards, or that the appraisal reflected very 
significant values for both visibility of the 
property and view from the property. 
Nor can UDOT claim that it does not seek 
in this case to force a transfer to it without 
compensation of a substantial part of that value that 
had been actually paid for the properties by Admiral 
i just before and after - and just before the take. 
. UDOT cannot dispute that what it is asking The Court 
to approve is grossly unfair to Admiral. 
The irreconcilable conflict has been 
complicated further by the recent Ivers case, that 
allows damages for loss of view but denies damages 
for visibility. UDOT is now asking The Court to 
exempt even the loss of view damages from payment. 
The inconsistency in the cases is 
dramatically illustrated in the instructions the 
trial court is going to have to give the jury in this 
case. The Ivers case -
THE COURT: Could I just ask a question 
about the sentence before last? Do you understand 
the Department of Transportation to be arguing that 
there's no recovery in any case for loss of view, or 
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1 that value is included in the property's fair market 
2 value when it was just purchased by Admiral. The 
3 Court would then instruct, to be consistent with 
4 UDOTs new position, that the fair market value is to 
5 be further reduced by the value of view from the 
5 property. 
7 And the jury must be told that those 
8 values, which were included in the price of fair 
9 market value Admiral just paid for the property -
1 0 for that same property, that they must be deducted 
11 from - these values must be deducted from their 
12 finding of fair market value. 
13 This demonstrates the undeniable 
14 conflict in the case law between the Constitutional 
15 mandate that just compensation be paid for property 
16 condemned by UDOT and the sanction given by the Utah 
17 Courts for UDOT to take valuable property rights in 
18 cases such as the present case without payment of any 
19 compensation for those rights taken. 
20 THE COURT: Counsel, is it your view that 
2 1 t h e -
22 MIL MARTINEAU: I'm sorry? 
23 THE COURT: Is it your view that the 
2 4 transfer of a fee simple title carries widi it a 
2 5 property right with respect to view and visibility 
Page 7 
simply that there's no loss of view on the facts in 
this case? 
MR MARTINEAU: They say we don't have a 
valid claim for loss of view. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MARTINEAU: And they also claim, 
pursuant to the Ivers case, that we dont have any 
claim for loss of visibility. 
THE COURT: Right. 
3 MR MARTINEAU: Yet both of those were paid 
L for when we bought the property. 
I Since the Ivers case, how does The Court 
3 properly instruct the jury? The trial court must 
4 first explain the requirement that UDOT is required 
5 to pay just compensation. It must then instruct that 
5 just compensation is to be measured by fair market 
7 value before the taking, less fair market value 
8 after. The Court must also explain that just 
9 compensation requires a property owner to be placed 
0 m the same position, in terms of money, before and 
1 after the take. The cases all support this - these 
2 instructions. 
3 Then, according to UDOT, The Court -
4 the jury must reduce just compensation as so defined 
5 by the value of visibility from 1-15, even though 
Page 9 
1 unless it is otherwise excluded in the deed? 
2 MR. MARTINEAU: Yes. Those views are 
3 specifically included in fair market value as that is 
4 determined, and that is an accepted method of valuing 
5 these properties, Your Honor. 
6 In case after case, UDOT lias repeatedly 
7 sought, and as in this case, continues to seek The 
8 Court's approval to further expand the property 
9 rights it can take for free in violation of the 
10 Constitutional mandate. As noted, no other agency or 
11 entity in Utah with power to condemn, including the 
12 Federal Government, is given this approval, 
13 There's no just reason why UDOT should 
14 be permitted to force property owners to transfer 
15 these valuable property rights to it for free. 
16 Certainly, this permission should not be further 
17 expanded as the UDOT is seeking in this case. Thank 
18 you. 
] 19 THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may 
2 D respond. 
21 MR. BURNETT: May it please The Court, first 
22 a correction. Fifth West is, was, continues to be a 
23 Salt Lake City-owned street. Yes, the Department of 
2 4 Transportation, as part of the I-15 remodeling, did 
2 5 move a purchased property so as to remake Fifth West 
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1 for Salt Lake City. 
2 THE COURT: It was part of the integrated ! 
3 project for which this property was taken? 
4 MR-BURNETT: It is, yes. But the road 
5 itself is owned by Salt Lake. j 
6 THE COURT: But to the extent, though, that 
7 we're applying the Ivers standard that says it's part 
8 of the integrated project, it meets that requirement? 
9 MR. BURNETT: It meets the integrated 
10 project requirement. 
11 The problem we have in this case, as 
12 shown by oral argument by my esteemed colleague, 
13 opposing counsel, is really the question of, what are 
14 the property rights involved? 
15 At issue was several motions in limine 
16 in which the Department of Transportation sought to 
17 exclude evidence of alleged property rights that 
18 don't exist. The trial court granted those, and that 
19 was the issue. The two property rights are both one 
2 0 alleged and one real, a pertinent easement. 
21 Pertinent easements are unique, because 
2 2 nonnally when you have a piece of property, you have 
2 4 of property. In the circumstance of public roads, an 
1 2 5 exception is made. 
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1 The initial pertinent easement was that 
2 of access; that if you owned property abutting a 
3 public road, you had the right to access that public 
4 road from your property. Over time, that was 
5 extended to pertinent easements of receiving light 
6 and air from that abutting public road. Finally, 
7 with Mia, it was further extended to have a pertinent 
8 easement right of view from that abutting road. 
9 The problem that Admiral Beverage has is 
10 that Utah has never recognized a pertinent easement 
11 of visibility. Indeed, they're caught in a quandary. 
12 They shout that this is Ivers, and yet this Court in 
13 Ivers expressly rejected and said that Utah never 
14 accepted a right of visibility, and indeed followed a 
15 long line of Utah decisions that said that you do not 
16 have a property right in ongoing motoring traffic, 
17 public traffic. 
18 THE COURT: Counsel, how do you square the 
19 end result of this with the Constitutional mandate 
20 for just compensation, where the touchstone of just 
21 compensation has got to be fair market value, and 
2 2 these, you know, view, visibility, all that kind of 
2 3 stuff, does make up part of fair market value? 
24 MR BURNETT: Your Honor, what it does -
j 2 5 fair market value of the property, not of something 
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1 that is given as early as Hampton where this Court 1 
2 said - excuse me - that what the police power may B 
3 give an abutting property away of traffic on the I 
4 highway may take away. 1 
5 I submit that, Your Honor, no court has 1 
6 ever said that that was part of the fair market 1 
7 value. They talk in the generic. But this Court has 1 
8 repeatedly said that what by police power the State | 
9 has put on that roadway and made it accessible to § 
10 motoring public as it changes. 1 
11 This is no different than when the I 
12 interstate system is extended or was originally § 
13 created, that those people who had businesses that E 
14 were now being circumvented, that were no longer | 
15 easily accessible to the motoring public because they | 
16 were not at a new exit ramp, that those people did 1 
17 not have a right to the ongoing traffic on the 1 
18 byroad, which is now being bypassed. I 
19 THE COURT: That's surely not the claim 1 
20 here. The claim here is: They used to have a piece | 
21 of property that people could see, potentially | 
2 2 customers, or whatever, and now they're in a hole | 
2 3 28 feet deep. Isn't that this claim? This isn't 1 
24 that the road bypassed them. £ 
2 5 MR. BURNETT: No, Your Honor. But it's the | 
Page 13 1 
1 same principle. Indeed this Court - same principle I 
2 in Ivers, is the exact same thing in Ivers where | 
3 there was - the roadway was elevated, putting the 1 
4 RVs Restaurant in a hole, as it were. This Court B 
5 said that there is no right to visibility, that's not B 
6 part of fair market value, hasn't been under Utah g 
7 law, and is not compensable. UDOT does not have to E 
8 pay for it. B 
9 THE COURT: Counsel, if 500 West Street were 1 
10 a State road as opposed to a Salt Lake City road, 1 
11 would you have to change your position in this case? 1 
12 MR. BURNETT: None. Not at all. Because B 
13 still, just as an access and other pertinent E 
14 easement, the pertinent easement is to the abutting 1 
15 roadway. Lef s assume for a moment that UDOT owned | 
16 500 West at all times. The abutting rights are still 1 
17 to 500 West. You cannot say, because I abut i 
18 500 West, you also own 1-15 or 300 West farther out. 1 
19 I have right to access directly over that other road. | 
2 0 THE COURT: What if you say, I abut [ 
21 500 West, which is a part of the integrated project. I 
2 2 Why couldn't they say that? | 
2 3 MR. BURNETT: Because it's still the [ 
2 4 question of, where are your rights? Your rights are 1 
[ 2 5 only to 500 West Has there been anything involving f 
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500 West that has taken your view? Otherwise, you're 
saying something -
THE COURT; Well, it moved 
MR. BURNETT: What? 
THE COURT: It moved 
MR. BURNETT: It moved, yes. But where did 
that, in any method, take away the view? 
THE COURT: Well, that's a question of fact. 
They still have a right to view, and if it did 
> interfere with their right to view, they've got a 
. compensable claim. 
! MR BURNETT: But it's not a question of 
• fact, because it's already agreed there was nothing 
t done to 500 West that changed the view out from the 
> remainder property. 
> THE COURT: So you claim the facts are 
f
 undisputed? 
1 MR BURNETT: The facts are undisputed. 
) THE COURT: But that's different from 
) claiming that simply because their pertinent rights 
. abut on 500 West, that anything that happens with the 
I integrated project beyond 500 West boundaries 
I impeded in some significant fashion by what was on 
5 the other side of 500 West as part of the project, 
Page 15 
they'd have compensable claims there, would they not? 
MR BURNETT: No. Because their right is to 
the abutting road 
THE COURT: How does that differ from what 
we had in Ivers? That's what I'm struggling with. 
Because in Ivers it was part of one integrated 
project, and they were, under our opinion, awarded 
compensation for loss of view. 
MR BURNETT: Because the road feat was 
) being elevated - the highway that was the abutting 
L highway. They did not have to look beyond abutting 
2 rights, as the Minnesota Supreme Court, who we 
5 pointed in our briefs, states, extend to the full 
1 width of the street. They don't go out beyond to 
5 other property. That would be an extension of-
6 THE COURT: So in Ivers it was only because 
7 the abutting road was raised? 
B MR BURNETT: That the abutting road, that 
9 they had rights to, was the road that abutted their 
0 property. 
1 THE COURT: Ivers it was, what, 89 was the 
2 abutting road? 
3 MR BURNETT: Highway 89, exactly. 
4 THE COURT: 89 was raised and there was an 
5 access that was created 
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1 MR. BURNETT: It was an off ramp from 89, 1 
2 which was becoming more limited access. So the 1 
3 Frontage Road really was off the southbound off ramp, 1 
4 meeting Shepherd's Lane, the cross street. E 
5 THE COURT: Why, then, does the - why can't 8 
5 the inverse argument be made, that if we define 1 
7 abutting rights as meaning, can you still see across 1 
8 Fifth West, 500 West, then Admiral has nothing to 1 
9 complain about there. 1 
10 But if we were to take the inverse 1 
11 argument and say, well, if UDOT hadn't widened 1 
12 Fifth West, our view would be the same, why doesn't 1 
13 that - why isn't that included in the abutting 1 
14 rights? Because if you had not widened Fifth West, E 
15 could you have raised the freeway? I 
16 MR. BURNETT: No. For the purposes of this i 
17 motion in limine, we agreed that it was an essential | 
18 part of the project. 1 
19 The difference comes down to, as 1 
1 2 0 Judge Faust pointed out, he stated they could assert | 
21 any - in his decision thafs being appealed, 1 
2 2 defendant is able to assert claims for any severance I 
2 3 damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to 1 
-24 being an adjoining landowner to 500 West. 1 
2 5 THE COURT: I guess my question to you is: | 
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1 The way you describe the interpretation of that, it 8 
2 has only to do, can you see across 500 West? 1 
3 MR. BURNETT: Yes. 1 
4 THE COURT: Vm asking, why couldn't that 1 
5 precise same legal principle be used to examine, I 
6 what's the result of widening 500 West on your view? 1 
7 MR BURNETT: Because what you then are 1 
8 doing is going beyond an abutting right, a property 1 
9 right for the abutting road and saying that other i 
10 property beyond that roadway that was never — that 1 
11 was just property on the other side is now subject to 1 
12 my right to view. | 
13 THE COURT: But isn't that exactly what the i 
14 integrated project doctrine was intended to permit? E 
15 MR. BURNETT: No, Your Honor. What the I 
16 integrated doctrine project was intended to permit 1 
17 was that if the property taken from you was not part 1 
18 of the obstruction, the construction that elevated a I 
19 road or otherwise obstructed your view on the 1 
2 0 abutting road, you could still reobtain relief, to 1 
21 avoid what happens in Colorado. 1 
2 2 The Colorado Supreme Court has said that 1 
23 if your right to view, you allege has; been violated, 1 
2 4 you must show it was violated not by obstruction that 1 
2 5 was part of an integrated project, you must show it I 
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1 was obstructed by that portion of the construction 
2 that was done on the condemned piece of property. 
3 This Court has gone extended beyond many 
4 other courts and said you had to show that it was the 
5 use of your property, that the obstructive 
6 construction was on your property that was condemned. 
7 Now, if it was used for that abutting road project, 
8 it can be even if it's not on the part that's 
9 condemned. 
10 THE COURT: Assume for a moment that instead 
11 of a warehouse on the property, there is occupying 
12 the property the last existing Frank Lloyd Wright 
13 house. Change your view on visibility? 
14 MR. BURNETT: No. 
15 THE COURT: So it's, in your view, a 
16 categorical position? 
17 MR. BURNETT: Yes. For both view and 
18 visibility. Because in the same circumstance, that 
19 wonderful Frank Lloyd Wright house, because of its 
2 0 importance, do we now say that all adjoining, 
21 adjacent, or nearby property owners have no right to 
2 2 put up an office building that might mar the 
2 3 beautiful view or visibility of this construction, of 
24 this edifice? 
25 THE COURT: Well, but the difference is that 
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1 can condemn it. And the Constitutional right is to 
2 be compensated for the take. 
3 The question becomes: Where the State 
4 exercises that power and insists on something that 
5 you otherwise might be able to block as a private 
6 citizen against another private citizen, why should 
7 we prohibit the measure of damages if it is directly 
8 linked, not necessarily abutting property, but just 
9 simply you can make the causal factual connection as 
10 a matter of feet in law. Why should it be limited? 
11 MR. BURNETT: Because to reach that, you're 
12 taking a property right and extending it beyond the 
13 property involved. 
14 THE COURT: It's pretty hard to say that any 
15 right to view wouldn't extend beyond the property, 
16 would it? 
17 MR. BURNETT: The right to view, though, is 
18 only found to the abutting roadway. 
19 THE COURT: In condemnation cases, yeah. 
20 MR. BURNETT: No. In any case, Your Honor. 
21 Because the right to view isn*t a pertinent easement. 
22 You have to have earned it. Normal case you find a 
2 3 right to view is where youVe either burdened by an 
2 4 easement in an adjoining property or adjacent 
2 5 property, or where you have it as a law because it's 
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1 if the adjoining property owners choose to do that, 
2 that is in some ways a risk that the owner of the 
3 historic house takes. But they can oppose that 
4 But if the State chooses to do it, it's 
5 very difficult for them to oppose it. It's very 
6 difficult for them to say, you can't build it. They 
7 can argue about what it costs, but they can't say you 
8 can't do it, right? 
9 MR BURNETT: But the difference here, Your 
10 Honor, is that you have a property right or you 
11 don't. You have a property right of pertinent 
12 easements to the abutting road. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. 
14 MR BURNETT: Just because the State owns 
15 the road - the property on the far side of the road, 
16 doesn't give you any further right to object. If the 
17 construction had been not a road of 1-15 being 
18 elevated, if it had been a new State office complex 
19 that would block out all view or visibility from 
2 0 further road, at that point --
21 THE COURT: The argument is that if my 
2 2 neighbor wants to build an apartment building next to 
23 me, but in order to do it he needs three feet of my 
2 4 property, I can block it if that's important to me. 
25 If the State wants to do it, I can't. Because toy 
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a public road. So this would be extending it beyond 
that property. 
But indeed, this Court need not even 
reach that issue. Because the reality is: Everyone 
of the appraisals was rejected not only because it 
sought a right to view above and beyond that to 
500 West. Every one of the appraisals also included 
claims of right to visibility. This Court has never 
accepted right to visibility, and each of those 
appraisals would have been properly rejected, thrown 
out under the motions in limine, because of their 
seeking to present evidence to the jury of a right 
that doesn't exist. 
THE COURT: Counsel, how do you sever those 
damages? It seems to me that the appraisal business 
looks at fair market value when the part of fair 
market value as a whole always is going to include 
that right of visibility. So on what basis could an 
appraiser segregate that value out? 
MR. BURNETT: By taking out that part which 
is due to the motoring traffic and the value of 
ongoing business because of motoring traffic and 
accessibility to having the motoring traffic viewing 
in or visibility in. 
THE COURT: Did your appraiser purport to do 
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that? 
MR. BURNETT: Yes, I believe so. The 
question was that the other side's appraisers -
well, I don*t want to go into something that's not in 
the briefs. But there was a question earlier about 
whether or not there was any right to view that was 
valuable, if it was all just the right to be visible 
to motoring traffic. 
But the important point is: If this 
Court would need to under our stare decisis, reject 
its long line of precedent, including Ivers, that 
Admiral Beverage claims it's relying on, Ivers is the 
most recent one that expressly said, there is no such 
right to visibility. It is not - it does not exist, 
does not need to be compensated, The burden of 
overcoming stare decisis has not been met, was not 
even attempted to be met by Admiral Beverage. 
The fact is: What is right of 
visibility? To be seen by the traveling public. 
THE COURT: Well, as I understand Admiral's 
argument, a value is assigned, either explicitly, but 
it sounds to me more likely implicitly, to view and 
visibility in every appraisal that is made of real 
property in the United States of America, which 
strikes me as a factual question, actually. 
Page 24 
1 Ifthere are no further questions, I'd 
2 submit. 
3 THECOURT: Thank you very much. Youmay 
4 reply. 
5 MR. MARTINEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 There's no question that the property 
7 involved here was an essential part of an integrated 
8 UDOT project. Td also like to say that the way that 
9 just compensation, under the rules of this Court has 
10 announced, depends on decreasing fair market value. 
11 Fair market value takes into account all of the 
12 elements that a willing buyer would pay and that a 
13 willing seller would take for that property. 
14 THECOURT: Counsel, I think it has to be 
15 clear, I think beyond reasonable dispute, that 
16 visibility has value. The fact that a property can 
17 be seen by motorists on a road, no doubt increases 
18 the value of the property. 
19 MR. MARTINEAU: Yes, this is the most -
20 THECOURT: But the question here is: In 
21 the case where that value arises by virtue of the 
2 2 State having decided to put the road there in the 
2 3 first place, is it necessarily compensable as a 
2 4 taking, given that the State could close down the 
25 road all together if they wanted. I mean, I think 
Page 23 
MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, it still comes 
back to the question of law. Because this appraiser 
says, I can't parcel it out, not because I can't 
factor, but when I only look to other purchases and 
sales in the area, I can't parcel out visibility, 
does that mean that this Court needs to reverse its 
case law and find that we made a mistake, visibility 
is compensable? 
All you have to do is play a game of how 
D you plead it. If you plead it as a separate, 
L distinct item, it's rejected because it doesn't 
2 exist. If you put it into a generic amount, contrary 
3 to statute, where the statute says as far as 
& practical compensation shall be assessed for each 
5 source of damage separately. If you disregard that 
6 and put it into a lump sum, you can have it, even 
7 though this Court has routinely said it doesn't 
8 exist. 
9 The Court of Appeals was correct in its 
D Footnote 2 in this case when it pointed out that 
1 regardless of what happens with right of view, that 
2 it's completely contrary to Ivers and the decision of 
3 this Court to continue to seek a recompense for a 
4 right of visibility, which this Court has routinely 
5 said does not exist. 
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1 thafs the issue that needs to be addressed. 
2 MR. MARTINEAU: There's no reason why that 
3 ought to be the case. If UDOT bought property that 
4 weren't adjacent to the freeway, they'd pay die full 
5 market value, and that may have substantial value in 
6 visibility or view. Why are they given a special 
7 dispensation here? Makes no sense. 
8 Not only that, but since the definition 
9 of just compensation depends on fair market value, 
10 and fair market value has to include those very 
11 items, how can you say it's consistent with the duty 
12 to pay just compensation to let them have these 
13 values for nothing, without paying anything for them? 
14 Even the Federal Government, when 
15 they're doing a federal project, have to pay a just 
16 compensation. And there's no basiis for reducing that 
17 in those cases. Only UDOT, and only on cases 
18 involving property next to a freeway, is given this 
19 kind of a by. 
20 THECOURT: Mr. Martineau -
21 MR. MARTINEAU: Let me say this. The only 
2 2 difference between this case and Ivers, the only 
2 3 difference, is that before the take, the Ivers 
2 4 case - the Ivers case was not adjacent to a State 
2 5 road. That's the only difference in this case than 
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1 that one. The only difference is that-
2 THE COURT: Well, it was adjacent. It just 
3 wasn't abutting it, 
4 MR. BURNETT: It wasnft abutting. That's 
5 what Vm saying. 
6 THE COURT: It was visible from the State 
7 road. 
8 MR MARTINEAU: They say that because 
9 Admiral's property abutted 500 West as opposed to 
10 1-15 prior to the take, that we're not entitled to 
11 anything. 
12 Now, I might say this: There's no case 
13 that I have found and no authority that says that the 
14 property that's damaged has to abut UDOT or a State 
15 highway. 
16 THE COURT: But even if y o u -
17 MR MARTINEAU: This is a case of first 
18 impression. 
19 THE COURT: But even if you were to win on 
2 0 that, what evidence do you have of a loss of view as 
21 opposed to visibility? 
22 MR. MARTINEAU: It's in the appraisal. It's 
23 in the appraisal. And the appraisal was done ~ 
24 THE COURT: It cannot be extricated from the 
2 5 evidence of loss of visibility, then? You can't tell 
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Mr. Martineau and Mr. Burnett. We appreciate the 
argument this morning. We'll take the case under 
advisement, and The Court will be in recess. 
(The hearing concluded) 
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1 the difference - there's no difference in the 
2 appraisal between what Admiral has lost in its view 
3 looking out from the property, versus what it's lost 
4 in the ability of the traveling public to see it? 
5 MR MARTINEAU: UDOT wants us to separate 
6 those out and deduct that from fair market value. 
7 THE COURT: Well, you're asking us to 
8 overrule Ivers and the line of cases on which Ivers 
9 relied in determining that loss of visibility was not 
10 compensable. If we decline to do that, I'm asking 
11 you what's left of your claim? 
12 MR MARTINEAU: Well, I think that Ivers 
13 should be overruled and that the cases should be 
14 consistent with the Constitutional mandate. 
15 But at least it shouldn't be expanded -
16 their right to take property without payment 
17 shouldn't be expanded in this case. Because there's 
18 no case they've cited that would come to that 
19 conclusion. 
2 0 Not only that, but this case complies 
21 fully with all of the requirements of Ivers and of 
22 the appropriate sections — it's section 70 - Til 
23 find it here. Just a moment. Yeah. 78(b)-6-511 
24 sub22. Thank you, Your Honor. 
2 5 THE COURT: Thank you very much, 
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had no such law before. We have had 
nothing declaring this Inequality, but 
they have been equal Just the same. 
But there may a contingency arise In 
this country when this power, or rather 
this limitation upon the power of the 
state government, will be exceedingly 
dangerous. 1 think that it ought to be 
wiped out and left entirely to the legis-
lature. For that reason I am in favor of 
the motion to strike out. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire 
to state—the gentleman has said that 
this is the same proposition that is in 
the state of Wyoming. I will say that 
It Is also In North Dakota, Arkansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin— 
as many as that and I don't know how 
many others. 
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I 
would be In favor of the motion for 
this reason, that there may come a 
time when the safety and defense of our 
government might require that there 
should be a distinction between aliens 
and citizens, in regard to holding prop-
erty, and I think that it can be safely 
left to the Legislature. 
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the 
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, was 
to strike out section 21. Mr. Wells 
moves to amend by striking out the 
word "resident" in line 2. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
raise a point of order on that; that is 
not germane. 
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of 
order is raised, I shall have to sustain 
it. 
The question was taken on the motion 
of Mr. Varian, and on division there 
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43. 
Section 21 was stricken out. 
Section 22 was read as follows: 
Section 22. Neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist in 
this State. 
Mr. WHITNEY. Mr. Chairman, I 
propose a slight amendment in line 2, 
that the word "whereof" be stricken 
out and the words, "of which" be sub-
stituted. 
Mr. EICHNOR. I think that is the 
language of the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Mr. WELLS. Exactly. 
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adhering 
to the Constitution of the United States 
when we copy it. 
Mr. WHITNEY. It is a hundred 
years old. 
The question being taken on the 
motion of Mr. Whitney, the amend-
ment was rejected. 
Section 23 was read as follows: 
Section 23. Private proj>erty shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1 
move an amendment by adding the 
words "first made," so that his com-
pensation shall be made before the prop-
erty is taken. That is in accord with 
most of the constitutions. 
Mr. ROBERTS. Does that mean bo-
fore the damage is clone? 
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move to strike 
out the words "or damaged." 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I call 
for a division of that—there are two 
motions. 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will di-
vide the motion so that the question on 
striking out "or damaged" will first be 
voted upon. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1 
would like to suggest to the gentleman 
from Salt Lake, Mr. Varian, that my 
purpose in offering this amendment is 
to provide for a compensation being 
made before the property is taken. If 
the words "or damaged" are put In 
there that cannot be very well deter-
mined. There ought to be a separate 
section covering the damage of the 
property. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I am 
-in-accord with the motion of the gen-
tleman to require the compensation to 
be first made, but it seems to me that 
Goosfc 
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to strike out "or damaged" is a very 
material matter. I have taken pains 
to look at it a little to-day in the late 
works on eminent domain, and I find 
it is put in other constitutions or stat-
utes to meet the entire case. In some 
states some courts have held that dam-
age to property of a consequential kind 
was not necessarily within the meaning 
of the article of the constitution. For 
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I 
may have confounded the state—the 
question arose where an elevated road 
was eitfcted upon a street and while it 
did not touch the property of the abut-
ting owner, did not destroy a brick, did 
not take afoot of his ground, it did af-
fect his use and occupation of his prem-
ises very disastrously. It affected the 
convenience of the inhabitants of a 
house, and in this particular cane, fol-
lowing later, it was held that there was 
no remedy. There was nut the taking 
of the property. Now, the courts of 
New York went off in another direction 
and it is finally settled in that case that 
such injury as that could t>e compen-
sated under the law of eminent domain. 
To make it perfectly clear this word has 
been put in laws and constitutions, and 
the text-writers say that it is an equiv-
alent for any kind of injury of that 
kind. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
agree that the compensation ought to 
to be made, but the trouble would be to 
make it first in the case of a consequen-
tial damage. 
Mr. FAKR. I do not see why. Take 
a case like that. It could be estimated. 
There could be no subsequent change; 
there is the railroad; there is the house; 
there are the windows; there is the 
deprivation of light and air; there are 
all the necessary inconveniences of noise 
and soot and cinders, and disturbing 
the peace and rest of the family. That 
can be compensated for just as well in 
the beginning as it can after the lapse 
of ten years, because the means of ar-
riving at the estimate are within the 
knowledge of men and can be adduced 
before a jury. I do not care how the 
gentleman does it. I do not wish to be 
technical about it; I would like to see 
those words, "or damaged," kept in 
some way. 
I hope those words, "or damaged," 
will remain in that section. I do not 
wish to argue the point, but I can Bee 
in a great many instances where it 
would be very important. For instance, 
on a sidewalk, a person owning land; 
they dig down a bank ten or fifteen feet, 
and damage that lot to a great extent. 
I think the man should be remunerated 
for the damage done to his lot. I move 
that those words remain in that section 
if they possibly can remain there. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my 
objection to the words "or damaged" 
is the utter impracticability of pro-
viding for compensation before the 
damage is done. Now, I will cite an 
instance familar to a great many. A 
few years ago people in Salt Lake 
County placed some boards in a dam 
here at the point of the mountain; 
they had a right to do that if they did 
not damage anybody and I don't sup-
pose they thought they would damage 
anybody, at the same time they did It; 
but the result was that a great many 
people in Utah County were damaged, 
after the act which cauned the damage. 
Now, in a case of that kind how would 
compensation be made before the act 
was done which caused the damage? 
Damage is not always—in fact is not 
often contemplated or expected. It 
comes unlooked for as the consequence 
of an act which the party performs. 
Consequently it seems to me that as to 
taking property by the law of eminent 
domain they should have the right to 
take it when they pay for it, if the ne-
cessity for taking it exists. As regards 
damaging it, why, it ought to l>e paid 
for as soon as the damage can l>e ascer-
tained. It seems to me that this is the 
only way that it can l>e done. 
Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. Chairman, if 1 
CTOC>2 
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understand the gentleman correctly, 
from Utah County, he would i>e in 
favor of striking out the words, "or 
damaged." Gentlemen. I hope this 
amendment will prevail. Jm-t for the 
very reason that the gentleman from 
Weber County said it should be in the 
Constitution. Take a city like Salt 
Lake, where grading is required, or any 
other city where grading is required, 
and you will bankrupt those cities if 
you place this in the Constitution. 
Every man that owns property in the 
street—the street will lie graded and 
one or two or three j>eople will claim 
damages and the result will be it will 
bring the municipalities into court. 
Mr. VARIAN. Would not the com-
pensation benefit always allowed in a 
case of that kind more than equalize 
the damage? 
Mr. ELCHNOE. The law is unsettled 
at present in regard to the grading of 
streets whether they can secure dam-
ages; it would simply bankrupt Salt 
Lake City, I tell you that, gentle-
men, if you place this in the Consti-
tution. 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman. I am 
in favor of retaining the words "or 
damaged." I recollect a spectacle a few 
years ago of grading in Salt Lake City. 
There was a certain street—I believe it 
was State street—the grade h*td been 
established for some years, and the city 
came in and established a different grade 
and built the street up some ten feet 
higher than property abutting on it. 
There is a spectacle where they could 
not get any damages for it, and the 
street as it was built absolutely de-
stroyed the value of their property and 
they could not get a cent for that. I 
say that it ought to be fixed so that 
the city must adjust the grade for the 
accommodation of people that own 
property along a certain street and 
that is the reason that I am anxious 
that the words "or damaged" should be 
left in. And in speaking to the re-
marks Mr. Varian made, I desire to 
read a line or tw<* from Lewis in his 
work upon Eminent Domain: 
"When the people of Illinois revised 
their constitution in 1870, they intro-
duced an important change into the 
provision respecting the power of emi-
nent domain. The provision reads as 
follows: * Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation/ Every other state 
which has revised its constitution since 
1870, except North Carolina, which 
never had any provision on the subject, 
has followed the example set by Illinois 
by adding the word 'damaged' or its 
equivalent to the provision in question." 
And the question not only refers to 
street grades in cities, but refers to 
grades of railway property. For in-
stance, it is unfair that a railroad should 
run right next to a man's front door or 
almost next to his front door, ahd that 
his property should be destroyed or 
half the value taken away without 
making some compensation for that 
property which is really not reached, 
as no part of the property is taken; 
that is, the part of the property that is 
damaged; and I say I am in favor of 
being liberal in eminent domain act, but 
whenever we grant this liberty to cor-
porations in any way—public or private 
corporations, we should make them pay 
for whatever the}' take, and I believe 
the words "or damaged" should remain 
in the Constitution. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am 
opposed to the motion to strike out the 
words "or damaged." I l>elieve, as has 
lieen said already in this discussion, 
that when the public use a man's prop-
erty or make an improvement that vir-
tually destroys the use of that property, 
that they should pay for it a* much as 
if the property itself were taken. Of 
course, as lias l>een suggested by the 
gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever 
benefit results by reason of this im-
provement is setoff against the damage 
that is caused, and in that way the 
public gets absolute justice in relation 
to the matter, but to say that a public 
corporation should be i>ermitted l»,\ the 
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raising ol a grade or by the lowering of 
a grade or by any other kind of im-
provement to injure private property 
and because they don't actually enter 
upon and take the property itself, 
although they do destroy the use of 
the property, that they should be liable 
for damage; I think it is unjust and 
unfair and I am therefore opposed to 
this motion. 
Mr. RALEIOH. Mr. Chairman, I pro-
pose a slight amendment, "Private 
property shall not be taken for public 
use or damage without just compensa-
tion first be made." Simply a recon-
struction of the section, that is all. 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules 
that that would be a proper question 
on revision and compilation. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
will withdraw the motion to amend as 
tar as "or damaged" is concerned if it is 
not objected to. 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I don't 
think that 'first made" should be put 
in there. If I recollect the statute cor-
rectly now, whenever a corporation is 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of the 
eminent domain act and desires to take 
property at all, before they can do it 
they have to apply to the court, and it 
is within the discretion of the court to 
fix a bond and require good sureties 
before that property is taken, and I 
l>elieve it should be left to the Legisla-
ture as to how it shall be taken. This 
is simply a declaration of principles 
that it shall not be taken. The Legis-
lature can require any corporation 
either private or public, to put up a 
bond before they take anybody's prop-
erty or damage it, without any consti-
tutional provision. 
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I am in 
favor of the motion of the gentleman 
from Utah, that the amendment shall 
be added to the section for the reason 
that notwithstanding the gentleman 
from Salt Lake says compensation may 
be secured, yet we know of cases—there 
are many in the Territory where prop-
erty has been taken and the party dis-
possessed and that the property be liti-
gated for for considerable length of time 
and the party kept out of possession, 
'notwithstanding there may be a bond 
there, and at the same time probably he 
would have to sue upon the bond 
afterwards. I think it is a very strong 
proposition anyway to give the public 
a right to dispossess a private person of 
his property summarily and it seems to 
me he ought to l>e compensated before 
that is done, because he may be put to 
a great inconvenience and loss of time. 
He may have to sue even upon the bond 
after he should vindicate his rights in 
the court. Therefore, I am in favor 
that if that should be required, he 
should be first compensated before his 
property is taken. 
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do 
not believe the committee can pass 
such an amendment. Emergencies may 
arise when it would l>e simply impos-
sible to carry it out. What there 
ought to be is a law (and that belongs 
to the Legislature) to compel fair treat-
ment both ways. It is true that rail-
road companies have had the right of 
way, and they own and have owned 
for thirty years where they have gone 
through. It is just as true that if you 
try to build a railroad through some 
back street in Provo, or up to some 
mining camp, you would find your-
self confronted with the most ridiculous 
property values you ever heard of, and 
every man in that town that you would 
get as an appraiser would raise the 
price. It is all right as it is; let the 
Legislature fix it Bometime within a 
year that the property shall be paid for 
and that the party taking the property 
shall give ample bonds. In this bill of 
righto it is simply foolish to put some-
thing that cannot be executed, because 
emergencies would arise in the mines, 
in the cities, and in the fields, where 
there are floods that would make it im-
possible. Sometimes the thing is to be 
acted upon in a moment, and there will 
Google 
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be no one to pay in advance, or to esti-
mate in advance what the damages 
shall be. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman, I 
want to call the attention of this com-
mittee to the fact that there are other 
cases in which it would be Impossible to 
make the payment before the work 
was done, which would be held to be 
damaged. Take the instance that has 
been brought up by grading of a street. 
We all know by experience that many 
a time men at the time the street was 
driven through and the grade is changed 
think their property is injured and in-
jured very severely. But upon further 
consideration, and seeing the benefits of 
the work that had been done for the 
public they find that where they would 
have considered themselves greatly dam-
aged in the first instance their property, 
in the eyes of every real estate man, 
has actually been improved and in-
creased in value. Now, if the damages 
have to be paid t>efore the property 
was taken or damaged,do you suppose 
that any one would come to the con-
clusion, no matter how much others 
did, that he had been robbed in receiv-
ing the damage that he thought he 
had sustained at the time and was 
ready to pay it back to the public? 
Another instance, we will take the 
case of a railway which in some man-
ner, rightfully or wrongfully, has ac-
quired its right of way, and we will say 
a hundred feet on each side of the rail-
road track, or two hundred feet wide 
in all. or a hundred feet wide; another 
railway wants to cut across the line 
and they know they are going to be a 
competing line, how long do you sup-
pose it will take the railway in posses-
sion to come to the conclusion that 
they are not going to let those people 
go through on a decent rate of dam-
ages? They will hold them there until 
the charter of the other railroad ex-
pires if it was possible to do it. And 
where you make a law of this kind and 
say that the damage must l>e paid first, 
how are you going to estimate your 
damage? They say, "we will be dam-
aged ten thousand or ten hundred 
thousand dollars by you crossing our 
tracks." The law provides for it now, 
it says, "you can proceed with your 
condemnation proceedings by giving a 
bond to answer in damages." What is 
the trouble with that? Why not have 
it? Are we going to have only the 
railroads that we have here now or are 
we going to have others that will 
cross the tracks of this, that, or the 
other corporation? The same thing 
will come—suppose a railroad was 
going to a mining camp and there was 
a narrow canyon and some fellow had 
a claim and one corner of it lapped 
over the proposed course of that rail-
road: his claim is benefitted by the rail-
way, that strip of land with no mineral 
on it would be worth for that occasion 
ten times the value of the mineral part 
of the claim, and he would assess his 
damages to the railroad company at 
such a figure that if they paid many 
such claims as that, it would cost them 
double the amount to build the rail-
road. Now, is not the citizens pro-
tected by the fact that our laws 
would say that the bonds must be filed 
to secure the damage, then the work 
can proceed, so that there will not be 
this unnecessary delay? Would not the 
public be benefitted by forcing a rail-
road company upon bonds being given. 
to let another railroad company cross 
their track? Are not we looking for 
the development of this country and 
not to say that those who are in pos-
session of surface ground of one kind 
or another shall say to the world, "Oh. 
you cannot cross our ground without 
paying us what we estimate it is 
worth, no matter what the develop-
ment is that is done; we do not want 
the land; we say we do for this occa-
sion. We are not using it, but you can-
not use it; we will sit here as guardians 
of the right of way, and this, that, 
or the other thing, and say you must 
Google 
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not come until you pay us Just what 
w^e see fit?" Gentlemen, such an act ae 
that, in ray 'opinion, would be putting 
into*the hands of men who wanted to 
act as obstructionists, the power to act 
as highwaymen to every enterprise 
that came along, and say, "throw up 
your hands and give all your money 
to me." 
The Hon. John Clark was admitted 
to the floor, at the request of Mr. 
James. 
Mr. BOYEK. Mr. Chairman, I hope 
the motion to amend will not prevail 
for the reason that I have a case in my 
mind now. Some two or three years 
ago a certain railroad company build-
ing a railway to Springville, having 
right of way, and they had fairty and 
justly compensated the parties for 
properties that they had used for their 
road. Subsequent to the building of 
the track and the running of the line it 
appears as though the erection of the 
grade had caused also some swamp 
lands to arise to a very great damage 
to the party that was interested there. 
It was a subsequent damage to that 
that could not possibly have been 
thought to have been asked for at the 
time of the construction of the road; 
hence I think, as it has been stated by a 
number of persons here, that to collect 
a consequential damage would really 
be inconsistent, and as I construe this 
section as it reads "private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for pub-
lic use, without Just compensation," 
that it conveys to the party owning 
the property the idea that he holds and 
has an inherited right in his property, 
and when just compensation is made 
therefor, he is entitled then to convey 
a title to the property. And further-
more, in answer to the gentleman on 
my right in relation to a railway hold-
ing another railway company off, the 
construction I place upon this argu-
ment is this, that if one railway com-
pany be a private corporation, owning 
private property, all other railway 
companies of necessity muBt be private 
corporations, and consequently in re-
lation to railway companies may not 
fully apply here; or private property 
taken for public use does not really and 
necessarily mean that a man's private 
property taken for railway purposes 
is converted to a public use, but it is 
converted to a private corporation and 
the private corporation eventually uses 
the road for public purposes; and hence, 
I believe that the right in private 
property is covered and provided in the 
section following, 24. I believe it is 
there fully covered and that section 23 
guarantees all the rights of the indi-
vidual that are necessary. And if 1 un-
derstand what constitutes the conver-
sion of proj>erty to public use, the pub-
lic is alwayg good for the damages that 
may accrue against the private indi-
vidual. 
Mr. THURMAN. Let me ask you a 
question. 
Mr. BOYER. Yes, sir. 
Mr. THURMAN. Please tell me under 
what provision of the next section you 
place a railway company. If it does 
not come under the head of public use, 
where does it come? 
Mr. BOYER. I would say this, that 
I have to place it in just the same posi-
tion that I would a man that would 
own one acre of land—a railway run-
ning through and across that ground, 
that is given to a railway company, I 
would hold to be a private corporation, 
and as such they would be entitled to 
compensate the individual for the dam-
ages they would do the property they 
would take and also be liable for any 
subsequent damage that might be done. 
Mr. Howard offered the folio wing sub-
stitute for section 23: 
Private property shall not be taken 
for public use without just compensa-
tion first made, and no private prop-
erty shall be damaged for public use 
without just compensation to be deter-
mined by a competent tribunal. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am 
opposed to the substitute, and I am op-
Google 
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posed to the amendments, because as 
has been shown here already m this dis-
cussion, it is very apparent that emer-
gencies may arise when It will be im-
possible to determine the amount of 
damage or the value of the property 
taken before the property would have 
to be used. Not only that, but if this 
section applies to railroad corporations, 
as I am Inclined to think it does, then I 
am opposed to the amendment for 
this reason, that It would prevent the 
construction of railroads and the mak-
ing of other Improvements—that is, 
other improvements that would be for 
public use. It is true that private prop-
erty taken for a railroad would be taken 
by a private corporation, but It would 
betaken for a public use because the 
public use the railroad. Now, I am not 
in favor of any railroad corporation, or 
of any corporation, public or private, 
taking any private property that It 
does not pay for. I want that distinctly 
understood; but I do say that when 
provision is made by the giving of 
bonds for the payment of the value of 
the property taken, or of the damage 
that may be sustained to the property 
by reason of the use that It may be put 
to, then the party owning the property 
Is safely protected and the public im-
provement can go on, whether it be 
taken by a public corporation or 
whether it be by a private corporation. 
For example, a railway company de-
sires to construct a railroad and they 
are met by the exorbitant demands of 
perhaps one or two or three, or a dozen 
persons owning laud on the line of their 
road. These people say "we absolutely 
refuse to make any terms with you/' or 
they put their price so high that the 
railroad company feel they cannot pay 
it and ought not to pay it. Perhaps 
several times as much as the property 
is worth; perhaps they do not want the 
railroad there at any price. What is the 
result? Proceedings for condemnation 
would have to be taken, and according 
to the experience of the courts, as we 
have had them here for years past, one 
or two years would be consumed in de-
termining the value of that property, 
and the compensation to which the 
owner was entitled, before the railway 
could be constructed. Railroads would 
not be built under those circumstances, 
and railway companies do not project 
railways this year in the expectation 
that they will construct them two or 
three years hence. By the time they 
had acquired the title to their property 
and the right to pass over it, tlje exi-
gency, or the desire, or the necessity for 
the railway may no longer exist. It 
may not be desirable and the road 
might never be constructed. 
I say that under the present law, they 
have all the protection that is neces-
sary. Just such a law as we may pre-
sume that the Legislature would pass 
in the new State, and that IB when any 
company—a private corporation or & 
public corporation—would enter upon 
the property of another person, or of a 
company or a corporation, that they 
should give a good and sufficient bond 
to be responsible for the damage that 
may be awarded and then they can go 
on and construct their Improvement, 
and as soon as the courts can determine 
the question, the party gets his pay. 
Mr. VARIAN. Will the gentleman 
answer a question? 
Mr. RICHARDS. I will try to if the 
gentleman will ask it. 
Mr. VARIAN. 1 just want to know if 
it is your idea that the railway com-
pany should take the man's farm 
whether he is willing or not, and then 
litigate It or not? 
Mr. RICHARDS. It is my idea that if 
a railroad is projected through my farm 
and I refuse to make reasonable terms 
with the railway company, that the 
company may euter upon that ground 
and by giving a proper bond they may 
take possession of it, and when the 
value of that property is determined 
and the damages I have sustained— 
they are to pay it. That is my idea of 
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it exactly, and I way that if I don't 
adopt this method—if you adopt the 
other method, then you put a block in 
the way of progress and of develop-
ment in this country, and in this new 
State, that the people of the State do 
not want to have there; that is what I 
say. I instanced it in the very example 
I have stated. I can point to cases now 
that are pending in the district court 
in this district that have l>een pending 
there over a year—Just such cases as I 
am speaking of where companies have 
entered upon the property of people, 
who refused to enter into negotiations 
with them or to agree with them on a 
fair compensation for that property; 
they entered upon it and gave their 
bonds, and from that day to this the 
court has not reached that case and 
they haven't been able to litigate it. 
Now, would you say that railroad 
should not have been constructed—that 
that public improvement, whatever it 
might be, ought not to t>e made. Why, 
II you say that, you will not have rail-
roads, and many other public improve-
ments will not be made, for the reason, 
as I have stated, that when men enter 
into these undertakings that involve 
the expenditure of large amounts of cap-
ital, they do it because the time is ripe 
when the}' enter upon the enterprise 
for the accomplishment of it, and if they 
cannot accomplish it within a reason-
able time, if they have got to w#ait two 
or three years before they can commence 
the construction of the road, they are 
not going to build a railroad, they are 
not going to project it. For that 
reason, I say I am opposed to it and J 
say that the individual has ample pro-
tection, when the owner of the property 
and the company that desires to take 
it cannot agree upon its value and upon 
the damage that will be incurred, and a 
sufficient bond is put up, as soon as the 
matter is determined he gets his money. 
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I hope 
the gentlemen will be a little patient. I 
don't believe there is a question to come 
up before this Convention that will be 
of greater importance to it than the one 
that is being discussed right now. I am 
heartily in accord, Mr. Chairman, with 
the remarks of the gentleman who has 
just been on the floor, Mr. Richards; 1 
don$t believe we can afford in this Con-
vention to take that matter out of the 
hands of the Legislature. I am in 
favor of the Legislature meeting and 
arranging how this shall be done. I say 
that we can afford to be as liberal as 
the great state of Illinois. There is a 
state that is almost one Bolid garden. 
It is said that there is not one point in 
the state of Illinois that is ten miles 
from a railroad. Now, what do they 
do? They leave it to the Legislature, 
and as it has been read on this floor 
already during this debate, they simply 
say that damages and compensation 
shall be allowed by a jury or fixed by 
the state. They leave it to the Legis-
lature. Nowr, why cannot we be as 
liberal as they are? Mr. Chairman, I 
can tell you why we cannot be more 
liberal than they are, for the very reason 
that the lands that our railroads are 
built over into this great vast desert 
country are far less valuable than they 
are in the state of Illinois. 
This is a country of the most difficult 
kind to build railroads and maintain 
them in. We have long hauls, and the 
most heavy grades that are to be 
found anywhere in the world, and in 
order to build railroads we must give 
them an opportunity and a fair show. 
Now, the gentlemen that are familiar 
with the construction of railroads 
through these canyons and these moun-
tains all know what the builder of a 
railroad has to contend with. 1 have 
seen it myself, within twenty-five miles 
of this town. I have seen a railroad 
blockaded for three months and our 
men behind their breastworks to pre-
vent that railroad from passing over a 
little piece of land that was not worth 
one cent, and is not worth to-day one 
cent, only for to lay that roadbed upon*, 
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and the work that existed there at the 
time when these gentlemen took pos-
session of this land was nothing more 
than some holes dug into some copper-
stained rock by some gentleman that 
had thought previous to that that 
there might be some mineral found 
there, and when this man found the 
survey was being made and the road 
must come over that point, he rushed 
out and locates and takes possession, 
and what did he do? He blocked the 
Bingham canyon railroad for two 
months and two men were shot over 
it. Now, why not allow this matter to 
be put in some shai>e so that these 
difficulties can be adjusted without 
compelling the land to l>e paid for, or 
the damages to be assessed and paid 
for before that railroad is built? I 
want to call the attention of the gen-
tlemen of this Convention to a 
point that they may not stop to 
think of. You take the state of Mon-
tana, the state of Wyoming, the state 
of Idaho, and the territories of Utah 
and Arizona, and the state of Colorado, 
and the state of Nevada, and the terri-
tory of New Mexico, and it represents 
an area in extent equal to a country 
east of the Mississippi river, or say east 
of the Missouri river, that contains 
pretty nearly thirty-seven millions of 
population. What iR the population of 
these states of this inter-mountain 
country that I have just named to you? 
Less than eleven hundred thousand. 
Now, in that sparsely settled com-
munity with interests in common with 
each other, where railroad^ must ex-
tend in order to make them valuable, 
are you going to put an obstruction in 
the way of building those roads? You 
will, my friends, if you adopt the 
proposition that the lands must be 
paid for and damages assessed and 
paid for before the railroad can move, 
or, as Mr. Richards says, you will find 
instances where they will remain in the 
courts maybe for two years and pre-
vent an enterprise being carried out 
which will be of great advantage and 
great value to the community in which 
that railroad is constructed. And I 
hope that the original proposition will 
prevail. I hope this Convention will 
leave our legislators to regulate that 
matter so that we can go ahead with 
our enterprises, with any railroads, 
with any factories, with any ditches, 
and all such things. And if we do not 
have them, we cannot be a prosperous 
and happy people. And, Mr. Chairman, 
the industrial system of a nation or a 
state is a more delicate thing than is 
often thought. We have an object les-
son before us in the last few years, 
when the country was all in prosperity 
and everything was moving and no-
body could realize 
Mr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, I arise 
to a point of order; I submit the gen-
tleman has left the main question and 
is not talking about rights of way. 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair thinks 
the gentleman is in order. 
Mr. JAMES. With this condition of 
things, before we knew it, we were in 
one of the hardest and most panicky 
conditions that a country ever saw, 
and I simply mention this, Mr. Chair-
man, to call the attention of this Con-
vention to the importance of l>eingcare-
ful how they deal with our industrial 
institutions in our new State. 
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman, I 
must confess that in listening to the 
oratory displayed by gentlemen of this 
committee upon my right and upon my 
left, I can hardly tell what some of 
them are in favor of. They think in 
their remarks it ought to be left to the 
Legislature. They presume to say they 
believe such a law ought to be enacted, 
while others believe it ought not to be. 
One of the gentlemen from Salt Lake, 
speaking upon this question, has re-
minded us very fortunately that many 
of these cases are taken into court and 
they are litigated for two or three 
years, I want to say to you, sir, that 
that is one of the reasons why I am in 
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favor of this amendment—for the rea-
son that if it should be in litigation for 
two or three years, the individual 
whose property would have been dam-
aged would have been taken and di-
verted for uses other than his own, has 
to remain out of the use of his money. 
I am opposed to that system. But, if 
the corporation that is seeking to take 
the property of the individual shall be 
told "thus far and no farther,'' you 
will find that there won't be a single case 
that will be in litigation for six months, 
but those corporations will proceed, as 
they will have the right to do, and they 
will force that question to an issue, 
when perhaps the power of an individ-
ual will be unable to accomplish that. 
If they should come against one of that 
class, he has assumed to say he had re-
fused to make a Just compensation, I 
take it, sir, that in that language he de-
sires to say that railroads offer compen-
sations that are just in every instance, 
and because men refuse to take them 
they are not just. Upon the other hand, 
my opinion goes in favor of the individ-
ual. I believe in nine cases out of ten 
that the individual whose property is 
to be taken for these uses is willing to 
make a sacrifice rather than to demand 
what is just, and I am in favor of this 
prevailing. I want to say to you that 
the Legislature have not done that in 
the past, and so far as I am concerned I 
am ready to cast my vote to place that 
restriction and say that they must do 
it in the future. 
Mr. EICHNOR. Mr. Chairman, I am 
in favor of striking out the words "or 
damaged/' I gave my reasons particu-
larly for it, but the committee thought 
differently. I am opposed to the amend 
ment for several reasons; but the main 
reason I am opposed to the amendment 
is this: The Constitution of the United 
States says, "Nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without 
just compensation." That is the law 
of the United States. Now, why not 
have the same law in this State? 
Mr. VARIAN. Will the gentleman 
permit me to answer him—because that 
was made a hundred years ago and it 
is found necessary by experience to 
change it. 
Mr. EICHNOR. The amendment was 
not made a hundred years ago. Now, 
I am opposed to tacking on this propo-
sition that compensation shall be first 
made, and I hope this committee will 
vote it down. I tell you, gentlemen, 
frankly, that if we sit here, day after 
day, and commence to improve on the 
Constitution, that the people, when 
they receive this Constitution, will vote 
it down. 
Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, I am 
in favor of the language quoted by Mr. 
Eichnor from the Constitution of the 
United States, and I believe that lan-
guage is incorporated in that substi-
tute. I am also in favor of the last pro-
vision which reads, "And private prop-
erty shall not be damaged for public 
use without just compensation, to be 
determined by a propertribunal." Now, 
that does not mean the damage must 
be paid for before it is done. It means 
that after the damage is done that a 
proper tribunal will take hold of it and 
assess the damage, and the party who 
did the damage shall pay for it. The 
first means that no property shall be 
taken until it is paid for. The other 
means that the damage shall be paid 
for after the damage has been done, and 
after the damage has been properly as-
sessed. I believe the substitute will 
cover the ground of the objections 
made, and I think it ought to carry. 
Mr. SNOW. Mr. Chairman, it is not 
often that laymen have interjected their 
opinions into the discussions that have 
taken place over the bill of rights, and 
I think the great majority of us would 
have been content to let the lawyers 
discuss these matters, inasmuch as they 
mostly pertain to law,-but this is a 
question that vitally affects all the peo-
ple. If corporations can be allowed to 
take private property for public use, 
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even if they say they shall have Just 
compensation, without some manner 
to be indicated how that compensation 
shall be arrived at, I think that the 
rights of the individual will be infringed 
upon as the experience of the past has 
shown that they have been infringed 
upon. I am in favor of the amendment 
of the substitute. I should have liked 
to have seen it drawn a little farther 
and provide how the farmer whose 
right is taken from him should be com-
pensated. I find that in California, 
Colorado and other states, that in 
their constitutions they have provided 
that the amount shall be paid into 
court for the owner before the right of 
way shall be appropriated. They have 
also provided, in some states, for a Jury 
or a number of commissioners to decide 
what the damage or the compensation 
shall be before ever the right of way 
accrues. I think that that is just. It 
is humane, and I don't think any law 
ought to compel the farmer or the citi-
zen to litigate for his natural, inalien-
able and indefeasible rights, and I think 
a right of property is just as useful, just 
as good, and just as near to the indi-
vidual in many canes as life itself, for 
life is dependent upon those rights of 
property. I am in favor of the amend-
ment or the substitute: 1 don't care 
which prevails, as I believe either will 
arrive at the point that we wish to see 
obtained. 
Mr. CUNNINGHAM-. Mr. Chairman, 1 
am surprised at many gentlemen here 
in their remarks that they have made. 
We must have a very wicked j>eople— 
people that own little pieces of land 
where the railway companies go 
through—and very holy, just, and 
righteous railway corporations. It 
must be all in favor of the corporation 
and nothing in favor of the people. 
Now, I believe people have rights, and 
we are here to protect the rights of the 
Biajority of the people and all the 
people, and I believe, as one of the gen-
tlemen has said—although 1 lielieve on 
the other side, that if we want this 
Constitution voted for we must protect 
the right* of the masses, even if it does 
not suit the righteous corporations. 
Mr. MURDOCK (Wasatch). Inasmuch 
as this discussion has got down to the 
laymen, I feel that I ought to say a 
word or two, inasmuch as I disagree 
with the gentlemen that have spoken 
upon the question. As it has been 
stated by our legal men, the laws of 
Utah make provisions for damage to 
parties who are injured by railroads 
and by other corporations passing over 
their lands. I think we can safely trust 
this to the Legislature to protect the 
man, to protect private individuals 
from corporations trespassing upon 
them, but I think that if this substitute 
of the amendment prevails it will place 
an obstruction in the way not only of 
railroads, but of enterprises like irriga-
tion companies. In my short experience, 
had this law been the law without any 
other legislation, it certainly would 
have stopped several irrigation com-
panies from building their canals for 
three or four years, long enough to 
have prohibited the owners of the land 
from raising enough grain to have paid 
the expenses of building those canals. 
Now, I am opposed to the substitute 
and to the amendment, and I trust 
that this committee will vote them 
down, and that we will leaye it in the 
hands of the legislature of this future 
State to make such laws that shall be 
necesssary for the protection of prop-
erty owners. 
Calls for the questiou. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
don't know whether this committee 
desires to hear me or not. I made this 
motion and have not had a single 
chance to speak to it. I made it in 
good faith. I believe that the right of 
property is a sacred right, and no mat-
ter if it is the widow'B mite, I believe 
that the man who owns just one little 
ewe lamb has just as much right to 
that ax the man has to his cattle th*t 
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graze on a thousand hilin; having a 
sacred and absolute right to his prop-
erty, having paid for it and the com-
pany owner; it may be his home—it 
may be all he has and the proposition 
here now advanced is that a railroad 
company may come along and stake 
out this lot and tell him to get off and 
await the slow process of the law in 
litigation; and we know what it is 
when you come to litigation with the 
railroad company; they Just simply 
have the advantage at every turn. 
They have their attorneys paid by the 
year; they have money to bring for-
ward all the witnesses they want, and 
to secure every advantage that the law 
possibly gives. And if delay is of any 
benefit to them in that case they insist 
on the delay and they get it. In the 
meantime, the man is deprived of his 
property, his home is taken away from 
him, and because his home is only a 
matter of three or four hundred dol-
lars—it did not amount to much any-
way as the gentleman from Salt Lake 
in front of me here intimated, very 
much in the language of a corpora-
tion attorney—it was not worth any-
thing anyway—land that was not 
worth a cent. Now, the facts are, 
gentlemen, that this proposition will 
not retard the development of the 
country. It will not retard the 
progress of the country, but as sug-
gested by one of the gentlemen on this 
floor if railroad companies understood 
that they must determine this compen-
sation in advance, they will see to it 
that instead of ceaseless and endless 
litigation, they will be anxious to bring 
their cases to the front, if it comes to a 
case, and have them disposed of, and if 
a man does ask them what they may 
think is a little bit extraordinary in 
its terms, had not thejr better, in view 
of the fact that they had this extraor-
dinary right to take away a man's 
property, without his consent—had not 
they better pay a paltry sum even in 
excess of the value and go on with 
22 
their work, than to ha\e the poor man 
kept without the use of his property 
and sitting by and seeing another man 
reveling in the possession of it, while he 
has not anything in return for it? Now, 
Mr. Chairman, 1 am about as much 
surprised as my colleague from Utah 
County to hear men talking Just as if 
this provision of the law which stands 
to-day in two-thirds of the modern 
constitutions in the United States was 
an innovation here. As if the progress 
of the whole country was going to l>e 
stopped, because we want to get into 
the Constitution n provision which 
says that before H person using the 
power of the State can take from a 
man the property that belongs to him 
he must first pay for it. I sajr there 
are two-thirds of them. I will not 
take the time to read the clauses in the 
various constitutions, but nearly all 
the modern constitutions provide that 
this payment must be made in advance; 
and I believe the constitution in the 
state of Washington ha* been referred 
to more than any constitution in the 
United States—has been referred to 
more by members on this floor than 
any other constitution, and I am going 
to read that paragraph as it will only 
take a moment: 
Private property shall not be taken 
for public use, except for private wayH 
of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or 
ditches, on or across the lands of others 
for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary 
purposes. No private property shall 
be taken or damaged for public or 
private use without just compensation 
having been first made or paid into 
court for the owner, and no right of 
way shall be appropriated to the use of 
any corporation other than municipal, 
until full compensation therefor be first 
made in money or ascertained and paid 
paid into court for the owner. 
Now, I ask what could be more just 
than that? That is all that is de-
manded in this, and gentlemen, it does 
seem to me for the protection of the 
individual as against corporations we 
ought to vote for this amendment. 
Mr. JAMES. Mr Chairman, I rise to 
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a question of personal privilege. I 
have l>een misquoted on this floor and 1 
want to correct it. Mr. Thin-man save 
the idea that I had stated that a man's 
home was worth nothing;, etc. If I 
said anything of the kind, I did not 
mean it. 1 cannot l»elieve that I said 
anything: of the kind. Mr. Thnrman 
knows very well that when I spoke 
about a worthless piece of land, I was 
speaking; about undeveloped, unim-
proved land in these canyons, and he 
knows very well that I meant this 
Mr. THURMAX. I object to the 
gentleman making an argument under 
cloak of ]>ersonal privilege; he can not 
do that. 
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule the 
gentleman has a right to speak as 
many times as he pleases and as long 
as he pleases. 
Mr. JAMES. That is the very reason 
why I inferred that this matter should 
l>e left to the Legislature, because we 
have these different kinds of land, and 
these different conditions of things ex-
isting here so that provision should t>e 
made without hardship to the railroad 
or without hardship to the settlers and 
the inhabitants. 
Mr. BUYS. Mr. Chairman, if the 
amendment of the gentleman from 
Utah Includes, as he indicated, the pay-
ment in advance for the lands, I am in 
favor of it. 1 am in favor of provision 
being made where property is taken 
for public use that the money shall be 
paid to the owner or to l>e paid into 
court for his use. If the amendment by 
the gentleman from Utah would secure 
this, I would vote for it, but as it is, I 
hardly think that it would, 
Mr. THURMAN. The substitute does; 
for the information of the committee I 
will say that I expected the substitute 
to be in lieu of the amendment that I 
proposed. 
The secretary read the substitute pro-
posed. 
Mr. BUYS. That is all right. I will 
accept that and I think it is just right. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I de-
sire to call attention to the fact that 
that amendment does not meet the ob-
jection that has been made. It does not 
provide that the money may be paid 
into court in case of taking property. 
As I understand it, it is an absolute re-
quirement that compensation must be 
made before the property is taken, 
but in case of damage, then the money 
may be paid into court. Now, I say 
that if this amendment prevails at all, 
there ought to be a provision that the 
money may l>e paid into court in every 
case. In other words, that the prop-
erty may be taken by paying a compen-
sation to the owner or paying the 
money into court, and that is not this 
amendment. 
Mr. VARIAN. It seems to me so. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Not necessarily. 
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment 
first offered by Mr. Thurman is with-
drawn from consideration and the only 
question before the committee is the 
substitute just read. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I 
offer as an amendment to the substitute 
the insertion of these words, "or paid 
into court for the owner," after the 
words **first made." 
Mr. THOMPSON. I will second the 
amendment. 
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman. I 
am opposed to that amendment for the 
very reason that it places the matter 
in the very same condition that it was 
t>efore. The corporation can pay 
money into court. They can go to work 
and plow up the man's land, tear down 
his house, turn him upon the street, and 
wait along three years before it is deter-
mined whether they are to have that 
money or not. That is the reason I am 
opposed to it. 
The amendment of Mr. Richards to 
the substitute was rejected. 
The substitute was adopted. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman, I 
call attention to the fact that the Con-
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vention resolved itself into committee 
of the whole until 5 o'clock. 
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is 
mistaken; as the chair understands it, 
the motion to fix a definite time was 
changed. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman, 
l>efore going any further I want to move 
an amendment to section 23, to insert 
at the end of the section as amended, a 
declaration of public use. I move to 
insert at the end of the section the fol-
lowing: 
Public use shall include dump, mill, 
and tunnel sites upon and easements 
over and across the lands of others for 
tunnels, roads, tramways, reservoirs, 
waterways, water supplies, and drains, 
for agriculture, mining, milling, muni-
cipal, domestic and sanitary purposes: 
and such other public uses as the Legis-
lature may declare. 
The amendment "was rejected. 
Section 24 was read as follows: 
Section 24. Private property shall 
not l>e taken for private use unless by 
consent of the owner, except for private 
ways of necessity, and for reservoirs, 
drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across 
the lands of others, for agriculture, 
mining, milling, domestic or sanitary 
purposes, and in no case shall such prop-
ertv be taken without due compensa-
tion. 
Mr. VAR1AN. Mr. Chairman, I move 
to strike out the entire section. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Chairman. I 
was going to move as an amendment 
to that that the amendment 1 propose 
be inserted in place of the section. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I second 
that. 
Mr. VARIAN. That presents sub-
stantially the same question that was 
presented on his motion to strike out. 
Now, it will be observed that this sec-
tion contemplates the taking of private 
proi>erty for private use. There is no 
question here of a public use. Of course 
the proviso in the second line of the sec-
tion amounts to nothing. Of course 
private property can be taken for 
private use by consent of the owner; 
that simply amounts to the right of 
contract, which we have anyhow. But, 
the objectionable feature of this is in 
the exception "except for private ways 
of necessity,'' etc. That is very far-
reaching, Mr. Chairman. That simply 
amounts to this, that if I have a lot or 
a farm, and my neighbor deems that it 
is necessary for him to have a private 
way across it without reference now to 
the public use, without reference to 
whether it is necessary for the con-
venience and benefit of the public, 
which comes in under the other section 
prior to this, he is entitled to go into 
court, if I don't choose to allow him to 
go upon my land, and proceed to con-
demn it, because it is in the organic law, 
and I am compelled to surrender my 
right; not for the benefit of the public, 
not for the good of the community as 
a whole, but for the benefit of ray neigh-
bor, and I would like to know why he 
stands in any better position than I do 
in that particular. If there is anybody 
to be inconvenienced it Bhould be the 
one who had not the vested right of 
property: I have it, it is mine, it belongs 
to me, it is vested in me, it is protected, 
not onl}- in the Constitution in other 
sections, but by the general law under-
lying all constitutions. The right of 
eminent domain is founded upon neces-
sity. It has never been and ought never 
to be accorded in anywise to any indi-
vidual; it is only accorded in the name 
of the State upon the fears and assump-
tion that the good of the entire com-
munity is the supreme law, and the 
rights of individuals must yield in 
order that the rights of the whole may 
be benefitted. That principle does not 
apply here. You are opening a wedge, 
you are invading the rights of the pri-
vate citizen in these particulars named. 
Where are you going to stop? Under 
this section, gentlemen of the committee, 
I can go upon your land if it adjoins 
mine, I can make use of it for domestic 
purposes; I can build an outhouse or a 
kitchen there, I can put a cesspool upon 
Goo£ 
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it, upon my showing to the court or the 
Jury that it is necessary for the con-
venience of myself. Do you want that? 
Whoever drafted this has interpolated 
a provision as to mining in order to 
cloud it a little. There is no question 
now in this country about mining being 
a public use. It is so recognized in all 
the mining states and territories. The 
legislatures declare it so, courts have 
upheld It. This matter of a public use 
ought to be maintained Just as It was 
entitled or Just as it means,—a use for 
the public. If it be necessary to develop 
the mines to get a right of way on 
another man's lands, to secure a dump-
ing ground, as the law now stands, as 
it has been construed in all these mining 
states and territories, by the legislatures 
and the courts, it is deemed to be a pub-
lic use. I lay no stress upon that word 
"mining" there, because it would be 
included in section 23 if the Legislature 
so declared it. Agriculture ought not 
to be deemed a public use; it is not a 
public use in the sense of the law of 
eminent domain. One farm is as good 
as another. The farm of forty acres is 
Just as good and sacred in the eye of the 
law, and ought to be, as the farm of 
three thousand acres, whether it be 
used as a range or for wheat growing 
or grain raising. Underlying it all is 
the fact that it is an innovation, invad-
ing the vested right, that ought not to 
be lost sight of here. As the law now 
stands, private ways of necessity as 
indicated by the courts in certain classes 
of cases, are given; that is to say, if 
you sell a man a piece of your land and 
the situation of the land that yon sell 
is such to the land which you retain 
that it is necessary for that vendee to 
cross your land to get out, the implica-
tion of law is, and it is so held—it is 
the law of real property, that you have 
conveyed to him the right to go out 
over your land; but if he goes and buys 
somebody else's land adjoining you, set-
tles himself down there to build up a 
home or a farm, he takes it as he finds 
it and he is not authorized to cut your 
farm up with a water ditch because he 
needs to get water on his land, nor to 
cut your farm up with a private way, 
because it is more convenient for him to 
cross it, and it should not be so, because 
you simply transfer a right from one to 
the other, and so far as the State is con-
cerned, it is a difference between the two 
individuals. He must take the situation 
as he finds it. I can imagine cases 
under this law where a man's farm can 
be cut in two with a big water ditch 
and every time he runs his plow or his 
harrow or reaper up there, he would 
have to stop and turn around or get a 
bridge and Jump his horses across. It 
is not right. The same application can 
be made of it in cities and towns. 
Going back to the first proposition, 
though, the main and the serious objec-
tion to it is that it is an interference 
with vested rights and you had better 
leave the disposition of property rights, 
except where the State is interested and 
concerned, to the subject of contract 
between the citizens of the State. 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to ask Mr. Varian a question l>efore 
I make any remarks. Mr. Varian, do 
you maintain that the right to build ir-
rigating ditches is a public use? 
Mr. VARIAN. No, it ha* not l>een so 
declared here. 
Mr. PIERCE. Is the right to build 
reservoirs 
Mr. VARIAN. l^ et me qualify that 
and answer the full question. If the sys-
tem of irrigation shall assume such pro-
portions here as to necessitate a thing of 
that kind and the Legislature should 
declare it, I doubt not that it would be 
held as it was in the case of mining, 
after some difference of opinion among 
judges, that because of the situation of 
the community and because of the 
prominence of that particular branch 
of industry in the community, it had 
become on the line of the building oT 
the railroads and other great public en-
terprises and public uses. 
V J O O ^ I O 
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Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I want 
to make a few remarks upon this prop-
osition. I agree in some points with 
the remarks o! the gentleman from Salt 
Lake Connty, that this section as it 
stands invades the rights of private 
property and I think we should well 
consider the amendment made by Mr. 
Van Home. The voting down of the 
amendment to section 23 I believe was 
done without very much consideration. 
The section as it stands I am not in 
favor of it; it says, "except for private 
ways of necessity." It has been argued 
by gentlemen who have preceded me 
that the law gave a man a right by ne-
cessity. That Is all right, I believe that. 
That is the correct principle of law, 
**for reservoirs, drains, ditches, etc." 
It seems to me that the Convention 
should protect the rights of irrigation 
as much as any one thing that they 
should protect. As it was well argued 
on the floor of this house not long ago 
by the gentleman from Wasatch, that 
the prosperity of a community de-
pends upon the rights of irrigation, 
and if it is not a part of our system 
of law that the right of irrigation 
and the right to build canals is a 
public use, then, gentlemen, we ought 
to make it a public use right here and 
now; and I differ from the remarks 
made by the gentleman who has Just 
preceded me upon the proposition that 
the right of condemnation for mining 
pro)>erty is a public use. Some states 
have held that the right to condemn 
property for mining purposes wax a 
public use, but the majority of the states 
hold that it is not a public use and that 
it cannot be condemned under such a 
clause as we have in section 28, which 
we have adopted. 1 have before me a 
collection of cases by Lewis on Eminent 
Domain, upon that proposition, and 1 
desire to read some selection** from the 
work so you gentlemen can see just the 
drift of the current of the decisions that 
the gentleman upon the other side has 
referred to. It is true, gentlemen, that 
Nevada had said that the right to con-
demn property for the benefit of mines 
was a public use and existed under the 
ordinary clause in their constitution, as 
we will have in ours, that private prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation, 
but there are several other states that 
hold that that is not the law. Those 
states are California, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, and some others, and the 
whole practice is approved by Lewis in 
his work on Eminent Domain. 1 would 
like to read from section 184: 
The tendency of those decisions 
which sustain the mill acts is illustrated 
by some cases now to be noted. 
The mill act was the right to dam up 
a stream and set the water back in a 
pond to create water power. 
The legislature of Nevada passed an 
act in which it was declared the pro-
duction and reduction of ores are the 
vital necessity to the people of this 
state, are pursuits in which all are in-
terested, and from which ail derive a 
benefit, so the mining, milling, smelting, 
or other reduction of ores are hereby 
declared to lie for the public use and 
the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised therefor. 
That is the language of the legislature 
of Nevada. In Nevada the law was 
sustained and under that law the su-
preme court of Nevada in the case of 
Daton Mining Company vs. Sewell held 
that the right of eminent domain ex-
isted in favor of the mining companies, 
and in their opinion there is some 
language which seems to l>e worth 
reading. 
(Reading): 
In the light of these authorities, 
nearly all of whicliwere decided prior to 
the adoption of the state constitution, 
I think it would In? an unwarranted 
assumption on our part to declare that 
the framers of the constitution did not 
intend to give the term "public use" 
the meaning of public utility, benefit, 
and advantage, as construed in the 
decisions we have quoted. The reasons 
in favor of sustaining the act under 
consideration are certainly as strong 
as any that have been given in support 
of the mill dam or flowage acts, as well 
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as some of the other objects heretofore 
mentioned. Mining is the greatest of 
the industrial pursuit* of this state. 
All other interests are subservient to 
it. Our mountains are almost barren 
of timber nnri our valley lands could 
never be made profitable for agricultural 
purposes, except for the met of a home 
market having been created by the min-
ing developments in different sections 
of the state. The mining and milling 
interest gives employment to many men, 
and the benefits derived from this busi-
ness are distributed as much and some-
times more among the laboring classes 
than among the owners of mines and 
mills. The mines are fixed by the laws 
of nature and are often found in places 
almost inaccessible. For the purpose 
of successfully conducting and carrying 
on the business of mining, smelting, or 
other reduction of ores it is necessary 
to erect hoisting works, to build mills, 
to construct smelting furnaces, to secure 
ample grounds for dumping waste rock 
and earth, and a road to and from the 
mines is always indispensable. 
Then he goes on to say that the pub-
lic utility is so great that the state of 
Nevada has said that the right of emi-
nent domain exists in favor of mining 
property. But, gentlemen, that is a 
disputed question, and I believe that is 
the question that this Convention wants 
to adopt. We want to declare that the 
mining industry is for the public benefit, 
and we should treat the mining Indus-
try as a public use. We do not, I believe, 
in that section wre have adopted, adopt 
this. And it cannot be so construed un-
less we are particular to declare it in the 
Constitution. That decision was fol-
lowed by a decision in Georgia. Lewis 
on Eminent Domain further says: 
On the other hand the validity of such 
laws has been denied In California, and 
Pennsylvania, and virtually so in West 
Virginia. This is undoubtedly the cor-
rect view. 
Now, gentlemen, it seems to me that 
we should either amend this section so 
that the right of eminent domain will 
exist in favor of mines for tramways, 
public grounds, tunnels, etc., or else we 
should amend section 23. I do confess 
that there are some pernicious clauses 
in section 24 and 1 am not in favor of it 
as it stands. It seems to me no harm 
will ever come to this State by reason 
of declaring in our Constitution that 
the mining industry is a public use. You 
know that the mines are situated in our 
mountains here and it is very rarely 
that any agricultural lands will be 
taken or any kind of agricultural 
rights will come up when the question 
of the right to condemn land for mining 
purposes for dumps or tunnels or tram-
ways is in question. And then again, 
you know, gentlemen, that where one 
mine wants to pass over other ground 
and it does not injure it^-the value of 
the mine is, by reason of the value of 
the ore underneath the ground. 1 am 
not in favor of striking out the section, 
but of amending it so that it will con-
tain these provisions or amend section 
28 so that it will also contain them. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. 1 am in favor of 
striking out the section providing for 
private property to be taken for pri-
vate use. I do not think it is right. 1 
do not think it is a safe thing to do, to 
go into taking private property for pri-
vate use, but I do think that accom-
panying that it 1B wholly in line with 
the good of this Territory and with the 
good of the people of this Territory 
and all the people of this Territory that 
we should make a declaration of public 
use for public Industries in such ways 
that our courts will not be at liberty to 
construe them against the uses and in-
dustries of our people. I think that the 
amendment that I propose does that, i 
do not know whether it had a second 
or not, but 1 can use it for the sake of 
argument. It provides for their con-
demning a dump, a mill site, or a tunnel 
site, upon the land of others, and only 
an easement over or across the lands of 
others for those ways for waters, roads, 
tramways, etc. It seems to me that we 
cannot err if we give our people the right 
for the good of the public to Bay to the 
man who has property and who is un-
willing that others should use it to pass 
over that, "by your being paid a just 
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compensation, it is ior the public good 
that you should not be privileged to say 
we cannot pass this wray, or you cannot 
come through my land with your irri-
gation ditch, with your tramway; you 
cannottake a comer of my land for an 
aqueduct, for a mine; you cannot take 
a ravine In my land, that I do not use, 
as a site for a tunnel/' Nobody wants 
this to be done without the man being 
paid a just compensation for it, but I 
believe we can well afford to declare 
that the citizen who IK HO un reasonable 
in his use of his land that he will not 
allow it to be used for a great public 
purpose, such as mining and irrigation 
schemes, tramways, roads, reservoirs, 
as are going to be in this country—that 
he will not allow it to be used by his 
consent on the payment of just compen-
sation, that we, representing the peo-
ple, would have a right to say to him, 
"You cannot act that way to the det-
riment of all of us. If you will not take 
the Just compensation when it is offered, 
we will bring you in a suit saying this 
is for the good of you and the rest of 
them, and upon paying you the just 
compensation by the court, we will 
compel you to let that land of yours be 
used for the public good." I think we 
would do injury to our constituents 
if we did not declare HO that our 
courts could not construe against it, 
what would be public uses of the 
lands of another. I believe it is 
right that a man who owns land 
near where another man owns a mine 
and ha« land that is suitable for a dump 
which is not used by him, should be 
compelled to say that upon taking a 
just compensation for it, it may be 
used by the other man and should not 
be entitled to say regardless of what 
use might be made, "you want to have 
the land and you have got to have it, 
and you shall not pay me a just com-
pensation, sir, but you shall pay me 
whatever I ask/' 
I believe it is also right that in this 
country where there will be great irri-
gation enterprises, needing reservoirs 
to hold the waters in our canyons, the 
public should say to the man, "You 
cannot say, because you have a hole 
that might be made a reservoir out of, 
that is no line to yon now, but that 
would be of use to a reservoir com-
pany—you cannot say to them, gentle-
men, 1 won't take a just compensation 
for this, your company is going to in-
vest a million dollars, I want two hun-
dred and fifty thousand dollars for the 
hole the water is going to be banked 
up in." I believe that we would be 
derelict in our duty if we did not say to 
him. Sir, yon cannot do that." But 
we ought to say to him, in my opinion, 
"When you have a suitable site for a 
reservoir not in use by yourself and are 
unwilling to sell it for a just compensa-
tion, that the company who is going to 
reclaim thousands of acres of land have 
a right to bring you into court, sir, and 
say to you what is the just and reason-
able value of your property, to deter-
mine the matter and condemn it for the 
use of the public." 
Gentlemen talk about invasion of 
private rights. We do not have much 
difficulty practically about it now. One 
man owrns a farm here and another one 
has to bring his ditch through it; he 
goes to his neighbor and says, "I will 
pay you all the damage for that 
ditch," his neighbor says, "all right, go 
8head." We are just simply declaring 
against the man who happens to be 
more arbitrary than most of the people 
of Utah and saying if he won't do what 
is reasonable, that he can be made to 
do what is reasonable. Take our val-
leyB, dry, without irrigation they are 
worthless; with irrigation they pour 
into our State a continual product. 
Shall the man that has a piece of land 
across a canyon from which water is to 
be brought say, "Gentlemen, before I 
will let you take an irrigation ditch 
through my land that will enable forty 
thousand acres to l>e brought under 
cultivation, you must pay me half the 
^oo^ lc 
344 BILL OF RIGHTS. March 26. 
value of the forty thousand acres, when 
the water is put upon them?" Would 
that be a proper thing for this Conven-
tion to allow? Would not it be proper 
for this Convention to prevent such a 
man from saying that he would ask an 
enterprise of that kind anything more 
than a just and fair compensation for the * 
land that was taken and damage that 
was done by such enterprise? It seems 
to me, gentlemen, that if we pass from 
the consideration of this question with-
out making some provision that will 
protect people In enterprises of this 
kind we will go back to our constit-
uents and when they ask us why we 
did not do this, we will have to be 
ashamed to say, we did not do it be-
cause we did not think that it was a 
public use and for the public good. 
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, to my 
mind we have struck no proposition of 
this bill of rights up to this time that 
should receive the grave consideration 
that this proposition now presents. 
Ours is a very peculiar country and I 
Hee that the committee have copied 
almost HteraDy Wyoming upon this 
proposition, and I trust that before 
any Immediate action shall l>e taken 
looking to the striking out of this sec-
tion the greatest care will be given. It 
seems to me, as gentlemen on the floor 
have explained in regard to the mining 
Interests, the same proposition affects 
our irrigation interests in this Bection of 
country. Our farms, as a rule, it is true, 
are usually small. We have got to cross 
each other's farms in order to carry our 
irrigation on properly and raise crops 
at all, and if this section be stricken out, 
it is going to leave us in the most de-
fenceless condition, in my judgment, 
and I trust the motion to strike out 
will not prevail, but that further con-
sideration of this proposition will be 
taken. 
Mr. VAR1AN. Let me ask the gen-
tleman a question. He will observe 
that this matter proposed to be 
stricken out includes many things. If as 
suggested, it is the sense of the Conven-
tion that they want to put in a clause 
protecting irrigation, mining, it might 
be put in a proper way separately, but 
this includes sanlviry purposes, domes-
tic purposes, private ways of necessity, 
etc. It includes too much. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. Varian, the 
amendment 1 suggested did not state 
the private ways of necessity. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, this 
is a very important subject and I do 
not believe that this committee can act 
intelligently on this amendment with-
out having it printed. I am not in 
favor of the section as it stands. I 
think it ought to be printed. Probably 
a substitute ought to be adopted, but 
It is a matter of such importance, I 
think we ought to postpone further 
consideration of it until we can have 
the amendment printed and consider 
what language we will adopt, if we are 
going to adopt a substitute or what 
amendment we will make. If it is in 
order, I would therefore move the 
postponement of the further considera-
tion of this section until the further 
meeting of this committee. 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules 
that a motion to postpone is out of 
order in committee. 
Mr. EVANS (Utah). Mr. Chairman, 
I move we now arise and report. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The committee of the whole then 
arose and reported to the Convention 
as follows: 
The committee of the whole have had 
under consideration the preamble and 
declaration of rights and haveeonsid-
sidered the same and desire to report 
progress and ask to sit again. 
The Convention then, at 5.35 o'clock 
p. m., adjourned. 
TWENTY-THIRD DAY. 
TnrRHDAY, March 26,1895. 
The Convention was called to order 
by the President at 10 o'clock a. m. 
i^ooofe 
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Section 22 was read. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. President, I 
move as an amendment to that section 
that the words, "or secured to be made 
to the owner thereof,'* be inserted in 
line three, between the words "made" 
and "and." I desire to say in support 
of this amendment that I have ex-
amined the constitutions of all the 
states of this Union and I find that this 
proposition only appears in a very few 
of them. It appears in a modified form 
in eight constitutions out of forty-four, 
and In almost everyone of those it is 
modified to some extent. All the other 
thirty-six either provide that Just com-
pensation shall be made and then 
stop at that declaration, or if anything 
further Is said they put the alternative 
"or secured to the owner thereof or 
paid into court." Now, a very great 
hardship may be occasioned by leaving 
this section as it now stands, and no 
possible hardship, It seems to me, can 
result from the amendment that I pro-
pose. It would be in the power of an 
individual owning property on the line 
of a railroad or a canal, that might be 
in course of construction to supply a 
whole settlement of people with water, 
to demand an exorbitant price for the 
right of way and refuse to be reason-
able. Now, you may say that it is not 
fair to assume that anybody will do 
this, but I am telling you what they 
may do, and that such things have been 
done is within the knowledge of many 
of us. And as was testified to before 
the committee of the whole when this 
matter was under consideration, such 
instances have occurred. It would be in 
the power of one individual to say, "I will 
Bot settle without exorbitant compensa-
tion, "something that would be entirely 
unreasonable and the whole progress of 
the enterprise would have to be stopped 
until an adjudication could be heard in 
regard to that matter, and the damages 
assessed in court. Now, my proposition 
is that the words "or secured to the 
owner thereof," be inserted so that if a 
person will not agree—if they cannot 
agree or do not agree upon the compen-
sation, then under the laws that will be 
enacted by the Legislature proceedings 
for condemnation will be commenced, 
but before anybody can enter upon the 
property a bond "will ha^e to be given 
or the money will have to be paid Into 
court, which will secure the owner am • 
ply as to whatever amount may be 
adjudged. Now, I think this is fair, and 
I think it is just. The suggestion was 
made the other day that this provision, 
the way it now stands, will be in the 
interests of the poor man. Now, It 
might be and It might not be. For ex-
ample, suppose a settlement of poor 
farmers desired to obtain water from a 
distant source, and suppose, in order to 
get a right of way they had to pase 
over a large tract of land owned by 
some wealthy corporation. Suppose 
that corporation were to say, "You 
cannot have my land nor the right of 
way over it unless you pay an exorbi-
tant price." A whole settlement of 
people could be deprived of the use of 
this water, could be deprived of the 
right to construct this canal and per-
haps prevented for a whole year from 
getting any benefit from it or else they 
would have to accede to the exorbitant 
demand that would be made upon 
them. A man might charge a thousand 
dollars for property that was only 
worth a hundred and compel them by 
extortion to pay this money or to lose 
the whole season. Now, it seems to me 
that no possible harm or injury can 
come to the owners of property, if the 
compensation is secured to them in ad-
vance, and that is what my amendment 
proposes, and as I say it is in harmony 
with the constitutions of thirty-six 
states in this Union, and the eight which 
have provided that compensation shall 
be first made have modified the effect of 
that by prescribing summary proceed-
ings by which these damages may be 
determined; and I submit, Mr. President, 
that this amendment ought to prevail. 
Google 
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Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, 
I desire to offer another amendment, by 
striking out all in section 22 after the 
word "compensation," in the second 
line, "providing property shall not be 
taken for public use without Just com-
pensation." 
Mr. RICHARDS. I second the amend-
ment. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) Now, I want 
to give a reason for that. That is the 
usual method of constitution making 
throughout the country. I do not 
know of any instance where any hard-
ship has ever accrued by reason of the 
fact that the additional clause has not 
been inserted in the constitution. There 
is no gentleman upon this floor who 
has studied the law who will deny that 
the Legislature has a perfect right under 
the section as it now stands if these 
words were stricken out, to make such 
regulations and such conditions that 
the property might be taken by the in-
dividual or corporation or might not be 
taken, without first having paid com-
pensation for it, or the Legislature would 
have the right to require a bond, would 
have the right to require security as our 
legislatures have already done in this 
Territory. 
Tt seems to be wholly a matter of leg-
islation that we are inserting in the Con-
stitution. The principle is what we want. 
The two lines, "providing private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use 
without Just compensation," declare the 
principle. That is, that no man's prop-
erty shall be taken even for public use 
without just compensation. Could we 
say any more? Do we want to go Into 
detail in this bill of rights and deter-
mine the particular manner in which it 
Bhall be done—the particular manner in 
which it shall be paid fur1' Now, gen-
tlemen, I am not a corporation lawyer; 
the fact is, all my business has been 
against corporations. That is, in the 
main, and I would do nothing at all to 
favor a corporation as against the in-
dividual, or anything which would op-
press the individual, but I say that 
through my experience in this Territory 
I do not know of any instances wherein 
the individual has been oppressed by rea-
son of our present laws or provisions of 
this character. If any gentleman does, 
I would like to have him point it out. 
The reasons given by my esteemed 
friend from Utah County the other day 
were that it would compel corporations 
to settle with Individuals by paying a 
fair price rather than go into court and 
have the expense and trouble of litiga-
tion. Now, in one sense, that might be 
a very admirable thought, but I say to 
you, gentlemen, is it right that even a 
corporation should be held up? I say 
that a corporation and an individ-
ual ought to stand upon equal foot-
ing before the law, and I say, too, that 
if this section passes in this way, Ita 
tendency will be to retard business en-
terprises in this Territory, and I say 
that if it passes as I suggest, it would 
not retard business enterprises, neither 
could It possibly injure the individual. 
Corporations would rather settle with 
the individual, and they usually pay a 
fal r price, rather than to have litiga-
tion. They are not seeking litigation 
any more than the individual. 
They desire to avoid it. If they are un-
able to contract between themselves 
they resort to a court for the purpose 
of determining the just value of the land. 
But, why say in this Constitution that 
they shall first pay before they take 
possession? It might be that even a 
preliminary survey could not be made 
by a corporation, because they would 
not have the right to take possession, 
although I think the weight of author-
ity is against that, but the law would 
permit individuals or corporations to 
make the preliminary survey over the 
land of others, although they would 
have no right to do anything at all 
with the land without first having 
made payment for it. It might be that 
the enterprise was not fully developed. 
It might be that It would require cer-
Lioogic 
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tain manipulations and negotiations 
in order to secure the money for the en-
terprise, but if men who desire to en-
gage in business enterprises see this pro-
vision in our Constitution and see that 
they can not go upon an individual's 
land without first paying for it, would 
not it have a tendency to retard this 
progress which we all so much desire? I 
say that the corporation ought to se-
cure the individual for the value of his 
land, but I say the Legislature has al-
ready done that and it always will do 
it, and if in the good judgment of the 
people who compose the next Legisla-
ture, they deem it necessary and proper 
to require payment first to be made, let 
them do it, but let us not put a rigid, 
unyielding thing of this kind in our 
Constitution, which is so hard to 
amend. Leave it as it has been left 
by other states. Leave it as it is left 
by the Constitution of the United 
States. That is a good model with re-
Bpect to a matter of this kind, and I do 
not believe that any injury would result 
from it. 
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I would 
like to ask that this section and the fol-
lowing section, 23, pass over without 
action for the present, and for this rea-
son. Mr. Varian Informed me on yester-
terday that he had been making a care-
ful examination of this subject and he 
is satisfied that the action already taken 
on section 23 Is In violation of the law 
of eminent domain'. 
The PRESIDENT. No question about 
It. 
Mr. SQUIRES. And the proposition 
which he has, I presume would be to 
strike out one of these sections and 
have the two sections consolidated, 
and for that reason and in his absence, 
I would like to have the Convention 
pass over these two sections, or further 
consideration of them, for the present. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, 
I desire to say that Mr. Varian desires 
to be heard on the other section in re-
gard to private property being taken 
40 
for private use. I understand he is pre-
paring an argument on it. 
Mr. SQUIRES. He might want to 
strike out one and amend the other. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). No; he talked 
to me about it. 
The proposed amendment of Mr. 
Evans was read. 
Mr. PIERCE. Are you going to put 
in the words, "or damaged?" 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am willing to 
as far as I am concerned. 
Mr. PIERCE. Weil, I am in favor of 
the motion with those words in. 
Mr. ELDREDGE. With the consent 
of the gentleman I would suggest it read 
as follows: "Private property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public or pri-
vate use without just compensation," 
and leave all the balance to the Legisla-
ture. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Section 23 pro-
vides that it shall not be taken or 
damaged. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I offer this as a substitute for 
section 22: 
Private property shall not be taken 
for public use, or damaged, without just compensation as determined by a jury, which shall be paid as soon as It 
can be ascertained and before posses-
sion is taken. No benefit which may 
accrue to the owner as a result of an 
improvement made by any private cor-
poration shall be considered in fixing 
the compensation for property taken or 
damaged. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, if 
any of these proposed amendments 
prevail, I hope it will be the last one 
proposed. There is something in that 
that has the true ring. I cannot say 
that I am exactly in full sympathy 
with it to the extent to which it goes, 
but, gentlemen, this is a serious question 
we are dealing with. There is nothing 
more sacred than the right of property, 
unless it be the right to live and enjoy 
your liberty. These amendments, ex-
cept the last proposed by the gentleman 
from Weber, simply propose to thresh 
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over the straw again that was threshed 
in committee of the whole. That is 
right. These men have a right to do 
that, but in the committee of the whole 
the vote was, very emphatic and it was 
overwhelming that if this principle of 
the right of the public by the strong arm 
of the law was to be exercised to the ex-
tent of taking a man's property away 
from him, it is as little as the public could 
be expected to do to pay the owner of 
the property in advance. Now, to 
show that I do not wish enterprises to 
be obstructed or stubborn men to have 
the chance to annoy, harass, or pre-
vent them, I do not care how summary 
the proceedings may be provided by 
law as long as it is an impartial method 
by which the compensation may be 
ascertained, but I say let it be ascer-
tained and the party who proposes to 
take the property be compelled to pay 
for it before possession is taken. If the 
ordinary course of the law is too tedious 
and too slow and may retard private 
enterprises, I do not care if you make 
a summary method by which a jury of 
three men may be picked up from the 
neighborhood of the owner—men ac 
quainted with the property, and let them 
appraise the value, and when they have 
appraised the value, demand that pay-
ment be made in advance or hands off. 
No matter who it is, no matter how 
grand and how mighty and how all 
pervading the power may be that pro-
poses to lay its hands upon the prop-
erty of the individual, I say compel it 
to pay for the privilege, or hands off. 
Has it come to pass that here in free 
America we attach less importance 
to this than they did in old England a 
hundred years ago? Why, if I were an 
eloquent man, I might repeat to you 
the words of Lord Chatham, spoken 
upon the floor of the house of commons 
when he says, "The poorest man in his 
cottage may bid defiance to all the 
armed forces, the wind may blow 
through it, the rain may enter, but the 
king of England cannot enter." But 
here we propose to give a railroad cor-
poration, and I speak of that, because 
the trouble always is with those 
Mr. JAMES. May I ask Mr. Thurman 
a question? Do you know in the last 
fifteen years in Utah Territory where 
the railroads have taken a piece of 
property from any individual and not 
paid for it? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir. 
Mr. JAMES. Would you name a 
case? 
Mr. THURMAN 1 will name the in-
stance. 
Mr. JAMES. Will you name the com-
pany and the case? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, I will name 
the company; I do not suppose it will 
be giving away secrets. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Without the 
consent of the owner, Mr. Thurman? 
Mr. THURMAN. Why, of course it 
was without the consent of the owner. 
I will name an instance under the law 
which exists in the Territory of Utah 
to-day, in which a man was cited to 
appear in court and have the question 
of the necessity of taking the property 
determined and also appraise the value 
of i t That corporation had offered the 
man $800 for his property. They were 
willing to pay him $300 and rather 
than go to law he offered to take $800 
for hiB property, though protesting all 
the time that it was worth more than 
that. At last when we reached a jury 
the Jury gave the man $1500 for his 
property. There was this righteous 
corporation that my friend from Utah 
County referred to the other day, and 
this same question, when the committee 
of the whole overwhelmingly voted to 
place this measure in the article as we 
find it here. There was the righteous 
corporation exercising a power under a 
constitutional law. In that case it 
was unconstitutional. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Will the gentleman 
from Utah permit me to ask him a 
question? 
Mr. THURMAN Ytt sir 
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Mr. RICHARDS. If the money had 
been secured by a bond or the money 
paid into court, how would this indi-
vidual have suffered, except by not hav-
ing the use of the money during the 
pendency of the suit? 
Mr. THURMAN. The exception an-
swers the question. 
Mr. RICHARDS. That is the only in-
jury he could have suffered, is it not? 
Mr. THURMAN. The exception an-
swers the question. I may say to the 
gentleman, if he needs money and if he 
is deprived of his home he needs money 
to buy another. I might ask him the 
question which is the better, a bond or 
promissory note or gilt edge note pay-
able at some indefinite time in the 
future, or the hard cash? We passed 
through a crisis in the last two or 
three years in which we found that 
there is just a little bit of difference in 
actual money and anybody's bond. 
Now, it is the principle that I protest 
against. Taking a man's property 
without his consent is bad enough. 
Take it without paying him in advance 
before the taking is an outrage and it 
ought not to be permitted. Now, I 
come back to the question to show 
that I am not here fighting corpora-
tions just because they are corpora-
tions. I say if you will make the 
principle of payment in advance before 
the taking, I do not care how summary 
the method may be if it is an impartial 
one by which the property may be 
taken. That is the point. We may 
provide right here that the Legislature 
may provide a speedy remedy so that 
the question will not be raised that 
you have got to take it in the ordinary 
course of law. Anything, gentlemen, 
but do not take men's property away 
from them against their consent by the 
strong arm'of the law without paying 
them for it. A man may even have to 
litigate the bond. The men on the 
bond may fail. The bond may prove 
worthless. There are a thousand and 
one contingencies that may happen 
that would show you in this pro-
ceeding proposed even by my friend 
from Salt Lake that it is not adequate 
in a question of this kind. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Don't you recog-
nize the fact that the property itself is 
always held as security for the pay-
ment of the land? 
Mr. THURMAN. Well, let us see. 
Suppose it is. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). No title passes 
until he gets paid. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, we 
will fall back" now on railroads. Men 
understand railroads, and understand 
what they mean. We all understand it, 
and we comprehend about how they 
sometimes do business. A railroad 
starts in a line. It is a tangent. They 
do not propose to swerve to the right 
hand or to the left to avoid running 
through a little house if need be, 
worth four or five hundred dollars, 
they go right through a man's house— 
a thing that is liable to happen any 
time where a railroad is built, and 
always happens through a thickly set-
tled country at some point or another. 
They tear this house down. They spoil 
the ground that it stands on for any 
other purpose. He is secured. The bond 
is not worth anything, how about the 
land being still security for the loss 
that man has sustained? 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Now, do you 
know of any such case as that that 
ever happened? 
Mr. THURMAN. I say it is a case 
that is liable to happen at any time 
and in any country wherever a railroad 
may be built. I will ask the gentleman 
a question now. If a railroad starts 
upon a tangent in a certain direction 
and there is a little house—a home 
where a man lives, worth two or three 
hundred dollars, right upon the line of 
it, will the railroad swerve around it? 
If not, then It will go through it. It 
spoils it, it destroys it. Gentlemen, 
unless we can provide a summary 
remedy by which the compensation 
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may be ascertained and payment made 
in advance, let us pass this proposition 
just as it stands. Just one word as to 
how this has been construed. The 
federal Constitution has been construed 
to mean all that I contend for, but 
state constitutions in exactly the same 
language have been construed by Borne 
courts to mean that the legislature 
may do what the Utah Legislature has 
done. Provide a bond. Other state 
supreme courts have construed the 
same language to mean as the federal 
language has been construed. Just how 
our Constitution would be construed— 
if I thought it would follow the con-
struction of the federal Constitution, 
then I would favor the proposition of 
my esteemed friend from Weber, simply 
leave it just as it was first written, but 
we know not whether it will be con-
strued that way or not, and whether or 
not the precedents in those states that 
hold to the contrary may no the fol-
lowed. For that reason, Mr. President, 
I favor fixing this in the Constitution so 
that it willbe unequivocal and unambig-
uous, and that the right of thecitizen to 
hiB property may be protected against 
any power whatever. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) I want to ask 
Mr. Thurman a question. Under the 
provision, as I propose it, "private 
property shall not betaken or damaged 
for public use without just compensa-
tion," has any court anywhere in the 
land ever decided that the corporation 
can take possession of it before pay-
ment is made? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber.) in the absence 
of a statute? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir—no, not in 
the absence of a statute, but courts 
have held in some of the states that 
under that kind of a constitution the 
legislature may provide the very pro-
cedure that my friend from Salt Lake 
desires, and that is just exactly what I 
want to prevent if possible. 
Mr. EVANS' (Weber). That is true. 
kU£ UQder this eongtitutional provision 
private property cannot be taken can 
it, until paid for, unless the legislature 
comes to its aid? 
Mr. THURMAN I think not, but 
there is nothing to prevent the legisla-
ture in one view of the authorities com-
ing to its aid and we are here to pre-
vent the legislature from aiding such 
things. That is Just what the bill of 
rights means. 
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. President, I am 
in favor of the substitute offered by my 
friend from Weber County. It strikes 
me it meets the objections raised by Mr. 
RichardB from Salt Lake. It does not 
stop the enterprises, it does not prevent 
progress, and I do not care how sum-
mary the proceeding may be, as soon 
as the compensation is determined by 
a jury, then let them pay for the land 
they take before possession is taken. 
"Which shall be paid as soon as it can 
be ascertained and before possession 
is taken." I maintain that that meets 
all the objections. And above all 
things in this world, I say protect the 
owner of this property and do not take 
his property and turn him out of his 
house and home to litigate with a rail-
road or any other corporation for a 
great number of years. It has been 
tried in South Dakota and it has been 
found to be acceptable to the people and 
at the same time it is sufficient protec-
tion to the railroad companies. 
Mr. CREER. Mr. President, I do not 
think property ought to be taken until 
paid for. I know of instances where it 
has worked great injury to the citizens. 
Now, those of you who are aware of 
the location of the railroads in Utah 
County know that after the railroad 
leaves Springville, it runs diagonally 
across the country pretty much to the 
south end. of the county. When the 
first railroad was located through 
there the probate court at that time 
assumed the whole jurisdiction and ap-
pointed a commission'to "value the 
lands; and this commission, I believe, 
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was a standing commission. However, 
they persuaded the people that it would 
be of great benefit to them if they 
would only consent to accept of the 
propositions that were made, and quite 
a number did so, but others did not, 
and it went into court. Subsequently 
there was another railroad located and 
they also went diagonally through a 
great tract of country—valuable land, 
and now there is another contem-
plated railroad going diagonally 
through this same country, and some 
individuals upon a single farm have 
now a contemplated third railroad cut-
ting right through their land diag-
onally. Now, while it may seem that 
it would be wrong to obstruct enter-
prise, at the Bame time, you can see 
that the farm would be useless al-
most after it was cut and divided up 
into pieces of that kind by three 
railroads, and perhaps more might fol-
low. And furthermore, I have in mind 
another condition over and above that. 
I had a near relative that was near and 
dear to me that was killed by a rail-
road. There was no particular wrong, 
however, at the time, but still she lost 
her life because of the close vicinity of a 
railroad to the domicile—to the house-
she did not contemplate it and did not 
see the disadvantages of having a rail-
road so near to the house. That was a 
little south of American Fork. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). How would it 
do to require the railroad company to 
make compensation for the lives of the 
people before killing them? 
Mr. CREEK. I am speaking about 
this fact that when the matter is left to 
the court, in fact, that is invariably the 
case, they take into consideration the 
benefit that might accrue. Now, all the 
benefit that might accrue would not re-
store that party's life again, and all the 
benefits that might accrue would not 
justify cutting up a person's home or 
domicile or even their farm, and just as 
remarked by my colleague from Utah 
County, when a railroad starts out they 
are going to go, no matter where it is. 
Supposing, now, in Salt Lake City, these 
railroads that run diagonally through 
some valuable blocks for instance—of 
course they have the power to do so, if 
they so desire, but it seems to me that 
there should be some check upon this 
matter, and I believe a greater justice 
would be done if they were required to 
pay for the land before the possession 
was taken. And I know of instances 
where they were kept out of possession 
for a great length of time in our neigh-
borhood. It seems to'me nothing but 
just and right that they should at least 
pay for the land before they took pos-
session of it, therefore, I am in favor of 
the gentleman's substitute from Weber 
County. 
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I am 
in favor of the motion of Mr. Evans, of 
Weber County, to strike out all after 
the word "compensation" in the second 
line. Mr. President and gentlemen, I 
have noticed this fact, that while men 
are opposed to railroads when they 
come to a consideration of this kind, 
every man is anxious enough to have a 
railroad built to his particular village 
or town or locality. You take the peo-
ple of any county in this Territory and 
those people are particularly anxiouB 
that the railroad should be built to their 
town, but after the line is fixed, after 
the survey has been made, after a man 
finds that it is going to cut right 
through his land, then we always find 
a certain class of men who rise and 
want to exact an exorbitant amount. 
There is nothing in this section as left 
by Mr. Evans that does not provide for 
compensation. It leaves to the Legisla-
ture the matter of fixing details as to 
how that compensation shall be ar-
rived at, when it shall be paid and ail 
other matters connected therewith. It 
may be true, and it doubtless is true, 
that sometimes people have been incon-
venienced by railroads, but where one 
man has been inconvenienced in this 
way hundreds of others have been ben-
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efltted. There is a certain amount of 
benefit to any community and to any 
locality to have a railroad brought to 
it, and I think we should not hamper 
railroads, and as stated by the gentle-
man from Salt Lake, Mr. Richards, this 
does not apply to railroads alone. It 
applies to all kinds of enterprises of a 
public nature, and in many cases poor 
people have combined their efforts in 
order that they may accomplish some-
thing, and it is Just as well that they 
should have this matter left to the Leg-
islature who will be able to fix the mat-
ter properly. 
Another thing is this, if we leave it 
to the Legislature and if they find by 
practical experience that the law which 
they enacted does not operate for the 
protection of the people, they can 
change it at any subsequent Legislature. 
But if we fix it here, we are then fixing 
it so that it requires a large vote and a 
great change in public sentiment before 
it can be changed. I am in favor of the 
motion of the gentleman from Weber. 
Mr. HART. Mr. PresidentJ trust that 
the amendment of the gentleman from 
Weber County to the original section 
will not prevail, and while I have little 
choice between the proposition of the 
gentleman from Weber County, Mr. 
Kimball, and the original section, yet I 
do prefer the proposition that the gen-
tleman has offered in preference to sec-
tion 2, for the reason that a proposition 
which he offers is one that has been 
incorporated in the constitution of 
another state and I believe has already 
been adjudicated upon, and for the 
further reason that section 22 is a pro-
duction that was produced right here 
in committee of the v hole by amend-
ments from various quarters of this 
house, and as it now stands it is some-
what uncertain in my opinion and 
poorly constructed. For instance, the 
provision that where private property 
is damaged for public use the compen-
sation is to be determined by a com-
petent tribunal would almost give rise 
to the inference that where private 
property is simply taken for public use 
that a public .tribunal 1B not to pass 
upon it. I think, Mr. President, as that 
section stands, that there is an oppor-
tunity for the misconstruction of the 
true purpose that we want to reach in 
bringing forward this section. I do not 
think that it is injustice to a railroad 
corporation, or to any other corpora-
tion if they are taking private property, 
to require of them that they shall make 
compensation for it. I do not think 
that there can be much of anything in 
the suggestion—and I make the remarks 
with all due deference to the opinion of 
the gentleman from Salt Lake, Mr. 
Richards, when he claims that a pro-
vision which requires compensation to 
be made in advance would Btop the 
business enterprise of the construction 
of a railroad or of some other enter-
prise. I see no reason, Mr. President, 
where a railroad company is being 
taken through a county or district of 
country, why compensation should not 
be made, and the matter of what is 
adequate compensation arrived at with-
in the short period for instance of tfiirty 
days. I do not believe that this would 
be an injustice to any railroad company 
or to any corporation to require that 
they shall pay in advance before they 
take the property. Iowa, Indiana, 
and a number of other states have 
provisions that are equally as strong 
as the provisions that the gentleman 
from Weber brings forward 
Mr. RICHARDS. Did I understand 
you to say the state of Iowa? 
Mr. HART. Yes, sir 
Mr. RICHARDS. The amendment 
tha t I offered is in the language of the 
state of Iowa. 
Mr. HART. I did not know that the 
gentleman had an amendment before 
this house. I thought the one of Mr. 
Evans of Weber was the only one 
pending. 
Mr. RICHARDS. I offered an amend-
ment in the very language of the con-
Goe>s:!c 
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stitution of Iowa and Mr. Evans offered 
as an amendment, striking out all after 
the word compensation, which I ac-
cepted. 
Mr. HART. The constitution of In-
diana on this subject—the portion of 
the section which refers to this matter 
Is, "No man's property shall be taken 
by law without just compensation, nor 
except in case of the state without Just 
compensation first assessed and ten-
dered/' And the provision of Iowa con-
stitution on the same subject 1*, "Private 
property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation first 
being made or secured to be made to 
the owner thereof, as soon as the 
damages shall be assessed by a jury, 
who shall not take Into consideration 
any advantages," etc., being the same 
provision that the gentleman from 
Weber produces; the only difference be-
tween the Iowa constitution and the 
provision which the gentleman from 
Weber offers, is the matter of securing 
compensation to be given, but I take it 
that the provision of the Indiana con-
stitution and of the others Is a better 
provision in this: that it requires the 
money to be paid in advance without 
the danger of a worthless bond, and it 
absolutely does no injustice to any 
man to require him to pay the money 
before he takes the property. 
Mr. CANNON. I want to ask Mr. 
Hart a question. I understood that In 
the case of Indiana it requires the 
money to be tendered, but not paid. 
Mr. HART. Well, that te equal to a 
payment; if the man won't take his 
money when you offer it to him, why 
every good purpose Is subserved. 
Mr. CANNON. He may not agree on 
the price. There is a great difference 
between allowing a man to make a ten-
der of a fair price and making a pay-
ment. 
Mr. HART. Well, it says it must be 
assessed or tendered in advance. 
(The President here called Mr. Ander-
son to the chair.) 
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I have 
been thinking considerably over this 
matter and to me it is a matter of very 
grave concern. The other day in com-
mittee of the whole, I remember that 
some of the constitutions had sections 
in li^e section 28. I became a little con-
cerned that possibly we might do a 
wrong if we did not put the 23d section 
in, but in the consideration of this sec-
tion It seems to me if we tie this up too 
completely and too perfectly it is going 
to strike back in a way that it will not 
only plague us but will do extreme hurt. 
I trust that the spirit of this Conven-
tion is that so far as it is possible we 
will declare in our Constitution what 
we want and that the legislative power 
shall be left with power to do some 
things where questions may arise of the 
character that present themselves here. 
This section to my mind as proposed to 
be amended by Mr. Evans is less liable 
In my judgment so far as I can weigh 
this matter, not being an attorney, 
the safest for all concerned. *'Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensa-
tion." It seems to me that if we were 
to work a month to shape that lan-
guage and to change it and fix it in every 
form possible we could not more per-
fectly shape it so that the Legislature in 
the exercise of Its powers would deal 
rightly and properly with this proposi-
tion, and BO far as I, myself, can weigh 
this language it strikes me that the 
safest thing for us to do In this matter 
Is to adopt the amendment proposed by 
the gentleman from Weber County. We 
may add to it and merely Insert words 
—we may change it to follow the var-
ious ideas and views, but we simply 
strike the ground of legislation when 
we, do it and when this has once become 
law, established in this bill of rights, it 
seems to me that it may place us in a 
position that It will work extreme hard-
ship possibly to men who are In the 
condition that Mr. Richards mentioned, 
unable to meet the responsibilities that 
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might be required of them by wealthy 
people. So far as the wealthy are con-
cerned In these matters, we recognize 
this fact, that they can usually take care 
of themselves, and these wealthy cor-
porations can do this, but In a country 
such as ours where any day of the week 
almost there are occurring little combi-
nations of interest—a half a dozen men 
perhaps to take out a water site or 
enter Into some little business enterprise, 
it would be In the power of a strong 
corporation or of men possessed with 
wealth to so tie them up that It would 
be impossible for them to act and the 
reverse might be the case, so far as that 
Is concerned, for I am not here myself 
upon the basis of trying to curry favor 
with the poor or with the wealthy. 
That Is not the proposition. The propo-
sition Is to secure in this law a law that 
will be sufficiently broad and at the 
same time will protect the rights of all 
men so far as possible, and give them 
their day in court when the Legislature, 
under the enactment under this Consti-
tution as it shall be provided, shall 
determine what are the rights of those 
Individuals. 
It seems to me that any attempt to 
reach the interests of this friend or to 
guard the interests of the other friend 
on some idea that may be engendered 
in our minds as affecting the other in-
terests or this Interest, will simply 
plague us In the future and that it will 
hurt the very ones that in our judgment 
we are seeking to guard. I trust that 
when the vote shall be taken upon this 
proposition and this section shall have 
been passed, It will provide that prop-
erty shall not l>e taken for public use 
without just compensation, and In my 
judgment when that Is done It amply 
covers the ground and our people are in 
less danger than they otherwise would 
be. 
Mr. VAN HORNE. Mr. President I 
am in favor of the amendment of the 
gentleman from Welier It Is exactly 
in the language of the orip^nal draft 
presented to ug by the committee 011 
declaration of rights, and It seems to me 
it covers every possible plea that has 
been made on this subject. It Is ad-
mitted by the gentlemen who oppose 
this amendment that no court has con-
strued such language without statute 
passed by the Legislature In such a way 
that could be a hardship upon persons 
whose property is to be taken. Are we 
to say on the very beginning of the new 
State of Utah that we are afraid of our 
legislatures and the laws that they will 
pass, that we will presume that they 
will pass such laws that the court will 
have to construe them as doing injury 
to the people? It seems to me that we 
can safely trust tfce legislatures of Utah 
to pass only such laws on the question 
of eminent domain as shall be just and 
fair to the citizen. I am opposed as far 
as It Is possible to avoid It, to putting 
legislation details and specialties Into 
the Constitution. I believe that the 
language of the committee on that sec-
tion now incorporated In the amend-
ment of the gentleman from Weber is 
all that is necessary. It Is all that Is 
needed to protect the rights of the citi-
zen against public use, and I am in favor 
of that amendment. 
Mr. THORESON. Mr. President, 1 
am In favor of this section as we have 
received It from the committee of the 
whole, or If amended at all as amended 
by the gentleman from Weber, Mr. Kim-
ball. We are sent here as I take It to 
defend the rights of the citizen of the 
proposed State. We have provided for 
the preservation of certain rights. We 
have now arrived at their property 
rights and I am In favor of providing 
here that before property Is taken from 
the private citizen for any use that he 
be paid a just compensation lor that 
property. You say, "Leave it to the 
Legislature." This Is something that 
we ought to fear when the rights of the 
citizen are set In opposition to those of 
corporations. Why, corporations wield 
a better influence and a greater influ-
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«nce with a smaller body than with the 
present one. I am in favor and I believe 
the citizens of the Territory of Utah de-
mand of us that we guard their inter-
ests, guard their lives, their liberty and 
their property, and that we restrict the 
Legislature upon this very point and 
upon all such points. If I understand 
it right, that is what we are here for, 
and I Bay that a corporation or an in-
•divldual—if I want anyone's property, 
I look upon it as honorable to first ne-
gotiate with the person and pay him a 
just compensation, if we can agree upon 
it, or submit it here to a tribunal that 
will decide it and then tender him his 
money before I take possession, and I 
say, gentlemen, it was our almost unan-
imous conviction upon this subject as 
•expressed in committee of the whole, 
we then concluded, and 1 think we were 
guided by the spirit of our constituency 
when we almost unanimously voted 
that compensation must first be paid. 
Mr. FARR. Mr. President, I have 
yielded the floor to different ones in 
hopes that this subject would come to 
a close without detaining this assem-
blage so long, but I am opposed to this 
amendment. That is, that the Legis-
lature has full power to enact. Of 
course, we want to limit them and tell 
them how far they Bhall go. This sec-
tion seems to be all that is necessary, 
"Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use." And I see in 
the next section it has got private use. 
If that is the wish of the Convention to 
have that in, why not insert it here— 
4
'shall not be taken or damaged for 
public or private use without just com-
pensation?" Who is going to take pri-
vate property for private use without 
first making reparation? The man has 
access to the law, that will be made in 
the Legislature, right straight, and if 
we put that in it does seem to me it 
covers everything without lumbering 
up our constitutional laws with legisla-
tive matters. Why not leave it to the 
Legislature? They have full powers to 
do it. They know what they should 
and should not do, and why not leave it 
there? What is the use of spending our 
time here day after day trying to legis-
late things that the Legislature is paid 
for to make laws, and then if they find 
that it don't work and they want to 
change it at the next session, they can 
change it; but to go to work and tie it 
up here, we put shackles on them and 
they cannot amend it. I do not want 
to find fault with members. I like to 
see them get up and express their views 
and knowledge upon things and give 
vent to their understanding, and so on; 
but to my mind it does not interest me 
at all. I want to see the Constitution 
broad and comprehensive and give the 
people all their rights they need instead 
of depriving them of rights as this sec-
tion will do. I leave it to the Legisla-
ture. 
Mr. HEYBOURNE. Mr. President,, I 
am not here,if I understand my duty ,to 
legislate against railroads or other 
corporations, nor am I here to retard 
any enterprise that may be established 
in our midst for the development of our 
country, yet at the same time, I think 
that we should have due consideration 
for the rights and privileges of the 
people and seek to protect them in 
every way that is possible. I under-
stand that we are living in a country 
that is not thoroughly developed. 
That there will be great improvements 
made in regard to railroading and in 
reclaiming many hundreds of acres of 
land that are now lying waste, and 
that in this latter matter canals and 
reservoirs will of necessity have to be 
constructed that will be of vital im-
portance to the people at large, and I 
have not in my mind at the present 
time any of these enterprises that are 
under way that have not got at least 
some pecuniary object in view, and in 
carrying out their projects they will of ne-
cessity have to cross over tracts of land, 
they will of necessity have secure places 
for reservoirs. In theadventof railroads 
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into the Territorj or coming State, 
rights of way will have to be secured, 
and I think, Mr. Chairman, that the 
section as reported upon in the com-
mittee of the whole is that that is 
necessary, and that that we require. 
That it has a due regard and consider-
ation for those who may invest in this 
enterprise, and it will reasonably recom-
pense and protect those whose prop-
erty may be taken and used for the 
consummation of these purposes that 
I have referred to. Therefore, I am in 
favor of the section as it now stands. 
That we in taking this course do not 
detract from the enterprises that may 
be introduced in the midst of the 
citizens here, and we offer reasonable 
protection to those whose lands may 
be taken for these enterprises. 
Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, I just 
want to say a word in the same line 
of argument used by my colleague from 
Iron County. This section was elabor-
ately discussed in committee of the 
whole. All of the ground was gone 
over and we concluded that as it 
passed that committee it was a 
good section, and I have Been noth-
ing nor heard nothing here this 
morning that would lead me to 
change the opinion in regard to it I 
do not regard it as legislation at all. 
It simply provides that compensation 
must first be made. It removes that 
question from any further discussion. 
It removes it from the province of the 
Legislature, so far as the enactment of 
a law by which it might be made pos-
sible for corporations to take ad-
vantage of individuals by the filing of 
bonds and promised compensation that 
would result in long drawn out law-
suits. I have instances that I recollect 
that have come under my own observa-
tion where railroad companies have 
built grades through private property. 
Compensation for damage done has 
been deferred and shortly after the rail-
road has become insolvent, and the 
man has been left with a grade through 
his farm, and the privilege of levelling 
it down again at his own expense. All 
we ask is that it be plainly defined that 
before private property can be taken 
for public use compensation shall first 
be made, and I believe this section is a 
good one just as it was reported from 
the committee of the whole, and it 
seemsto me that it ought not to be 
changed. 
Mr. HOWARD. Mr. President, I 
think that the section as it stands now 
will give satisfaction, for the reason 
given in argument made here to-day. 
It has been said by some of those who 
are opposed to it or who are in favor 
of some of the amendments, that 
a man would have the power to 
ask a thousand dollars or ten thou-
sand dollars for a piece of property 
that is not perhaps worth over one 
hundred. This does not give him the 
power to do that. The first part of the 
section reads: "Private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just 
compensation first made." Now, that 
does not say the man who owns this 
property, be he a poor man or what-
ever he may be, can demand just what 
he pleases, and the party that wants 
the property has got to pay the price 
that he asks for it. It leaves it with 
the Legislature to determine that. It 
leaves it with the Legislature to pro-
vide how and in what way this prop-
erty might be assessed. And the latter 
part of the section reads, "And no pri-
vate property shall be damaged for 
public use without just compensation 
to be determined by a competent 
tribunal.*' It looks to me, Mr. Chair-
man, as though that was fair. To 
change this section and leave it as 
some of these amendments suggest, it 
would throw this question into the 
courts and perhaps leave it there for 
years to the detriment of the poor man 
that owns this property that might 
want to be taken, whether it be by a 
railroad corporation or any other cor-
poration The amendment offered by 
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Mr. Kimball, from Weber, covers some 
of the ground that this section already 
reported covers,* but it provides that 
the compensation is determined by a 
Jury. If that should prevail, it would 
compel the man to go into the court. 
He may go xo a court to get a jury, he 
cannot arbitrate it, he cannot settle it 
in any other way provided there is any 
trouble over it, only by going into 
court to get a Jury. Some of the gen-
tlemen who want this changed admit 
in their argument that it is good 
enough but they want to leave it to the 
Legislature. Let the Legislature pro-
vide for these things, that this section 
now asks for. This body of men here 
to-day is a larger representation of the 
people of the Territory than you can 
get in the Legislature, and if they con-
clude that this is good enough why let 
them put it in the Constitution. If it 
must go and it is left to the Legislature 
to fix how this shall be done, there is a 
possibility that it might be changed or 
left in a way that corporations would 
have the advantage. It is possible— 
we have heard of such things being 
done—that corporations have in-
fluenced legislation, and if this is such 
an important article to be considered in 
the interests of corporations, they cer-
tainly would take an interest in this 
matter when it came before a Legisla-
ture and would do all that they pos-
sibly could in their own interests to 
keep the Legislature from protecting 
the rights of the citizens, and I think 
that it should be left as this section 
now provides, that this should be deter-
mined by a competent tribunal. Let 
the parties when they disagree in re-
gard to the value of a piece of property 
choose arbitrators if they want to, or 
let the court appoint a commissioner to 
take testimony and to present in the 
case if they want to, or let it go to a 
Jury if they like; let them choose the 
mode, but do not compel them to go 
into court and take a jury. I think we 
should leave it the way it is. 
Mr. LAMBERT. Will you allow me 
a question? You are living in a sparsely 
settled country. There are canals to 
be taken out in your region. Who are 
taking out those canals? 
Mr. HOWARD. The people as a rule 
are taking them out, 
Mr. LAMBERT. Are they not com-
posed, as a rule, of poor men, and would 
not it make it a hardship if they had to 
put up cash for a right of way? 
Mr. HOWARD. I think not. 
Mr. THURMAN. How about the 
other fellow, ie not he a poor man, toot 
Mr. HART. I would ask if a private 
canal company has anything to do 
with this section? This is for public 
purposes, as I understand it. That 
would come under the following section. 
Mr. LAMBERT. You can incorpor-
ate canal companies, can't you? 
Mr. RICHARDS. I desire to ask the 
gentleman from Cache a question. I 
understand you to say that the taking 
out of water might not be a public use 
—the construction of a canal? 
Mr. HART. I say that that probably 
comes under the consideration of the 
succeeding section—section 23, I think it 
is—taking private property for private 
uses. 
Mr. RICHARDS. I ask the gentleman 
from Cache this question. Suppose the 
inhabitants of a town were to construct 
a canal to convey water from any 
source, would not that be a public use? 
Mr. HART. Well, it would probably 
be so construed, but we have not 
considered it as such in framing the 
provision of this Constitution. We 
have public uses and private uses and 
we have placed as private use rights of 
way for the construction of ditches and 
canals. There is a doubt as to what 
the construction would be. 
Mr. RICHARDS. I desire to ask the 
gentleman another question. Is it not 
a fact that this section 28 does not re-
late to that kind of a case? Is it not a 
fact that section 28 does not apply to 
the case that I suggested? Would not the 
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case that I speak of Lie a public use and 
would not the case where an individual 
or two or three individuals desired to 
use the property of another—would not 
that be the kind of a case that Is 
reached by section 23? 
Mr. HAKT. Well, it is possible, 
as I stated, that the case stated by the 
gentleman would come under section 
22, but the restriction given by the gen-
tleman here of three or four men taking 
out a ditch and going a/ross another's 
land is certainly in contemplation of 
section 28. 
Mr. LAMBERT. If they would incor-
porate it would come right under that 
section. 
Mr. BOYER. Mr. President, I only 
arise especially to place myself straight 
before this Convention. The worthy 
gentleman from Utah County in hiB re-
marks referred to his colleague from 
Utah County taking opposite ground 
t© him on the particular question before 
the house a few days ago. Now, when 
this question was up, I remember dis-
tinctly objecting to placing in this Con-
stitution any provision that should 
subject any corporation to consequen-
tial damages, and that those damages 
should first be paid before gaining pos-
session of the property that would be 
necessary for their use. That objection 
having been thoroughly overcome in 
this section, as now provided—in section 
22 upon this subject. 1 then voted fairly 
and squarely for the provision in my 
mind as it now stands, for the amend-
ment; and I hope that every amend-
ment that has been offered to the sub-
stitute, as it has been offered, will not 
prevail, but that section 22 as it now 
reads may stand in this Constitution; 
and I desire, while on my feet, to make 
reference to one particular case that I 
now have in my mind, in furtherance of 
answer to the questionof the gentleman 
from Weber County, and that is whether 
—I think, however, if I mistake not, it 
was Mr. James that asked the question 
—whether within the last fifteen years 
any property had been taken and con-
fiscated without first being paid for by 
any corporation. Now, I have in my 
mind one Bpecial instance that trans 
pired in Utah County 
Mr. JAMES. May I correct the gentle-
man? 
Mr. BOYER. Yes, sir. 
Mr. JAMES. You have not quoted 
my question exactly right. I asked the 
question of Mr. Thurman, did he know 
of an 3 property having been taken 
within the last 15 years where compen-
sation had not been had and owners of 
the property had not been paid for 11 
and to name the property and name 
the corporation. I wanted to ask it 
for information. I wanted to know if 
it had been done under the law which 
provides that property can be taken 
and a bond given for the payment of 
the property. 
Mr. BOYER. I will confine my answer 
to that question or endeavor to. The 
case that 1 have in mind is something 
like this: a corporation desired a cer-
tain piece of property and running in 
front of a gentleman's land in the con-
struction of a railroad, and this in-
dividual gave a certain piece of his land, 
very meager though, in quantity, yet 
to him somewhat valuable—gave to 
this corporation certain property and 
then there was a difference still existing 
between the corporation and the in-
dividual. The private individual wanted 
a thousand dollars for his property 
and the railway declined to make any 
concession and then went away. Be-
fore taking forcible possession of this 
property the railway agent, conversing 
with the individual owner of the prop-
erty' asked him whether he would take 
five hundred dollars for his claim. The 
gentleman replied, "I want one hour to 
consider," inferring to him that he 
would accept of the proposition. In 
the meantime, the same agency came 
before me and desired to enter proceed-
ing by way of obtaining a warrant to 
suppress the individual from doing 
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damage in the event that the company 
should take possession of his property 
forcibly. I declined to issue him a 
warrant on any information or belief of 
that kind, that would so deprive the 
individual of his personal liberty. Con-
sequently—I will not say consequently 
of that action, I will say, right along 
here, before the individual and the 
agent got together, the company itself 
took forcible possession,and with a score 
of men with ax in hand took possession 
of the property of the individual, 
chopped his forest trees, etc., down, held 
possession of it, and it was months 
afterwards before the individual got 
his pay and that was by the award of 
a jury in the district court of the first 
judicial district of the Territory of 
Utah. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, 
I desire to ask the gentleman a ques-
tion. Could not a corporation do the 
same thing under this section as you 
desire to have it passed? 
Mr. BOYER. Certainly not. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is simply 
a lawless act? 
Mr. BOYER. I should say so. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I could go 
upon anybody's property and lawlessly 
do the Bame thing. 
Mr. BOYER. I have no fear of any-
thing of this kind when we have the 
law emphatic. When we provide that 
no property shall be taken without 
compensation first made therefor, then 
we have no question about it, and he 
subjects himself to a double prosecu-
tion. 
Mr. BOWDLE. Mr. President, in all 
these cases there will be individual 
hardships, and it is a well settled prin. 
ciple that the general good must first 
be subserved, even if an individual occa-
sionally does have to suffer. I do not 
believe in taking any man's property 
without just compensation, but as we 
stand here to-day, we cannot see ex-
actly what will be the future in all its 
bearings on this subject, and all that I 
have heard said with reference to this 
section and urging against the amend-
ment of the gentleman from Weber (Mr. 
Evans), is casting a doubt upon the 
wisdom and the ability of the future 
Legislatures to take care of this matter. 
Under the amendment as offered by Mr. 
Evans, and which I most certainly 
favor, the Legislature can take ample 
care of this whole subject. They will" 
have the power to pass any law that 
they may see fit regarding the manner in 
which the compensation shall be made. 
They can say it shall be made before the 
property is taken. They will come up 
from the people; they will be persons 
that will be representing the people, 
and I take it, not the corporations, and 
it seems to rae that we can safely leave 
that to them when we say that no 
property can be taken or damaged 
without just compensation. That 
covers the whole ground. The only dif-
ference is that some say it must be paid 
in advance or there must be a bond 
given. That is all. Those are the only 
things upon which they differ. We 
must not lose sight of the fact that we 
want this Territory developed, and 
while we must take care of our citizens 
and protect them in their property 
rights and in their homes and all that, 
we must not at the same time make 
such a Constitution here as will dis-
courage private enterprise and proper 
development of this country. Now, If 
we put this in as the gentleman has by 
the substitute offered, that fixes it for 
all time to come. The Legislature at its 
first session may do that very name 
thing that is here proposed by thin sub-
stitute. There might come up such a 
circumstance or such a complication of 
circumstances that the Legislature in 
its wisdom would say that it was not 
a good thing. The Legislature could 
remove that, but as we fix it here the 
Legislature can do nothing at all in the 
matter. They are compelled to leave 
it just as we fix it here, and I am in 
favor of leaving it with the Legislature 
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when we say that you shall, not 'take 
the property without you make com-
pensation for it—I believe we can safely 
leave to the Legislature the question of 
how and when that compensation shall 
be made, and I am In favor of the sub-
stitute and leaving it just as that will 
leave it, and then the Legislature can 
adopt the ways and the means which 
will be eminently within their province 
by which this can be done. 
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver)., Mr. Presi-
dent, as I regard it, we are in the inter-
ests of all parties. That is not only 
those that may constitute a corporar 
tion, but individuals and all there is of 
a corporation, they are just simply a 
little larger "Idler" than the individual. 
That is all there is of a corporation. 
They represent a company, and they 
should be treated as an individual, and 
if it is right to take the property of 
individuals for a public purpose, which 
all corporations is more or less regarded 
as a public enterprise, that is instituted 
to what? To develop the country* mak-
ing roads, railroads, to make canals, 
or reservoirs, and all these things, and 
it Is very possible that directly an indi-
vidual may be injured but indirectly he 
may be greatly benefitted by that enter-
prise whatever it may be. He may be 
greatly benefitted and we are here to 
not only look after the individual, but 
we are here to look after what? Men 
who are enterprising, men of means, 
men who are desirous to make perhaps 
money for themselves. That is their 
main object, is to make money for them-
selves, and while they are making 
money for themselves, they are making 
money for the individual. We are 
dependent upon enterprising men, we 
are dependent upon men who will bring 
their means into the country, and we do 
not wish in any wise to hedge up and 
hinder their progress. We have only 
commenced 
Mr. THORESON. Will the gentleman 
allow me a question? 
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). fee, sii 
Mr. THORESON. Would that hedge 
up the way of any citisen or corpora-
tion by juBt saying, "if you want private 
property you must pay for it." 
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). I am not 
arguing against a man's private prop-
erty being properly— 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). That is what 
the section does say, "If you want 
private property you must pay for it." 
Mr. MURDOCK (Beaver). Yes, sir, I 
fully endorse the section and the very 
most I think is necessary is the amend-
ment of Mr. Evans from Weber County. 
We do not want to make the matter so 
stringent that men of enterprise will 
feel discouraged. I believe in giving 
them a chance to bring forward any 
enterprise that will be beneficial to the 
public. I do not believe in being so par-
ticular. While I desire to have individ-
ual interests guarded and well guarded, 
and we are not hereto legislate, gentle-
men, I believe that we are here simply 
to make a boundary that will surround 
and protect future legislation, and we 
do not want to legislate in all these par-
ticulars in a detailed condition, which I 
see are many, if it is in bills that an 
brought here, that to my mind t« a 
great deal too much legislation. 1 
think we should leave these matters. I 
have confidence in the men that will 
represent the people here in the future 
in the Legislature. Let them have as 
much at stake as we will here. 
Mr. HAMMOND. Mr. President 
The PRESIDENT. Mr. Hammond. 
Mr. RICKS. Mr. President, I move 
the previous question. 
Mr. VARIAN. 1 hope thi 
vail, I protest against it. 
Mr. ROBERTS. I sincerely . „,-
will not prevail. 
The PRESIDENT. I had already 
acknowledged Mr. Hammond before 
Mr. Ricks had presented his motion. 
Mr. HAMMOND. I am now getting 
tired. I do not purpose to detain you, 
gentlemen. It has been well said that 
this is a very important question that 
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we are debating. I have had some exper-
ience; I am not a lawyer nor the son of 
a lawyer, but I have my thoughts and 
convictions. A long resident of this 
Territory, saw a great many acts of 
corporations, I am utterly opposed 
and ever have been for any individual 
or corporation of any character jump-
ing down onto my land without my 
having a voice in saying—at least pre-
venting me from having any voice in 
the act. The government which I love, 
our great and good government, with 
Grover Cleveland at the head—I am not 
good on dates, but I think in the year 
1888 there was a commission sent out 
to make a trade with the Southern Ute 
Indians, and it placed them over into 
San Juan County. The secretary, a 
very able gentleman—a clergyman of 
great repute and high standing, was 
the secretary, and they rode about our 
country up and down for four months 
until they expended every last cent of the 
appropriation, I think it was ten thou-
sand dollars, before ever they returned 
a report at all, and finally by paying 
the chiefs over two hundred and fifty 
dollars—five hundred dollars possibly, 
they got their names to a treaty to give 
up their present reservation and placed 
them over in Utah, and this secretary 
wrote to me afterwards asking me to fol-
low with a report or an estimate of the 
settlers' claims—the value of our claims 
there? $80,000 was embodied in the bill to 
pay settlers for their thirteen years of 
hard labor there. In connection with 
some other gentlemen we got together 
and submitted an appraisement of the 
valuation of our claims there exceeding 
$100,000, and afterwards, I went to 
Washington on that rerj thing to keep 
every—inasmuch as we were bound to 
be ousted, and I submitted it to the com-
mittee, that they embody in the bill 
$200,000 more or less, to pay the settlers 
for their labor and claims there. Why 
we had one canal that cost the people 
$96,000, that this high toned commis-
sion was going to allow us $80,000 for 
all our land, land claims and water 
rights. Now, I am opposed to this, 
whether it is the government, or 
whether it is corporations, private or 
municipal, to squat down onto me or 
on my people without giving us a 
chance to have some voice in the bar-
gain—two sides to a bargain, hence, as 
I seconded this amendment, I am 
heartily in favor of it. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I want 
to suggest to my friends on the right 
that they must not be impatient; the 
discussion of these matters is long 
sometimes and some of us have not the 
opportunities of being in at the begin-
ning when the work is done and hear-
ing the discussion and the talk before 
the committee. I muBt talk on this 
question, and particularly the matter 
concerned in the 23rd section. It may 
be that if the views I entertain shall 
meet with consideration at the hands 
of the Convention, the Convention may 
desire to add something more to sec-
tion 22, the one under consideration 
now. In the view I take of it, it does 
not make very much difference whether 
you put in the Constitution a pro-
vision that compensation shall be paid 
for private property taken for public 
uses, because otherwise you could not 
take it. That is a fundamental proposi-
tion. 1 lay it down now. You cannot 
take private property for a public use 
without paying for it. The second 
proposition is you cannot take private 
property for private uses at all, 
whether you put it in your Constitution 
or not. The section as it stands per-
haps is not objectionable unless it be in 
the provision regarding compensation 
to be first made. We went over all 
that ground the other day and I had 
supposed that the Convention had 
finally and definitely concluded upon 
that subject. So far as I am concerned, 
I do not care to discuss that question. 
I find in my mind at least serious 
objection, however, to a portion of 
the amendment, offered I believe 
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by the gentleman from Weber, Mr, 
Kimball, which, as I remember it, ex-
pressly provides that benefits accruing 
to the owner of the condemned prop-
erty shall not be taken into considera-
tion in the award of compensation. I 
do not believe that is right. I have 
Berious doubts whether it could be 
maintained. Perhaps, however, that 
being for the benefit of the citizen, 
might not present a serious question. 
It is wrong in principle anyhow. Under 
such a provision as that any munici-
pality in opening a street in a city, 
increasing the value of the property 
immensely perhaps—for the Bake of 
illustration, we will say, a hundred per 
cent—why should the city be compelled 
to pay the price for the land taken for 
this great public purpose, which not 
only results beneficially for the general 
community at large—the entire city, 
but absolutely puts money into the ad-
joining property owners' pockets? It 
does seem to me that such a proposi-
tion as that ought not to be con-
sidered. It is not alone a question of 
railroads or quasi public corporations. 
This great question of eminent domain 
includes a vast variety of matters. It 
is founded on fundamental principles, 
underlying which, all the time, as it is 
the corner stone, is the right of private 
property. I object, therefore, so far as 
I am concerned, to that amendment, 
and I understand that there is another 
amendment by the gentleman from 
Weber, which, if adopted, would simply 
leave the first two or three lines, I 
believe, in the section. 
The amendment offered by Mr, Evans, 
of Weber, was read. 
Mr. VARIAN. ItWivr *1 I'.'V, brir.g 
made." 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Yes, sir. 
Mr. VARIAN. Now, gentlemen, this 
is a mutter of popular—a matter which 
you will decide without reference to 
law, because it is a matter that can be 
determined. It is a legislative question. 
I do not care, to discuss that. I do 
want, however, to discuss matters aris-
ing particularly because of the 23rd 
section, and while we have not reached 
that yet, still as I said before, it is in-
timately connected with the 22nd sec-
tion, and with the general subject, and 
it may be that you will want to make 
some further declaration as to what 
public uses are. If I shall be able to 
convince you as I have convinced my-
self since this matter was before the 
committee of the whole, that all these 
matters and declarations in the 23rd 
section are absolutely in violation of 
the 14th amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States 
Mr. BUTTON. Would not you pre-
fer to take a recess and argue that 
afterwards? 
Mr. VARIAN. I very much perfer it. 
I wanted to bring a volume or two 
here to illustrate. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. Parian, I 
desire to ask you a question. Would 
it not be better for you to make your 
argument on that subject when we 
reach it? We are simply determining 
this question now of taking private 
property for public uses. 
Mr. VARIAN. Well, I have concluded 
to pitch right in here. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I thought that 
might confuse both sections. I simply 
want to settle this question about 
what we will do, that is all. I Bimply 
want to ask you whether it would not 
be a better order if you had no amend-
ment of this section to dispose of sec-
tion 22 and then go to section 23. 
Mr. VARIAN. No, Mr. President, the 
\ iew I take of it, the two sections 
should properly be considered together. 
And as I am advised, it might be nec-
essary to present some additional 
amendment to section 22, which cannot 
be done without considering at least by 
way of argument the effect of section 
23. 
The Convention then took a'"recess 
until 2 o'clock p. m. . -
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AFTERNOON SESSION. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I do not desire to make a speech 
at this time on my substitute for the 
section that is now under consideration 
and all the amendments, but I do desire 
this, as the gentleman from Salt Lake, 
Mr. Varian, has the floor, to correct 
him in one thing that he mentioned this 
morning. If you read my substitute, 
it obviates the objection the gentleman 
raised. I do not refer in that clause of 
the substitute that refers to the non-
allowance of benefits to public corpora-
tions, and I simply want to call his 
attention to that matter now, so that 
he may not be misled in his argument 
that he may make hereafter in regard 
to that matter, and if the gentleman 
reads it himself, he will observe that it 
is restricted to private corporations, 
not municipal corporations, or any 
other public corporations. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, as inti-
mated before the recess, the matters em-
braced in section 23 are intimately con-
nected with the subject matter of sec-
tion 22. It is impossible, I think, to 
intelligently discuss the whole underly-
ing principle which ought to be and 
must be, I submit to you gentlemen 
here, discussed and understood before 
you can afford to pasB on either one of 
these propositions. The matter has 
been considered, Mr. President, at some 
length in the committee of the whole. 
I believed then as I believe now that in 
the general desire to accomplish an 
admitted good for the people of the new 
State and to enable them to develop its 
resources, the great fundamental prin-
ciple underlying this entire doctrine was 
overlooked, or if not, was passed by 
too hastily. It was assumed that the 
people in this Constitutional Convention 
assembled had complete and full power 
to even disturb vested rights, to invade 
the sanctity of the private ownership of 
property, and by a simple ipse dixit>—a 
declaration to make of a private use a 
public use. Now, I submit in the begin-
ning that that theory is in violation of 
the principles upon which this govern-
ment rests; it is the right of eminent 
domain which we are considering and 
it is well to pause a moment and under-
stand and admit what that right and 
power are. It is the power inherent in 
all governments, whether you declare it 
in your Constitution or leave it out, 
based upon the principle that the public 
safety is the supreme law, predicated 
upon a law of necessity, which author-
izes the entire people, through the 
medium of their common government,, 
to reach out the hand and take the 
property of the citizen, because it is 
deemed necessary to advance the inter-
ests of the state. That is the principle 
underlying it. It is well expressed by 
the supreme court of the United States, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Field, in 
the following language: 
The power to take private property 
for public uses, generally termed the 
right of eminent domain, belongs to 
every independent government. It is 
an incident of sovereignty, and as said 
in Boone versus Pattereon, requires no 
constitutional recognition. The pro-
vision found in the fifth amendment to 
the federal Constitution, and in the 
constitutions of the several states, for just compensation for the property 
taken, is merely a limitation upon the 
use of the power. 
I start with the proposition then (and 
it is necessary to consider this from the 
beginning in order to emphasize and 
point what J have hereafter to say), 
that it needs no declaration in your 
Constitution to give your Legislature 
this right. While I will admit it i* usual 
to put it there, and it is found in all the 
constitutions (generally for the purpose, 
however, of connecting with the declar-
ation a limitation upon the right rela-
tive to the compensation to be awarded 
when it is exercised), if it is not there 
it still exists in the government of the 
new State as a very part and parcel of 
its sovereignty. You will observe that 
you do not have to declare the fact, 
which of necessity belongs to. all gov-
Digitized by G o O g l e 
642 BILL OF 
ernmentB, that you may take private 
property for a public use. If you. do 
declare it, it is well to limit it and mod-
ify it to this extent, that when you shall 
do so, you must make just compensa-
tion. It is possible we may admit, in 
the absence, at least without reference 
now to the higher law as embodied in 
the 14th amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, that the whole 
people in constitutional convention 
assembled might enact an act of confis-
cation, which that would be, if com-
pensation was not provided; but we 
must also admit that it would be so 
foreign to the entire temper and dispo-
sition of the people of the United States, 
that it could not be maintained; public 
sentiment would not maintain it, and 
it is at least questionable at this time 
whether the courts themselves would 
not override the constitutional enact-
ment, upon the ground that it was con-
trary to ail natural law and an inter-
ference with vested rights that the 
present age would not permit. 
The second proposition, intimately 
connected with this, is that after all, 
under your system, however you may 
curtail it and modify and express it, in 
your constitutional enactment, it is 
upon the judiciary that the weight of 
determination must fall. It is impos-
sible for any American citizen to admit 
for a moment that the power lies any-
where in a legislative body or in the 
people themselves to invade the owner-
ship of private property to the extent 
that it may be taken, even for public 
use, without compensation; and of 
course that principle is always accom-
panied with another, that in cases of 
supreme necessity, when the laws are 
silent, when the necessities of the entire 
community require different action, it is 
not applicable then. As an instance it 
may be illustrated in cases of great 
conflagrations and calamities of that 
kind, which have overtaken and may 
be expected to overtake large commu-
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nities; when a great fire eats away 
arid destroys cities, the government 
may step in on such occasions and may 
arrest the progress of the flames, or 
attempt to do so, by destroying private 
property, for the benefit of the public, 
and unless there is a statute providing 
for it, no man is liable and no compen-
sation need be made. But, we are not 
dealing with exceptional cases, we are 
dealing with the general principles, and 
I want to start right from that broad 
foundation, upon which I stand, and I 
affirm these propositions: First, that 
the right of eminent domain is inherent 
in all governments and needs no con-
stitutional declaration. Second, that 
since the 14th amendment to this Con-
stitution of the United States was 
adopted, no state can take the prop-
erty of the citizen for a public use, 
* withomt compensation. Third, that no 
state can take the property of the pri-
vate citizen for a private use under any 
circumstances or at all. Fourth, that 
of necessity the question of public use 
must finally be determined by the 
courts; that the simple declaration In 
your Constitution or in your legisla-
tive enactment, that the use of prop-
erty in a certain way shall be deemed a 
public use, Is not conclusive. This is a 
question of necessity, a shifting one. 
It depends upon different conditions, 
different circumstances, which overtake 
a people from time to time as the years 
go by. What iray be deemed a public 
use in one locality, under certain con-
ditions, with certain circumstances sur-
rounding its people, would absolutely 
be deemed the contrary under other cir-
cumstances and under other conditions. 
So that, of necessity it is' always a 
question, as we term it, not alone of 
law, but a mixed question of law and 
facts. The facts must be ascertained, 
the conditions must be ascertained, the 
circumstances must be known, the pur-
pose and objects of the proposed act 
must be defined, in order that the ap-
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plication of the law to such conditions 
and such facts may be made by the 
proper tribunal. 
Now, if I have made no mistake in 
that (and I don't think I have), we 
are ready to proceed in the line to the 
consideration of the nest matter. We 
start, you will remember, with the 
understanding that we do not need, 
first, to make any declaration in this 
Constitution at all. We are all agreed 
that as it is usual and customary to do 
so, it is better to do so, perhaps. We 
are all agreed that we ought, in ac-
cordance with the times, with our sys-
tem of government and with our ideas 
concerning the protection of property 
and the rights of the individual, also 
couple with the declaration a limita-
tion, as it were, upon its exercise; that 
is to say whether we shall put in there 
that it shall not be taken without just 
compensation. Bujt, now we are con-
fronted with the further proposition, 
that we are to declare here, not alone 
what shall be public uses, if we come 
to condemn, but we have gone further 
and attempted to say what shall be 
deemed private uses; or, to reverse the 
statement, we have attempted to de-
clare that in certain classes of cases, 
for some certain specific purposes, the 
property of the private citizen may be 
transferred from him to his neighbor; 
and I undertake to Bay that it is in 
violation of the Constitution of the 
United States, as it is in violation of 
all our understanding of vested rights; 
that it is confiscation and spoliation, 
in principle and in fact, as it is presented 
here in this declaration. Why, the very 
object of this government, the primary 
object, is the protection of life, liberty, 
and property. Property stands upon the 
same plane with life and liberty. It is 
simply, as it is affirmed in the opening 
statement of this very preamble and 
declaration of rights, a reaffirmation 
of what has always been in this country 
and in England since the days of magna 
charta. The language is changed a 
RIGHTS. 643 
little, but the equivalent is there, and 
the meaning is the same, and none 
other. 
It will take no longer, as a part of 
what I have to say, to incorporate in 
my language what is said by others 
upon this question, law writers, and 
judges. Following this, of course, it is 
apparent, Mr. President, that a consti-
tution is not beginning of government. 
Government existed before the consti-
tution. It is not the origin of all these 
rights, or privileges if you please, that 
are affirmed and declared in it and are 
protected in it or by it. Mr. Cooiey 
says: 
In considering state constitutions, 
we must not commit the mistake of 
supposing that because individual 
rights are guarded and protected by 
them, they must also be considered as 
owing their origin to them. These in-
struments measure the power of the 
rulers, but they do not measure the 
rights of the government. What is a 
constitution and what are its objects? 
It is easier to tell what it is not than 
what it is. It is not the beginning of a 
community nor the origin of private 
rights. It is not the fountain of law 
nor the incipient state of government. 
It is not the cause, but consequence, of 
personal and political freedom. It 
grants no rights to the people, but is 
the creature of their power, the instru-
ment of their convenience, designed for 
their protection, In the acknowledg-
ment of the rights and powers which 
they possessed before the constitution 
was made. It IB but the framework of 
the political government and necessarily 
based upon the pre-existing conditions 
of laws, rights, habits, and modes of 
thought. There is nothing primitive in 
it. It is all derived from a known 
source. It pre-supposes an organized 
society, law, order, property, personal 
freedom and love of political liberty, 
and enough of cultivated intelligence to 
know how to jruard it against the en-
croachments of tyranny. 
Mr. Justice Storey, speaking for the 
supreme court of the United States, 
has said: 
Fundamental maxims of a free gov-
ernment seem to require that the rights 
of personal liberty and private prop-
erty should be held Bacred. The lan-
guage of magna charta in substance 
was. no freeman shall be taken or im-
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prisoned or be disseized of his freehold, 
etc., but by the lawful judgment of his 
peers or by the law of the land. 
By "the law of the land" is meant the 
due course and process of law, and that 
has been affirmed of necessity, as it ap-
pears by the people of the United States 
when they adopted the 14th amend-
ment to the Constitution. The 5th 
amendment covered the same subjects 
but it only applied to Congress. It 
never applied to the state, and it was 
not until in latter days that the people 
of the United States engrafted upon 
their organic law that prohibition re-
affirming the prohibition of the 5th 
amendment, making it specially appli-
cable to the states in this Union. Let 
me read you the language particularly 
applicable here: 
No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law, nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the law. 
That provision until of late has been 
substantially the constitutional provis-
ion of every state; but within the last 
few years, notably in those states that 
have just come into the Union, Wash-
ington, Wyoming, and one or two 
others, they have gone outside of that 
and have adopted provisions which we 
find embraced within section 22 of this 
proposed preamble and declaration of 
rights for the State of Utah. The con-
struction and interpretation of this lan-
guage of this constitutional guaranty 
everywhere have been that you cannot, 
under it, take private property for pri-
vate uses. By no specious reasoning 
has it ever been permitted to any legis-
lature to evade that guaranty where it 
existed, and the fact that that is so is 
made apparent by the action of these 
constitutional conventions of late years. 
They have sought to limit, to modify, 
to get outride of this constitutional 
guaranty, and they have overlooked the 
fact that behind that and above that 
there is a higher law, organic as to 
these states, before which they must all 
yield and to which they must all con-
cede—the Constitution of the United 
States, as amended by the 14th amend-
ment. To that extent the construction 
put upon those several constitutions by 
the state courts is applicable to this 
same language which is incorporated in 
the Constitution of the United States. 
It ail turns and depends upon what 
"due process of law" means—what "the 
law of the land" means, to be inter-
preted and understood in the light of the 
general principles affecting human lib-
erty and the rights of property in this 
American republic. A great judge, 
speaking for the supreme court of New 
York, says: 
Due process of law undoubtedly 
means, in the due course of legal pro-
ceedings according to those rules and 
forms which have been established for 
the protection of private right. 
And Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking 
for the supreme court of the United 
States, at an early day, said: 
As to the words from magna charta, 
incorporated in the constitution of 
Maryland, after volumes spoken and 
written with a view to their exposition, 
the good sense of mankind has at length 
settled down to this, that they were 
intended to secure the individuals from 
the arbitrary exercise of the power of 
government, unrestrained by the estab-
lished principles of private rights and 
distributive Justice. 
And Mr. Justice Sharswood, one of 
those great justices of the olden time, 
whose judicial life and history shine out 
and emblazon the pages of jurispru-
dence in this country, speaking for the 
supreme court of Pennsylvania, said: 
If, however, an act of assembly, 
whether general or special, public or 
private, operates retrospectively to 
take what is by existing law the prop-
erty of one man and without his con-
sent transfer it to another, with or 
without compensation, it is in violation 
of that clause in the bill of rights which 
declares that no man can be deprived 
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of his life, liberty, or property, unless 
by the judgment of his peers, or the 
law of the land. By "the law of the 
land" Is meant, not the arbitrary edict 
of any body of men, not an act of as-
sembly, though it may have all the out-
ward forms of a law, but due process 
of law by which either what one alleges 
to be his property is adjudged not to be 
his, or It is forfeited upon his conviction 
by his peers of some crime for which by 
law it was subject to forfeiture, when 
the crime was committed. If this be 
not so, every restriction upon legisla-
tive authority would be a vain formula 
of words without life or force. For 
what more can the citizen suffer than to 
be taken, imprisoned, disseized of Tils 
•freehold, etc., and be deprived of his 
property without crime? 
And in the sinking fund cases, Chief 
Justice Waite, speaking for the supreme 
•court of the United States, uses this 
language: 
The United States cannot any more 
than a state interfere with private 
rights except for legitimate govern-
mental purposes. 
And Mr. Cooley again says: 
But there is no rule or principle 
known to our system under which pri-
vate property can be taken from one 
person and transferred to another for 
the private use and benefit of such 
other person, whether by general law 
or by special enactment. The purpose 
must be public, and must have reference 
to the needs or conveniences of the pub-
lic. No reason of general public policy 
will be sufficient, it seems, to validate 
such transfers when they operate upon 
•existing vested rights. 
And again, the supreme court of New 
York on the same subject Bay: 
An act to take private property for a 
purpose not of a public nature, is to 
take the property of one and give it or 
»sell it, which is the same thing in prin-
•ciple, to another, would be a gross 
abuse and fraudulent attack upon pri-
vate rights. 
Justice Nelson, in that great state, 
•sitting as a member of the court, when 
It was a great court, as it is now, per-
haps: 
It is now considered a universal and 
fundamental proposition in every weD 
regulated and properly administered 
government, whether embodied in con-
stitutional form or not, that private 
property cannot be taken for strictly 
private purposes at all. 
Mr. CREER. I would like to ask the 
gentleman a question upon this point 
he is on now. May I ask you if that 
authority, taken from New York—why 
is it then it makes no provision by gen-
eral laws that private property may be 
taken for private use? 
Mr. VARIAN. I am endeavoring to 
show and I have shown that the same 
principle which has hitherto prevailed 
in all the constitutions has latterly been 
incorporated in the same language in 
the Constitution of the United States. 
I am simply alluding now to the inter-
pretation of that language by the state 
courts as to what it means in the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
In a late case in the supreme court of 
the United States, Mr. Justice Brown, 
Bpeaklng for the court, says: 
Upon the other hand, it is probably 
true that it is beyond the competency 
of the state to appropriate to itself the 
property of individuals for the sole pur-
pose of creating a water power to be 
leased for manufacturing purposes. 
This would be a case of taking the 
property of one man for the benefit of 
another, which is not a constitutional 
exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
Mr. THURMAN. I would like to ask 
the gentleman one question. I am in 
sympathy with the gentleman on this 
question entirely, but the query in my 
mind is, how this discussion comes in to 
this matter as it now stands? 
Mr. VARIAN. If the gentleman will 
allow me to lay my premises, I will 
endeavor to explain how it affects the 
discussion of section 22. I was going 
to read from the report of the supreme 
court of Illinois. I will not pause for 
that purpose now. 
Now, these are the premises that I 
lay down, If I can make myself clear. 
Of course it is a lawyer's argument, 
and it would not be justified in a body 
like this under other circumstances It 
is a matter, as I shall suggest hereafter, 
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which ought to be discussed and set-
tled or at least investigated by a com-
mittee. The proper committee here 
would be the committee on federal re-
lations, but without any disrespect to 
those gentlemen, they are not lawyers, 
any of them, I believe, and this is 
peculiarly a matter for lawyers, as 
is quite apparent. Now, these are 
the premises: First, that it does not 
lie within the power of our government, 
whether acting through the medium of 
a constitutional convention or a legis-
lature, to take the property of one 
citizen and transfer it to another for a 
purely private use. It is within the 
power of our government, in cases of 
public necessity, and those alone, to 
take the private property of the citizen, 
for the uses of the state, making Just 
compensation therefor. We are also 
bound by the prohibition in the 
Constitution of the United States just 
as if we were sitting here as a legislative 
body, with an organic law of the state 
controlling and restricting our action 
with the same kind of language. Do 
not the gentlemen see that? Do not 
you see that it is Just exactly the same, 
since this amendment has been adopted, 
ag if we were dealing with a like clause 
in a state constitution and were attempt-
ing to make an enactment under that? 
Imagine for a moment now that this was 
a Legislature of the State, and that this 
provision of the 14th amendment were 
incorporated in the organic law of the 
State, and we were discussing a bill 
containing these clauses. Take that 
section 23 for instance; the entire ques-
tion would be disposed of as this must 
be disposed of. We would look into the 
history and origin of the power. We 
would review it in the light of the inter-
pretation and construction it had re-
ceived. We would review it in the light 
of the necessities of our people with ref-
erence to these constitutional guaran-
ties and protection, and it would be de-
termined there, as it must be deter-
mined here, that you have no power, 
no right, to enact anything at all like 
that in section 23. 
Now, gentlemen say, what has that 
got to do with section 22? This: If the 
Convention shall be convinced that the 
position I am taking is the correct one, 
and that it will not do to leave section 
28 in there, they may consider, "well, 
there are some matters embraced within 
section 23 that might properly be 
declared public uses.'* That being so, 
we want to consider section 22, which 
refers to public uses, is dealing with that 
subject in the light of these objections 
to section 23, and ascertain, if we can, 
whether we can take some of these uses 
for which we have attempted to provide 
in section 23 and make them public uses, 
and incorporate them by amendment 
or addenda to section 22. It is in that 
sense and in that view €hat I consider 
that the argument came on properly at 
this time, because in dealing simply 
with these amendments to section 22 in 
the light of Just the matters embraced 
within it, the Convention not having 
its attention called to what was coming 
in section 23, might undertake some 
action that subsequently they would 
want to reform and do away with. 
Now, I submit, that we ought to take 
those two sections, pass this question 
for the time; the matter ought to be 
recommitted with directions to the com-
mittee to investigate and ascertain 
whether my position here is correct. I 
do not ask nor expect that my ipse 
dixit shall be taken by this Convention 
on a question of this kind. It is a mat-
ter of grave and serious moment. It 
involves one of the gravest question* 
of constitutional law. It is not only 
serious as to the effect upon the people 
if the Constitution should be adopted, 
but you will observe it is serious in this 
particular if my position is correct: The 
President of the United States cannot, 
under his oath and under the Enabling 
Act, issue his proclamation upon this 
Constitution. The language of that act 
is, "if it shall appear that the provisions. 
April 3. BILL OF RIGHTS. 647 
of this act have been complied with, 
that the Constitution as adopted Is 
republican In form and is not in conflict 
with the provisions of the Constitution 
of the United States, then the President 
shall issue his proclamation, whereupon 
the State shall be admitted/* 
So, it is in no captious spirit, and cer-
tainly with no desire to be heard or to 
make a speech (I have plenty of oppor-
tunities to do that in my profession), 
that I have intruded myself at this 
length at this time. It is in the honest 
and earnest and sincere conviction that 
you are Just now upon the eve of mak-
ing a great mistake—and I will go fur-
ther and say that I do not believe that 
many of these matters that are con-
tained in section 28 could be made pub-
lic uses simply by a declaration; and 
after all, in every case the matter will 
have to be determined by the court; 
that under the guise of a public legis-
lative declaration, whether in the Con-
stitution, or in the act of the Legisla-
ture, a fact is not changed, a merely 
private use is not made a public use 
Bimply because a body of men repre-
senting a government say so. I think 
that ought to be borne in mind. This 
matter ought to be investigated pa-
tiently and learnedly, if you please, 
through the medium of a committee, so 
that we will feel assured that no mis-
take has been made. 
One word with reference to the sug-
gestion made by my friend Mr. Kimball. 
It seems that I misapprehended the full 
force of his amendment, and to that ex-
tent I withdraw whatever criticism I 
made upon it. I should still be opposed 
to it upon principle, however, because I 
believe that the best and safest way to 
do is simply to put in your declaration 
in this Constitution, that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use, 
except upon just compensation, and 
put in, "first made" if you please, 
and "taken or damaged/'and let it rest 
there. There is no necessity of lumber-
ing up the Constitution with enact-
ments as to what shall be public uses, 
because whatever you say or do, as I 
said before, in the end you can do no 
more than the Legislature could do, and 
can no more take my property and turn 
it over to my neighbor, compelling me 
to sell it for a purely private use, by 
constitutional enactment, than you can 
do it by legislative enactment. And I 
say right here that I would hesitate 
long before I would vote to establish 
over me as a citizen of this republic such 
a law. I believe that it invades the 
sacred private rights of the citizen. I 
believe that it is wrong in principle. It 
is in violation of all that we have under-
stood concerning those things, and it 
ought not to be, particularly in this Ter-
ritory. It ought not to go into this 
Constitution if it is going to Jeopardize 
it in the least; and I simply ask you 
gentlemen to consider now—I have 
made no further suggestion. I am not 
going to make any motion—whether it 
would be better to take those two sec-
tions on that subject and send them to 
a committee and let the committee re-
port back after investigation what 
ought to be done in the matter, 
Mr. HOWARD. I would like to ask 
Mr. Varian a question. You say you 
have no objections to the words u pri-
vate property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation 
first made?" 
Mr. VARIAN. I said I had none. 
Mr. HOWARD. What particular ob-
jection have you got to the balance of 
that section 22? 
Mr. VARIAN. None in particular— 
none at all. I am not criticising section 
22. I concurred in the judgment of the 
committee the other day. I am not at-
tacking that section, but I think the 
two sections are intimately connected, 
because it is one subject matter and 
ought to be disposed of all at once. 
Mr. HOWARD. Section 28 is not be-
fore the house, as I understand. I am 
opposed to that. 
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I do not 
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know—I would like to Inquire In re-
gard to the length of time a person can 
occupy In the debate. 
The PRESIDENT. There Is no rule 
In the Convention. The rule applies 
only to committee of the whole. 
Mr. FARR. I do not wish the Con-
vention to understand by this question 
that I got up for a long speech or any-
thing of the kind. I do not consider If 
I was to stand here for two hours and 
quote you authorities It would have 
any bearing on this matter. The ques-
tion lsf what Is right In the matter? 
That Is what I want to know, and 
what law shall we enact for the benefit 
of the future State of Utah? (Reads 
sections 22 and 23.) Well, now, I main-
tain that the Legislature should provide 
for all of these. I have a substitute 
that I wish to Introduce here that em-
braces only a few words, that I think 
will cover the ground of these two sec-
tions. 
The PRESIDENT. We already have 
an amendment to section 22, and a sub-
stitute, and another section, until we 
take some action on this, would not be 
proper. 
Mr. FARR. Mr. President, I just 
want to say this, for the consideration 
of the house, while I may vote for the 
other, this section I think will cover the 
ground of both of these sections and 
nearly all the amendments. There are 
a great deal of exceptions taken to this 
section, and they have provided a num-
ber of amendments to cover that. I 
will Introduce this and read it and I 
will leave it for the gentlemen of this 
Convention to act upon it as they see 
fit: 
Section 22. The Legislature shall pro-
vide by law that private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public or 
private use without due compensation 
first being made. 
I have noticed all the amendments of 
the different gentlemen. I have tried to 
embody their amendments as much as 
possible in this so that It will provide 
for all the objections, and the section 
will cover the whole In as few words as 
possible. I do not believe In going Into 
all this xigamarole of law when It can 
be simmered down to a few words. I 
maintain the Legislature can provide 
all that there Is In this twenty-third 
section. This Convention requires the 
Legislature by this section to provide a 
law for the whole of this. And I leave 
this section now for your consideration. 
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, in view 
of the remarks of the gentleman from 
Salt Lake, who has just taken his seat, 
and in view of the great Importance of 
this subject as to the constitutional 
of our own Constitution, when it is to 
be adopted, I move that sections 22 and 
28 be referred to the committee on Judi-
ciary with Instructions to make an 
early report on that subject. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I second 
that motion. 
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I hope 
that motion will not prevall,for the rea-
son that I believe that this house Is pre-
pared to settle this question now. We 
have been making slow progress and I 
think It Is time that we mcLde haste as 
much as we possibly can. Not that I 
am in favor of endangering any great 
principle by hurrying it over, but after 
the doctrines that have been expounded 
here on this question, and the rights 
and powers that the Legislature will 
have In the matter, and the questions 
also apparently having been pretty 
well Bettled In the courts of the coun-
try, I think we can at this time adopt 
section 22, and when we come to con-
sider section 23, either declare such uses 
public uses as will grant the privileges 
desired to be obtained,or else leave It to 
the Legislature and to the future action 
of the courts, and we can do so with 
perfect safety. For one, I am prepared 
to accept section 22 as it is, and then 
accept such amendments of section 23 
as will remove the objections that are 
made here to it. 
Mr. CANNON. I would like to ask 
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Mr. Varian a question with his consent. 
I was not present at the time the gen-
tleman commenced his addrees,but from 
what he said in closing I understand 
that section 22 as proposed to be 
amended by Mr. Evans, of Weber, pro-
vides that private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use with-
out compensation, and that that would 
be agreeable to Mr. Varian? 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I would 
say that I have no objections to section 
22, but as coupled with section 23 there 
is a still further question in connection 
with it. If section 22 is allowed to 
stand, the question of public uses is 
complicated by the declaration in 28 as 
to private uses. For instance, take 
mining and milling, etc., that might be 
construed as a prohibition against the 
Legislature declaring certain public uses 
under section 22. If it were certain that 
28 were to be stricken out, I would not 
have a word to say about section 22, 
and am perfectly content with it. 
Mr. CANNON. Then, I am opposed 
to the motion to commit and in favor 
of voting on this motion as proposed. 
One reason is that section 10 was re-
ferred to the committee on Judiciary sev-
eral days ago. 
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I will 
withdraw my motion with the consent 
of the gentleman from Weber. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I withdraw 
my second. I now call for the previous 
question on the adoption of my substi-
tute for section 22. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, 
I want to make a remark or two before 
this vote is taken, and I will be very 
brief. 
The PRESIDENT. The previous 
question is called for. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I submit 
the previous question has precedence of 
everything else. I object to the gentle-
man's speaking until that is disposed 
of. 
The previous question was ordered. 
The PRESIDENT. The question is 
on the substitute offered by Mr. Kim-
ball of Weber. 
The substitute was rejected. 
The PRESIDENT. The question now 
recurs on the amendment of Mr. Evans. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Pres-
ident, I raise the point of order, the 
previous question was on my substitute 
and not on any other matter foreign to 
that section. I now move to amend 
section 
Mr. IVINS. Mr. President, I rise to a 
point of order. 
Mr. PRESIDENT. The gentleman 
was right; he moved the previous ques-
tion simply on his substitute. 
Mr. IVINS. The gentleman from 
Weber (Mr. Evans) moved an amend-
ment to this section. The other gentle-
man from Weber moved as an amend-
ment to the motion a substitute. If a 
substitute is in the form of an amend-
ment, the question having been put 
upon the substitute of the gentleman 
from Weber, my point of order is that 
the question should immediately follow 
upon the amendment of the other 
gentleman from Weber, without any 
further debate. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, my motion was the previous ques-
tion on my own substitute. I believe 
that the chair sustained me in that. 
The PRESIDENT. I sustained i t 
The question before the house is the 
amendment. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). I move now 
to amend section 22 by adding at the 
end thereof the following words: 
That among other public uses shall 
be included all lands for necessary res-
ervoirs, drains, flumes, sewers, con-
duits, pipes, or ditches, for agricultural, 
mining, milling, domestic, or sanitary 
purposes. 
Mr. EVANS (WeW). Mr. President, 
I arise to a point of order, that the 
amendment of the gentleman from 
Weber is not in order. I made a mo-
tion to strike out a portion of that sec-
tion and now he offers to amend by 
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adding to the section. We have got 
to pass certainly upon that matter 
which I moved to strike out. I have no 
particular objection to the gentleman'B 
amendment, but I think we ought first 
to dispose of that matter which I 
moved to strike out. The amendment 
which he otters is in the right direction, 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber.) Mr. Presi-
dent, I maintain that the gentleman's 
point of order is not well taken. It is 
true that he moved to strike out certain 
matter of that section, but my motion 
was to add to the end of that section, 
and it does not make any difference 
whether his amendment is adopted or 
whether it is not adopted. My amend-
ment comes to the end of the section. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). We can not tell 
what the end of the section is now un-
til we vote 
The PRESIDENT. The chair is of 
opinion that the gentleman's amend-
ment is in order. 
Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, would 
an amendment to the amendment be in 
order? 
The PRESIDENT. No; there are two 
now before the house. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, I 
move the previous question on the 
whole subject. 
Seconded. 
The PRESIDENT. The question now 
recurs upon the proposed amendment 
of Mr. Kimball. 
The amendment was rejected. 
The PRESIDENT. The question is 
now on the adoption of this section as 
proposed by Mr. Evans and accepted 
by Mr. Richards. 
Mr. HILL. Mr. President, it is some 
time since we heard that amendment 
read. I would like to have it read before 
the motion is put. 
The PRESIDENT. It is the strik-
ing out after the word compensation-
all after that in that section be stricken 
out. 
Mr. VARIAN. Did Mr. Evans accept 
the suggestion over here, "or dam 
aged?" 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I did. 
The amendment was agreed to. 
The PRESIDENT. Section 23 is now 
before the house. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, I move 
to strike it out. 
Seconded. 
Mr. KEARNS. Mr. President, I have 
a substitute here which I wish to otter 
for section 28, taken from the 14th sec* 
tion of the Idaho declaration of rights, 
which I think will cover all the grounds. 
Mr. VARIAN. I move to strike out 
section 28. 
The motion was agreed to. 
The PRESIDENT. The secretary will 
read section 24. 
Sections 24, 25, 26 were read. 
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I move 
to strike out "a" as it stands in the 
second line of. section 26, so that it will 
read, "all laws of general nature shall 
have uniform operation." 
The motion was agreed to. 
Mr. VANHORNE. Mr. President, I 
move to strike out section 26. 
The motion was rejected. 
Sections 28 and 29 were read and 
passed without amendment. 
Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I now 
move the previous question on the 
whole proposition. 
The previous question was ordered. 
Mr. CREER. Mr. President, I move 
that we adopt the preamble as reported 
by the committee. 
The motion was agreed to. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. President, before 
action is taken 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I rise to a point of order. The 
previous question was sustained. 
The PRESIDENT. Only on the bill 
of rights, not on the preamble. 
Mr. WELLS. Before flnqJ action is 
taken on this article I move that the 
subject matter 
The PRESIDENT. The previous ques-
tion has been called for and ordered. 
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Mr. EVANS (Weber.) Mr. President, 
I move that he have unanimous consent 
to speak. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). 1 object; I 
ask for the roll call. 
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I arise to 
a point of order on the previous ques-
tion on this whole article. Thus far we 
have arrived at no understanding as to 
the scope of Rule 28 
The PRESIDENT. It is stricken out. 
Mr. HART. Rule 23. (Reads rule 23). 
Now, Mr. President, while I think a 
great many of us would not wish the 
ayes and noes—I think in fact we can 
unanimously agree that the ayes and 
noes should not be called separately on 
all these propositions, because I believe 
that there are a number of these prop-
ositions that there is no objection to 
from any person. But there are cer-
tain propositions here that individuals 
should have the right to record their 
votes on. There are some of these that 
I shall vote on separately. My objec-
tion is to the previous question on this 
whole proposition that it is out of order 
under these rules, and that the proper 
thing to do is to vote on each proposi-
tion separately. 
The PRESIDENT. Not each section 
—upon the proposition—this is a prop-
osition. The ayes and noes are called 
for under it. 
Mr. HART. I think each one of these 
sections is a proposition. 
The PRESIDENT. Oh, no, it is a bill 
of rights. 
Mr. HART. And a man would have 
a right to cast a vote against any one 
section. 
The roll was then called on the adop-
tion of the article entitled declaration 
of rights, and the vote was as follows: 
AYES—96. 
Allen Lemmon 
Anderson. Lewis 
Barnes Lowe, Wm. 
Bowdle Lowe, Peter 
Boyer Low, Cache 
Brandley Lund 
Button 
Buys 
Call 
Cannon 
Chides ter 
Christiansen 
Clark 
Coray 
Corfman 
Creer 
Cunningham 
Gushing 
Driver 
Eichnor 
Eldredge 
Emery 
Engberg 
Evans, Weber 
Fair 
Francis 
Gibbs 
Goodwin 
Green 
Hammond 
Hart 
Haynes 
Halliday 
Hill 
Howard 
Hughes 
Hyde 
Ivins 
James 
Johnson 
Joiley 
Kearns 
Kerr 
Maeser 
Mackintosh 
Maloney 
Maughan 
McFarland 
Miller 
Morris 
Moritz 
Murdock, Beaver 
Murdock, Wasatch 
Murdock, Summit 
Page 
Partridge 
Peters 
Peterson, Grand 
Peterson, Sanpete 
Pierce 
Preston 
Raleigh 
Richards 
Ricks 
Roberts 
Robertson 
Robinson, Kane 
Robison, Wayne 
Ryan 
Shurtliff 
Spencer 
Squires 
Stover 
Symons 
Thompson 
Thoreeon 
Thome 
Thurman 
Van Home 
Varian 
Kimball, Salt Lake Warrum 
Kimball, Weber 
Lambert 
Larsen, L. 
Larsen, C. P. 
Wells 
Whitney 
Williams 
Mr. President. 
NOES—0. 
During the roll call members ex-
plained their votes as follows: 
Mr. BOYER. Mr. President, I do not 
fully comprehend what we are voting 
on. 
The PRESIDENT. You are voting 
on the bill of rights as amended. 
Google 
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Mr. ROBERTS. Does that include 
the preamble also? 
The PRESIDENT. No, sir; the pre-
amble will be voted on separately after-
wards. 
Mr. ROBERTS. And the ayes and 
nays called on the preamble? 
The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir. 
Mr. BOYER. No further amendment 
-allowed? 
Mr. ROBERTS. Gentlemen, I would 
•ask 
The PRESIDENT. Gentlemen, you 
•a/e out of order. The roll is being 
called. 
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I wish to 
explain my vote. I can only vote yea, in 
favor of this proposition as awhole,but 
there are certain propositions in there 
that I wish to have my vote recorded 
on, and as I understood it I had the 
right under rule 23 to so record my 
Tote. I, therefore, desire to be recorded 
against the striking out of section 23 
and also against the adoption of sec-
tion 10 as it no w stands. 
The PRESIDENT. The gentleman 
•has the privilege. 
Mr. VARIAN. Let it go on the 
minutes. 
Mr. PARTRIDGE. Mr. President, I 
am willing to vote yea on that article, 
except the amendment of section 22. I 
wish to be recorded as voting no on 
Xhat section. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, I 
would like to vote upon the entire bill 
with the exception of the amendment 
to section 22, by which the Convention 
refused to require that private property 
should not be taken for public use with-
out JuBt compensation first made. As 
to that, I wish to be recorded in the 
negative. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. President, in 
voting yea upon the article, I simply 
want to state that I have not changed 
my views as to the article. I am op-
posed to section 10, but I don't under-
stand we can vote yea on one proposi-
tion and nay on another. Therefore, I 
vote yeft upon the whole proposition. 
Mr. FARR. Put down the same 
for me. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. President, I vote 
yea and announce now that I do so 
with the understanding that I may 
move hereafter to reconsider, because I 
am not satisfied to strike otlt section 23. 
The PRESIDENT. The chair declares 
article 1, the declaration of rights, 
adopted. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I have stood up here so long in 
order to get the floor, because I knew 
that if I kept my seat my friend Dave 
Evans, from Weber County, would be 
ahead of me, and therefore I stood up 
while you were announcing the vote. I 
now move, Mr. President, that the 
preamble 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President. 
I arise to a point of order, that when 
a vote is commenced on any proposi-
tion it must be continued. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). The presi-
dent had announced the vote. 
The PRESIDENT. The gentleman is 
not in order. I "had announced the vote 
on the bill of rights. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). The question 
is on the adoption of the preamble; 
nothing is in order but the roll call on 
that. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). That has 
been added to the many times my 
friend has been wrong. He is wrong 
again. My motion now is that we 
adopt the preamble as reported by the 
committee and as it appears in the 
printed article, and that we take the 
vote on it now. I move the previous 
question now. 
The previous question was ordered. 
The roll was then called on the ques-
tion to adopt the preamble, with the fol-
lowing result: 
AYES—95. 
Allen Lemmon 
Anderson Lewis 
Barnes Lowe, Wm. 
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Boyer 
Brandley 
Bowdle 
Button 
Buys 
Call 
Cannon 
Chidester 
Christiansen 
Clark 
Coray 
Corfman 
Creer 
Cunningham 
Cushing 
Driver 
Eichnor 
Eldredge 
Emery 
Engberg 
Evans, Weber 
Fair 
Francis 
Glbbs 
Goodwin 
Green 
Hammond 
Hart 
Haynes 
Halliday 
Hill 
Howard 
Hughes 
Hyde 
lvins 
James 
Johnson 
Jolley 
Kearns 
Kerr 
Lowe, Peter 
Low, Cache 
Lund 
Maeser 
Mackintosh 
Maloney 
McFarland 
Miller 
Morris 
Moritz 
Murdock, Beaver 
Murdock, Wasatch 
Murdock, Summit 
Page 
Partridge 
Peters 
Peterson, Grand 
Peterson, Sanpete 
Pierce 
Preston 
Raleigh 
Richards 
Ricks 
Roberts 
Robertson 
Robinson, Kane 
Robison, Wayne 
Sharp 
Shurtliff 
Spencer 
Squires 
Stover 
Symons 
Thompson 
Thoreson 
Thome 
Thurman 
Van Home 
Varian 
Warrum 
Kimball, Salt Lake Wells 
Kimball, Weber Whitney 
Lambert Williams 
Larsen, L. Mr. President. 
Larsen, C. P. 
NOES—0. 
The PRESIDENT. The chair an-
nounces the preamble carried. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I move that we now resolve pur-
selves into committee of the whole to 
consider the next article on the cal-
endar. 
The motion was agreed to and the-
Convention then resolved itself into 
committee of the whole with Mr. Pierce 
in the chair. 
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE. 
The article entitled executive was, 
then considered. 
Section 1 was read as follows: 
Section 1. The executive department 
shall consist of governor, secretary of 
state, state auditor, state treasurer, 
attorney general, and superintendent of 
public instruction, each of whom shall 
bold his office for four years, beginning 
on the first Monday of January next 
after his election, except that the terms, 
of office of those who were elected at 
the first election shall begin when the 
State shall be admitted into the Union, 
and shall end on the first Monday in 
January, in the fourth year thereafter. 
The officers of the executive depart-
ment shall, during their terms of office, 
reside at the seat of government, where 
they shall keep the public records, 
books, and papers. They shall perform 
such duties as arepresc,ibed by this Con-
stitution and as may be prescribed by 
law. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I move to amend section 1 by in-
serting after the word "governor," in 
line 2, .the word "lieutenant-governor." 
Mr. THURMAN. I second the mo-
tion. 
Mr. KEARNS. Mr. President, I hope 
that the motion will not prevail. It is 
unnecessary to create any extra offices. 
We find thirteen states in the Union 
that are all of more consequence and 
with more inhabitants and wealthier 
states than this that get along without 
a lieutenant governor. Again, I find 
that the secretary of state is an office 
that contains a good deal more respon-
sibility. We are apt to get a better 
representative in the office for secretary 
of state than w* are for lieutenant 
governor, and I do not Bee why at this 
time we should create that office. I 
think it is unnecessary. I hope this mo-
tion will not prevail. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Chair-
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UDOT, 154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007) ("Ivers 2") and UDOT v. hers, 218 P3d 583 (Utah 2009) 
("Ivers IF9), the case was finally tried before a jury on April 13-15, 2010. The issue tried was 
Defendants' claim for severance damages resulting from the obstruction constructed by UDOT, 
The non-unanimous jury awarded no severance damages to Defendants based upon loss of view. 
Defendants submit the trial court erred in permitting UDOT's appraiser to rely upon irrelevant 
hearsay opinions of persons without any expertise in opining Defendants' loss of view had no 
value. Additionally, the parties' attempts to craft jury instructions that reflected the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling in Ivers I and Ivers II resulted in jmy instructions that were 
contradictory, inconsistent, and that did not reflect the ruling in and the intent of Ivers L 
Defendants were awarded no damages in a case where they clearly suffered some level of 
2 
damages. Moreover, a case is currently pending before the Utah Supreme Court where the Ivers I 
ruling may be re-evaluated on the issue of awarding severance damages for visibility and view. 
See Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT> Case No. 20081054-3C. 
ISSUE: Did the trial court en: hi permitting UDOTs appraiser to rely upon non-expert 
hearsay opinions to base his expert opinion that Defendants suffered absolmely no damage for 
loss of view? 
a. Determinative Law: Utah Rules of Evidence. Rules 702, 703 and 801; 
Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 
1328, 1332 (Utah 1979); United States v. Cormier, 468 F,3d 63, 73 (1st Or. 
2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-511(2); Article \ §22, CONSTITUTION OF TEE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
b. Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling 
for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See abo 
Kauris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v, Smith, 
793 P.2d 407,409 (Utah App. 1990). 
ISSUE: Was the jury appropriately instructed concerning severance damages for loss of 
view based upon the mandate in Ivers £ and prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court? 
a. Determinative Law: Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya} 526 P.2d 926 
(Utah 1974); Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78B-6-511 (2); Article I, §22, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
3 
b. Standard of Review: 
ISSUE: Are the distinctions between view and visibility a jury is required to draw under 
Ivers I appropriate and consistent with a property owner's rights to receive fair compensation for 
severance damages? 
a. Determinative Law: Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Utah 
State Road Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-
6-511 (2); Article I, §22, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
b. Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's 
ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 P3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also 
Kauris v. Utah Highway Patrol 70 P3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v. Smith, 
793 PJ2d 407, 409 (Utah. App. 1990). On appeal, a jury's verdict is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and the evidences presented and every 
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence is accorded the same degree 
of deference, See, e.g., Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 
110 (UTApp. 1997). 
ISSUE: Was a jury verdict awarding no severance damages to Defendants for loss of 
view justified and supported by the evidence, the applicable law and the Utah Supreme Court's 
mandate in Ivers I. ? 
a. DetermiaativeLaw: Ivers v. UDOT, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007); Utah 
State Road Comm 'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-
6-511(2); Article I, §22, CONSTLTUTEON OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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b. Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's 
ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 73 ?.3d 362, 364 (Utah 2003). See also 
Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72, 75 (Utah 2003); and Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). On appeal, a jury's verdict is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and the evidences presented and every 
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence is accorded the same degree 
of deference. See, e.g., Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 
110 (UT App. 1997). 
8. Factual Summary: A portion of Defendants' commercial real property was taken by 
UDOT for an improvement that resulted in the elimination of fhe intersection at U.S. 89 and 
Shepard Lane in Farmfngton, Utah. The property taken from Defendants was essential to 
UDOT's project Appellants' remnant property, which is being used for an Arby's restaurant, is 
located on the northwest corner of the intersection that was eliminated. The reconfiguration of 
the intersection entailed elevating U.S. 89 going north and south over Shepard Lane, which 
travels east and west Appellant's property is immediately west of Hie elevated U.S. 89. The 
elevated U.S. 89 now blocks the view from Appellants' property to the east. 
The issue of severance damages was first presented to the Utah Court of Appeals, which 
ruled Defendants had no severance damages claim for loss of access or loss of view. Thereafter, 
the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled specifically that Defendants had a 
protectable easement of view from their property. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the trial court for a factual determination of whether the property taken from Defendants was 
5 
essential to VDOTs project UDOT stipulated that its taking was essential to the project. This 
left the amount of damages as the only issue for trial. However, UDOT then filed a motion in 
limine, which the trial court construed as a motion to amend, asserting a theory that had never 
been presented previously. Ultimately, the trial court agreed that pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-34-11(2), UDOT could freely amend its complaint to modify its taking at any time. This 
allowed UDOT to excise from its condemnation complaint its claim for taking of Defendants' 
appurtenant rights. By allowing UDOT to take this position, the trial court's ruling foreclosed 
Defendants' severance damages claim for loss of view. 
The trial court's ruling was appealed and the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
in its Ivers U decision in 2009. The case was then tried before a jury on April 13-15, 2010. The 
non-unanimous jury awarded absolutely no severance damages for Defendants' loss of view, 
despite the Utah Supreme Court's mandate that Defendants' could recover severance damages 
for loss of view. The ruling in Ivers /proved to create confusion in the trial court and prevented 
Defendants from receiving their constitutionally protected rights of just compensation. 
9. Opposition to Assignment: Tins appeal is subject to transfer by the Utah Supreme 
Court to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-3-102(4), However, 
Defendants oppose such a transfer on the basis that the Utah Supreme Court is already familiar 
with this case, having heard two previous appeals. Additionally, this matter involves important 
constitutional law issues that should be reserved for decision by the Utah Supreme Court for 
clarification. The Utah Supreme Court is also potentially reconsidering its ruling in Ivers Jin the 
Admiral Beverage Corporations v, UDOT case currently pending before the court. Finally, hi the 
interests of consistency and in having is prior rulings respected, the Utah Supreme Court should 
6 
retain this appeal, 
10. Related Appeals. Ivers v. UDOT, 128 P.3d 74 (Utah App. 2005); Ivers v. UDOT, 
154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007), UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009). Similar issues related to 
the distinction between loss of view and loss of visibility are pending before the Utah Supreme 
Court in. Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT, Case No. 20081054-SC. 
11. Attachments: The following documents are attached hereto: 
a. The verdict and judgment from which this appeal is taken, dated May 11, 
2010. 
b. Notice of Appeal date June 14,2010. 
c. Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike 
Portions of I Philip Cook's Appraisal Report dated April 12,2010. Portic 
DATED this A day of My, 2010. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
XNALD J. WINDER 
JOHN W.HOLT 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Randy Hunter 
OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 5ft Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
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ATTACHMENT 
"A" 
RANDY S. HUNTER (#9084) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, 5fh Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
randvhtmter@Ptah.gov 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DETRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF' 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaints 
VS. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHER3KE G. HAVAS; 
P and"F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); and 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants, i 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael Allphin 
This matter came on fox trial on April 13,14 and 15,2010, before the Honorable Michael. 
Allphin of this Court. Plaintiff was represented by Randy 3, Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, 
and Defendants were represented by Donald Winder and John Holt A jury of eight persons was 
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action, "Witnesses on behalf of both parties were sworn 
and testified. After hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the Court, 
the jury retired to consider their verdict, taking with them the exhibits which had been offered 
and received and the mitten instructions of the Court. ThB jmy subsequently returned to the 
Court and, through its foreman, said that they find a verdict for the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendants as follows: 
[We] find in favor of the Plaintiff and againstthe Defendants in 
that the Defendants have failed to prove damages for diipirmation 
of fair market value for loss of view and we decline to award the 
Defendants a monetary sum, 
TOTAL AWARD $0,00 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premise aforesaid, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DEOREED that James Ivers and P and F Food Sendees, 
Defendants herein* recover from the State of Utah, no forfhsr monies; a stipulation and award of 
$104950Q having been stipulated to and ordered on the 6th day of June, 2003, leaving a. balance of 
$0.00 owed by the State of Utah by Defendants, 
DATED this ,2010, 
U ' BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL 
District 
Approved as to Form: 
DWAUD WINDER 
JOMHOLT 
ArataW for Defendants 
3ndgm£3E DB Verdict 
Dayis Comity Civil Ko, C20700665 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that atrue and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON 
VERDICT was mailed, postage prepaid, this j3/gf day of April, 2010, to: 
Donald J. "Winder 
WINDER & COUNSEL, PrC. 
175 West 20D Booth, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2568 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2658 
John W.Holt 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C, 
175 "West 200 South,' Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 ' 
SaltLakc City, Utah 84110-2668 
/s/-StaseyEL Calvm 
Secretary 
Judgment or. "Verdict 
DRVIS County Civil No. 020700665 
Page-3 
ATTACHMENT 
Donald 7. Winder #3519 
Join W.Holt #5720 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
175 West 200 South #4000 
P.O. Box 2568 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOE. DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
IVERS; ICATHERINE G. EAVAS, 
P ami F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant); 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 020700665 
Judge Michael G. Aflphrn 
Notice is hereby giyen that Defendants, hy and through counsel, hereby appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Coral the jmy yerdict and final judgment entered by the trial court in this matter 
onMayl752010, 
?i I dav DATED this M__ y of June, 2010, 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
DOKALD J, WINDER 
JOHN W.HOLT 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cernfy thai on this .|_j_ day of June, 2010, I caused to he saved a trae and 
correct copy of the foregoing Defendanf s Notice of Appeal to the following via U.S Mail, 
postage prepaid: 
Randy Hunter 
Office of Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fif& Floor 
P.O.Box 140857 
Salt Lake Ciiy, UT 84114-0857 
ATTACHMENT 
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IN THE SECOND DKTRICT COURT,' DAVIS COUNTY 
•STATE 0F..1EJTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERME G. HAVAS; P 
AND F FOOD SERVICES CTenant); and 
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
RULING ANDORDER 'ON 
.DEFENDANTS' MOTION 3K LIMINE' 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION! 
OF J, PHILIP COOK'S APPRAISAL 
REPORT 
Case No. 020700665 
Judge Michael G. Alipidn 
Tms matter is before l ie Court on "Sue defendants' motion in limine and motion to strike 
•portions of J. Philip-Cook's appraisal report The Coral lias reviewed the moving and responding 
papers, as well as, their supporting documentation. Having considered all of foe arguments, 
determined that a hearing is unnecessary for its ruling and order, being folly advised in the 
premises, and for the reasons set forth herein, the Coral DENIES the defendants' motion. 
RULING 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the basis upon which expert testimony 
may be admitted. See Utah R, Evid 702(a) ("{Tjf scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand-the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."), Pursuant to Rule 702: 
"Scientific, technical, ..or other specialized knowledge may serve as the 
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or 
methods mdeiiying;:&^^ meet a threshold showing that they (i) 
are reliable (H) are-'based upon .sufficient facts or data, and (id) hare been 
reliably app!is3'to'fbe facts nf the "base.*9 
Utah R. Evid 702(b). Moreover, "#>* "%eshold showing >.. is salisfied if ^ principles or 
methods on wkiclrsT&h knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facets or data snd ifoe 
manner of t£eir application to the^facts of the case, are generally accepted by fee-Televmt expert 
community." Utah B., Bvid. 702(b)* -!Whe?i detaining whgthei to allow experttestimony^ the 
trial court must consider if there is. a sufficient foundation for the expert's opinion. The trial conr 
is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the 
absence of a clear showing of abuse, [appellate courts] will not reverse." Young v, Fire Ins. 
Exck> 20O8 UT App 114, f21,182 P3d 911 (Internal quotations omitted); see also Lamb v. 
Bangart, 525 P 2d 602,607-08 (Utah 1974) 
Bfere, the defendants have .argued that portions of J. Philip Cook's appraisal report should 
be stricken as nnrehable and lacking adequate foundation, Specifically, the defendants argue that 
Mr. Cook's appraisal report relies upon inadmissible hearsay of lay persons, which is irrelevant 
and not of the type that an appraiser reasonably relies upon when forming an expert opinion, 
Additionally, the defendants assert that Mr Cook's appraisal report fails to disclose the 
underlying methodology that he used to form his expert opinion. 
"With regard to an expert's reliance upon statements of lay witnesses, Rule 703 of the 
Utah Pules of Evidence states: 
"The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particulai field m forming opinions oi inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence " 
2 
UtahB, Bvid 703 J?urfherrihe Utah Supreme Court has -addressed the expanding scope- of Rule 
703, holding thai 
ccTheiraditioiml rule has limited aa expert's opinion testimony to personal 
experience and observation. . More recently, [Rule] 703 has broadened 
the biisirfor an expert's testimony bytepsbifymg .thai facts or data used m 
forming an opinion or inference need not be admissible if of the type, 
reasonably relied on -by experts h r f e witness' field of expertise. 
[Accordingly,] once the expert is qualified by the court, the witness may 
base Ms opinion on reports, writings-or: observations not in evidence which 
were made or complied by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably 
reHed.upon.hy experts in thai particular field. The opposing party may 
challenge the 'suitability or reliability of such materials on cross-
examination, but such challenge goes ta the weight to be given the. 
Patey v. Lamhart, 1999 UT 31,130, 977 P.2d 1193 (quoting State v. Clayton,* 646 ?2d 723,725-
26 (Utah 1982)) (Emphasis added). 
la the instant matter, Mr. Cook's appraisal report indicates that he hiterviewed several 
marketparticipants, ie . certain managers of Tarious neighboring businesses and similar fast food 
restaurants, regarding me enecxs mac a loss of view would have on their businesses. See J. Philip 
Cook Appraisal Report, pg. 51-54. Mr. Cook then incorporated the information he obtained from 
these market participant interviews in oanjuaction with data research and case studies to 
establish his expert opinion on the value of the loss of view from the defendants9 property, See 
Id, at pg. 54-55. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cook's market participant interviews were 
not the sole basis for his expert opinion Further, the use of market participant interviews by real 
estate appraisers to aid in the formation of their opinion as to a property's value is an acceptable 
method in the field of real estate appraisal Cf Appraisal Institute, Tlie Appraisal of Heal Estate, 
pg 272 (13 th ed. 2008) (discussing the use of market participant interviews for the appraisal of 
3 
•special-purpose buildings'); see-ako AppraisaitotLmt^ pg: 2-7-1 
[12H<'* ecL2Wl iftiisrassingTaw^^ ot market'detaiition and -
..•Giv.snf.float.ieaI 'estate ant)raisersTi5aaiifliketnartiorD*aiil interviews .when defas^rime 
property vafa,es,..and-that the scope/of'Rate 703 'is .'expanding to permit e:xpe0/testhnon}t based;,, 
upon observations^m'evidenckwMc&'Were made fey others, and becanse&e subject, 
interviews ifrfofrins^^ Coot's expert opiniGm,4h§ Corat«Sndi 
thatMr. uooiC;.s appraisal reponnspropsrunasricuies /.uz ana /u.3 oitne uta&.Knies ot 
Evidence. Moreover/ Mr. Cook's appraisal report discusses Ms qualifications tp provide, gn 
sxpert opinion in this matter, which the defendants havB not challenged, and addresses the data, 
analysis and basis for formation of an opinion as to the value of the subject property's "before 
condition" and "after condition." See generally, J. Philip Cook Appraisal Report Mr. Coot also 
niffidsnfly identifies the market participants that were interviewed for his appraisal report, why 
hese market participants were chosen for interview, and the information that was obtained.from 
he interviews and how this information was implemented into the formation of his expert 
jpmion. See generally Id. The Court, therefore, finds that sufficient foundation exists for the 
expert opinion rendered in Mr. Cook's appraisal report In this matter, the defendants-' challenge 
o Mr. Cook's appraisal report are more appropriately the subject of cross-examination and -
ebutial expert opinion, rather than the instant motion in limine and motion to strike. Cf, 
The Court notes that while its specific citation to The Appraisal of IRsal Estate Thirteenth Edition discusses fee use 
if market participant interviews in the appraisal of "special-purpose*' buildings, the concept of using such interviews 
o aid in the determination of property values is, nevertheless, sufficiently analogous to the issues presented in the 
ostant matter to dra'w an inference that market participant raterviews are a method reasonably relied npon by experts 
cifhe field of real estate appraisal, 
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•MMLING .CERTEEICA-CE.. 
I certiiyAatl.smt^i£Bmaiimdfl3:e,IJ.$. Postal Service, a true .and correct cqp5c.-pfvftje 
foregoing RULING' AND ORDER ON DEPENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
•MOTION TO SIRngB.PQR2g0N5- OF J,-?HTT ,"PP; GQQEg AJPPRAJSAL REPORT 
postage pi&paid, to &e Allowing on&is dat&r • .^•j frqp • 
Donald J. Winde 
Jehu W. Bolt 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C, 
175 West 200 South, Suite-4000.'. 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Laie City, Utah 84110-2668 
iholt(3foyiDfl fvrfrrm .r-nm 
Randy S. Haste 
[JTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFHCB 
160 East'300 Soufh, 5 a floor 
P.O.Box 140857 
3altLake City, Utah B4114-0857 
•aadyb.mitsr@utali. gov 
« T > " ;B 
WINDER & COUNSEL PC 
Donald J. Winder 
John W.Holt 
IinetteB.Hutton,lLN. 
Jerald V.Hale* 
Lance P. Sorenson** 
Michelle Winder McDonald**** 
Of Counsel 
Robert K. Rotifedex, MJD. 
*Also admitted in Arizona 
**Also admitted in California 
^Admitted in California only 
Pat EL Bartholomew, Cleric of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Ldce City, UT 84114 
Re: Utah Department of Transportation v. Ivers, et al ("Arby's) 
Case No. 20100511 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Our law firm represents Arby's in the above-reference condemnation case. Randy Hunter of the 
Office of the Attorney Genera! represents UDOT. 
This letter is presented in response to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court on June 29, 
2010. For the reasons set forth herein and in the Docketing Statement Arby's previously filed, 
this appeal should be retained by the Utah Supreme Court. 
This is the latest appeal of a case with which the Utah Supreme Court is already well familiar. 
The Utah Supreme Court previously granted Arby's petition for writ of certiorari following a 
ruling by the Utah Court of Appeal precluding Arby's from seeking recovery for severance 
damages. The Utah Supreme Court, upon certiorari, held there was a compensable loss for loss 
of view and Arby's could pursue that claim for severance damages at trial. Ivers v. Utah Dept of 
Tramp.9154 P3d 802 (Utah 2007). The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination 
of whether the taking of Arby's property was essential to the construction project that causes the 
loss of view. If it was found the talcing was essential to the project, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled Arby's would be awarded appropriate damages for its lost view. 
Following remand, UDOT stipulated the talcing was essential to its project, leaving the amount of 
severance damages as the only issue for trial. However, UDOT then filed a motion in limine 
seeking to preclude Arby's severance damages claim on a basis never before raised in the long 
history of this case. UDOT claimed that access deeds executed by Arby's predecessors in 
interest could be interpreted to mean that any and all appurtenant rights, including the right of 
view, had been relinquished years before Arby's acquired its interest in the property, in short, 
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UDOT argued Arby's held no appurtenant rights that could be damaged by the subject 
construction project. The trial court construed UDOT's motion in limine as an untimely motion 
for leave to amend its pleadings. However, while the trial court was troubled by UDOT's 
request and its use of "shifting theories", it ultimately determined that pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78B-6-511(2), UDOT had an unfettered right in condemnation cases ro amend its 
pleadings at any time after the date of the service of summons, Based upon that ruling, Arby's 
was once again been precluded from recovering its severance damages, which damages were 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Ivers L Arby's appealed the trial court's ruling. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court. See UDOT v. Ivers, 218 P.3d 583 (Utah 2009) 
(Ivers H) and required the case be tried pursuant to the mandate of Ivers Z, 
Following Ivers II, the issue of severance damages was finally tried before a jury in a three-day 
trial in April 2010. The parties and the trial court found it a challenge to instruct the jury and 
conduct the trial based upon the holding of Ivers I with respect to the scope of severance 
damages, Arby's claims that in attempting to abide by Ivers I9 the jury was confused by 
inconsistent, contradictory and inconsistent instructions. The jury was asked to make 
distinctions between view and visibility related to severance damages that were impossible to 
make. Despite the fact Arby's had suffered a loss of view, and some damage would have to be 
associated with that loss. The non-unanimous jury awarded no damages to Arby's, The issue of 
severance damages in a case like the present case remains less than clear, despite the Ivers I 
ruling. 
This matter involves important constitutional law issues that should be reserved for decision by 
the Utah Supreme Court for clarification. The Supreme Court has previously heard two appeals 
in this case. The present appeal concerns issues that occurred at trial related to attempts to 
follow the Court's prior rulings. The Utah Supreme Court is also potentially reconsidering its 
ruling in Ivers I in Admiral Beverage Corporation v. UDOT, Case No. 20081Q54-sc5 which is 
currently pending before this Court Finally, in the interests of consistency and in having is prior 
rulings respected, the Utah Supreme Court should retain this appeal, 
Thank: you for your kind attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours^ 
JdtoW.Eolt 
COM P^ andy Hunter 
